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ABSTRACT 
Hitherto, the dynamics of social change in Fiji has 
been understood primarily in racial terms. This study seeks 
to provide an alternative interpretation. An historical-
materialist analysis of the origins and development of 
capitalism in Fiji, it advances the argument that the 
strongest tendential forces which shaped the trajectory of 
change were class forces and, more importantly, class con-
flict came to assume a racial form. Because the state is 
integral to the capital relation, it serves as the thread 
around which my analysis of the class struggle in Fiji 
revolves. The theoretical principles which inform the study 
are derived from the Marxist theory of the state. But there 
are various strands to that theory, and that which has been 
most influential in the recent attempts to come to grips 
with the state in Third World societies is the Poulantzian 
one. But Poulantzas's theory is flawed, and this study 
seeks not only to demonstrate this but also to suggest an 
alternative. Hopefully, therefore, the theoretical argu-
ments developed here will represent a modest contribution 
to a more adequate understanding of the state and the 
dynamics of capitalist development not only in Fiji but in 
capitalist Third World societies generally. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The collective legacy of bourgeois historiography and 
social science with respect to Fiji is a series of accounts 
of historical and social change which are couched essen-
tially in racial terms. Effectively, therefore, these 
accounts have served to reinforce the dominantly ideology of 
race, an ideology which holds that the problems confronting 
Fiji, both now and in the past, have to do very largely with 
racial tensions. That racial conflicts in Fiji are real and 
important cannot be disputed. To argue, however, that they 
are the root causes of Fiji's problems is fundamentally 
mistaken. For the central argument of this thesis is that 
those causes lie in underlying class contradictions, contra-
dictions which are masked by racial conflict. In Fiji, in 
other words, class conflicts - the strongest tendential 
forces which determine the country's trajectory of change -
predominantly assume a racial form. The purpose of this 
study is to show how and why that is the case, and that 
involves explaining the historical origins and the evolution 
of the structure and contradictions of contemporary Fiji. 
The study might therefore be seen as a modest contribution 
towards the urgent need of constituting an alternative and 
more adequate history of Fiji. 
1. AN OVERVIEW 
As I show in Part One, the origins of capitalism in 
Fiji are to be found in the early years of the twentieth 
century. Prior to the penetration of capitalist relations, 
the country was caught up in a process of structural trans-
formation which had its origins in the inherent contradic-
tions of tributary production relations. The inability, 
however, of the contending class forces at that time to 
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bring the internal struggles to a determinate conclusion, 
facilitated the penetration of capitalism into the country. 
Over a period of some sixty years after initial penetration, 
capitalist relations increasingly took root, but the absence 
of a capitalist state delayed the transition to capitalist 
dominance. And only with the establishment of the colonial 
state in 1874 could that transition be completed. That 
process of capitalist transformation is the subject of Part 
One. But it is the subsequent history of capitalist develop-
ment in Fiji that the study is primarily concerned with, and 
because it is crucial, the role of the state serves as the 
thread around which my analysis of the class struggle in 
Fiji revolves. 
Part Two opens with a discussion of the structure and 
contradictions of the colonial economy, and the central 
theme there is how the principal axis of conflict, that 
between capital and labour, carne to assume a predominantly 
racial form. Capital was white; labour black, but more 
importantly, predominantly Indian. But the system of capit-
alist relations also aggravated a regional cleavage which 
historically divided the Fijians. That, however, is dis-
cussed later on. 
In order to cope with underlying class tensions, 
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forms of class organisation had to be developed, and in 
Chapters V and VI the major forms of bourgeois and working 
class organisation are examined. Although the bourgeois 
forms of organisation were fairly effective as a means of 
class containment, when the relative balance of class forces 
changed, class relations had to be restructured. The two 
major strands in the process of restructuring are explained 
in Chapters VII and VIII. The peasant and worker struggles 
of the early colonial period gave expression to the intensity 
of capitalist exploitation, but the strike of 1959, which 
coincided with the completion of the process of restructuring 
that laid the foundations of the neocolonial economy, was an 
historic event. Shaking the capitalist system to its very 
roots, the strike was followed soon afterwards by another 
one staged by sugar-cane farmers. Those historic struggles, 
and the state's violent suppression of them, are discussed in 
Chapter IX. Part Three is concerned with the neocolonial 
period. The structure and contradictions of the neocolonial 
economy are explained in Chapter X, and in Chapter XI, I 
discuss the major dimensions of the class struggle in neo-
colonial Fiji. 
2. METHOD AND EVIDENCE 
The broad theoretical principles which guide this 
study are outlined in the next chapter, but when the need 
arises in subsequent chapters, various particular theoretical 
issues are discussed. As the foregoing discussion suggests, 
however, I follow the Marxist method, and this is evident in 
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the way that the study is broadly structured. For although 
I try as much as possible to maintain historical continuity, 
the study is essentially thematic, and the themes are dic-
tated by the Marxian dialectic: structure-contradiction-
organisation-struggle-containment-restructuring and so on. 
The single most important weakness of bourgeois 
writers on Fiji is their inability to get beneath surface 
appearances and thereby to uncover the underlying structure 
and process, and basically that is due to their failure to 
make and maintain the crucial distinction between structural 
positions (classes) and the ~~ents (people) who occupy them. 
That is the main reason why these writers have been unable 
to see how it is that racial conflicts are the form of 
appearance of underlying class conflicts. Clearly, then, 
the distinction is particularly important for the purpose of 
analysing and explaining broad processes of structural trans-
formation. And it is precisely that kind of explanation 
that this study is concerned with. 
The originality of this thesis, then, lies in its 
scope and interpretation. It offers an historical-material-
ist analysis of the broad process of structural transform-
ation over a period of more than one hundred and eighty 
years, and it seeks to provide more adequate explanations 
of the major causes which have shaped the course of devel-
opments in Fiji. The nature of the study, however, requires 
me to be selective both in terms of my sources and the 
particular events which I examine. 
On the question of evidence, I have relied totally 
on published sources. Where they have been incomplete, the 
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necessary acknowledgements and qualifications have been 
made. On the whole, however, the sources have been adequate 
for the purposes of the study. Most of the developments 
which are examined are theses in themselves, and I acknow-
ledge the limitations of the analysis when particular 
developments are not considered in detail. But detail is 
not what the study is about. It is concerned primarily to 
provide an I alternative interpretation of the broad trajec-
tory of development in Fiji. Its aim is to offer a new 
perspective which hopefully will serve as something of a 
spring-board for more fruitful and adequate research in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF rHE STATE 
The state in 'Third World' capitalist societies has 
only recently emerged as an object of study, and the short 
history of the debate which has grown up around it cannot be 
divorced from another recent but wider debate within marxist 
theory about the capitalist state. Although I draw on the 
various strands of the latter debate, and also on the classic 
Marxist contributions, there is not the space here to con-
sider them in any kind of detail. A very good discussion of 
those contributions is to be found in Bob Jessop's The 
Capitalist state.! 
Sparked off initially by the work of Louis Althusser,2 
then, the recent debate came to centre largely around the 
work of Nicos Poulantzas, whose theory of the capitalist 
state appears in its most developed form in Political Power 
and Social Classes. 3 With the growing interest in the cap-
italist state in Third World societies, many writers looked 
to Poulantzas for guidance, and the attempts at theorising 
it continually acquired a decidedly Poulantzian character. 
The whole burden of Poulantzas's work was to explicate 
and theorise the "specificity" of "the political", and in 
particular that of its form, the state. Although he provides 
some useful insights, his analysis, like that of his mentor 
Althusser, is, as Clarke as well as Holloway and picciotto 
have argued,4 is flawed because it makes the fundamental 
mistake of separating the 'political' from the 'economic' and 
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the 'ideological'. By making that separation, Poulantzas 
was able to advance the concept of the relative autonomy of 
the state, and it is that concept which has figured so 
prominently in the debate about the state in capitalist 
societies in the Third World. For that reason, and also 
because it occupies central place in Poulantzas's theory, it 
is necessary to examine that concept in some detail. This 
will be done presently, but first its influence on the 
debate about the state in Third World societies will be 
examined briefly. Simply for the purpose of convenience, 
the state in Third World societies will be referred to as 
the "peripheral state". 
1. THE STATE IN 'THIRD WORLD' SOCIETIES 
Inspired largely by Poulantzas's work, then, there 
was an upsurge in the early 1970s in the application of 
marxist state theory to the peripheral state. Of the early 
attempts, the most influential was Hamza Alavi's article on 
Pakistan and Bangladesh which appeared in the New Left 
Review in 1972. 5 Alavi summarised his case in this way: 
The central proposition which I wish to empha-
sise is that the state in the post-colonial 
society is not the instrument of a single class. 
It is relatively autonomous and it mediates 
between the competing interests of the three 
propertied classes, namely the metropolitan 
bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeoisie and 
the landed classes, while at the same time 
acting on behalf of them all to preserve the 
social order in which their interests are 
embedded, namely the institution of private 
property and the capitalist mode as the domin-
ant mode of production. 6 
What distinguished the colonial from the postcolonial state, 
9 
he implied, was precisely the 'relative autonomy' of the 
latter; under colonialism the state essentially served the 
interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisies, but in the post-
colonial period it mediated between the competing classes, 
and its ability to do that was because it was 'relatively 
au tonomous ' . 7 
In 1974, John Saul echoed Alavi's argument in relation 
to the state in Tanzania,s and a lively debate ensued and 
for which the Review of African Political Economy provided a 
major forum. 9 The whole burden of the debate was to develop 
a general theory of the postcolonial state and in that task 
heavy reliance was placed on Poulantzas's concept of the 
relative autonomy of the state. 
It soon became evident, however, that the exercise 
was highly problematic because it was based on a concept 
which divorced the state from its very foundation - the pro-
cess of accumulation. Moreover, a fundamental reality of 
Third World societies was their subordination to imperialism. 
The demands and contradictions of imperialism imposed such 
serious structural limitations of the peripheral state that 
the adequacy of the notion of relative autonomy, and also of 
any theory of the state based on it, was called into question. 
The concept of the relatively autonomous state simply did 
not square with certain stark realities about Third World 
societies. The preponderance of repressive military regimes 
acting in the interests of transnational capital, for example, 
highlighted the subordination of peripheral states to imper-
ialism. 10 It was necessary, therefore, to re-situate the 
state in the process of capital accumulation and to theorise 
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it in terms of the dynamics of both the internal and exter-
nal dimensions of that process. The various attempts at 
doing that, however, have not been altogether satisfactory, 
and this is particularly true of the world system approach. 
What, then, are the weaknesses of Poulantzas's theory 
of the state? In the section which follows, I address 
myself to this question by examining the theory on its own 
terms. I then put forward an alternative. 
2. THE QUESTION OF RELATIVE AUTONOMY 
Our starting point is Poulantzas's analysis of the 
social formation and the mode of production, two fundamental 
concepts of historical materialism. The mode of production 
is an abstract formal object which does not exist in reality. 
The only thing which does is the social formation f which is 
an historically-determined social whole. 
The mode of production, Poulantzas argues, is "a 
specific combination of various structures and practices 
which appear as so many 'instances' or 'levels - the econ-
omic, ideological and political levels".l1 It is a complex 
unity which is dominated, in the last instance, by the econ-
omic level. 12 But relations in this "structure in dominance" 
are never simple; they are "overdetermined" by relations at 
the political and ideological levels. As Poulantzas put it: 
the fact that the structure of the whole is 
determined in the last instance by the economic 
does not mean that the economic always holds 
the dominant role in the structure. The unity 
constituted by the structure in dominance 
implies that every mode of production has a 
dominant level or instance; but the economic 
is in fact determinant only in so far as it 
attributes the dominant role to one instance 
or another, in so far as it regulates the shift 
of dominance ... 13 
And of the capitalist mode of production in particular, 
it is specified by a characteristic autonomy 
of the economic and the political ... 14 
11 
But what, essentially, is the political? It is "the jurid-
ico-political superstructure of the state".IS Therein lies 
the origin of the notion of the relative autonomy of the 
state - the lynchpin of Poulantzas's theory of the state. 
The thrust of the criticisms which have been levelled 
against it is summarised by Holloway and picciotto: 
As a result: 
His view that capitalist society is charac-
terised by a relative autonomy of the economic 
and political 'instances' which allows one to 
make each instance a separate and specific 
object of study leads him to neglect the all-
important question of the nature of the separ-
ation of and relation between these instances ... 16 
the central problems of the marxist theory of 
the state, the problems of the development of 
the state form, of the structural limitations 
and possibilities of state action ... are neces-
sarily passed over .,. 17 
By severing his study of the political from the analysis of 
the contradictions of accumulation, then, Poulantzas has 
failed to provide an adequate analysis of the relation 
between the state and its basis - capitalist exploitation of 
the working class in the process of accumulation. This 
criticism can be extended by identifying some of the partic-
ular ways in which his theory is deficient and also by 
considering the nature of its connection with his theory of 
class. 
12 
For Poulantzas the political is the superstructure of 
the state. But, as Clarke correctly pointed out, Poulantzas 
did not intend that the state should be seen as an instit-
ution per se but rather should be understood in terms of its 
function. In what, then, does that function consist? It 
has, according to Poulantzas, three dimensions, each of 
course corresponding to his three "levels". The economic 
dimension consists of the state's role as "organiser of the 
labour process". In that capacity, the state provides 
the set (ensemble) of rules which organises 
capitalist exchanges and provides the real 
framework of cohesion in which commercial 
encounters can take place. ill 
But there is also an ideological dimension through which 
the state's activities in educational institutions, the 
media, the legal system, penal institutions and so forth, 
serve to reinforce the ideology of the dominant class and at 
the same time legitimise and perpetuate its dominance. 
Finally, there is the political dimension which has to do 
with the "political class struggle". 19 That, however, 
Poulantzas stresses, needs to be distinguished from the 
state's "global role". What is the difference? 
Whereas the political function has to do with main-
taining class dominance "at the level of political relations", 
in its global role the state serves as "the factor of 
cohesion in the unity of a formation". 20 That is, the state 
"serves as the regulating factor in the social formation's 
global equilibrium". 21 Very importantly, this global func-
tion is ascribed to the state by its place in the structure-
in-dominance. 22 In other words, the state is determined by 
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the struct.ure-in-dominance and, in particular, by the struc-
ture's need for cohesion and equilibrium. To it, therefore, 
is ascribed the task of meeting that need. In sum, then, 
the state's global function necessarily entails a specif-
ically political task of reproducing class division and 
class domination. 23 
Now, "strictly speaking", says Poulantzas, there is 
no economic, ideological or political function, only a global 
one of cohesion and equilibrium maintenance.~ What we 
have, therefore, are "modalities of the [global function] 
which are overdetermined by the [specifically] political 
modali ty" .25 This overdetermina tion is actually crucial to 
Poulantzas's theory. Because the modalities are "over-
determined" by the political one, they are necessarily sub-
ordinate to it. But here a major methodological problem 
arises. 
Methodological primacy for the state's global function 
had already been posited - the state exists in order to 
maintain global cohesion and equilibrium. Now, however, we 
are told that the task has various modalities one of which 
is overdeterminant. There is a tautological sense in which 
it is true that the global function necessarily entails the 
reproduction of class domination. By claiming, however, that 
this specifically political task has an overdetermining 
effect on the other functions, without at the same time 
clearly specifying how that bears upon the methodological 
primacy of the wider global function of which it is a part, 
the methodological foundations of Poulantzas's theory become 
less clear. He cannot have it both ways. Either he must 
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build a theory whose central propositions do not contradict 
the theory's methodological premisses, or he must make quite 
clear why they do not if, in fact, they appear to do so. 
And the argument here is that they actually do. In other 
words, the methodological primacy of the state's global 
function cannot be sustained if at the same time one of its 
constituent modalities (the political one) is said to over-
determine the other modalities (the economic and ideological 
ones) because such overdetermination necessarily implies 
that the latter are subordinate to the former. 
So what does this mean for Poulantzas? Either he 
must show that the subordinating effect does not imply a 
shift in methodological primacy from the global to the 
specifically political function, or, he must establish the 
validity of the basis on which the case for overdetermin-
ation is made. He does not do the former, so we must assume 
that the global function really is accorded methodological 
primacy. But this still leaves open the validity of the 
basis upon which he advances the notion of overdetermination. 
It derives, in fact, from the supposed autonomy, at the 
level of the mode of production, of the political from the 
economic. Let us therefore investigate the issue a little 
further, taking as our starting point Poulantzas's view of 
the state in its "specifically political" role of maintain-
ing class division and domination. 
Class domination under the capitalist mode of 
production differs from that under non-capitalist modes in 
the important respect that it is mediated through commodity 
exchange. One of the effects of the emergence of the 
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commodity form under capitalism is that it produces a series 
of separations which hide relations of exploitation beneath 
surface appearances. One of these separations, Marx des-
cr ibed thu s : 
For the transformation of money into capital 
... the owner of money [the capitalist] must 
find the free worker available on the commodity 
market; and this worker must be free in the 
double sense that as a free individual he can 
dispose of all the objects needed for the real-
isation of his labour power. 26 
With nothing else to sell but their labour power, 
workers appear on the commodity market as apparently free 
sellers who contract with the capitalist for the sale of 
their labour power. Bound thus by a contractual obligation 
which the state will enforce through its legal and repressive 
apparatuses, the capitalist is now free from having to resort 
to physical force in order to exploit the worker. Exploit-
ation through the wage relation, therefore, is not mediated 
through force but through a contract which the worker "freely" 
enters into. It is this visible separation of relations of 
force (and in the end class domination rests on the use of 
force) from the immediate production process and their loca-
tion in the state (which is separated from individual capit-
alists) that constitutes the economic and the political as 
particularised and apparently distinct and separate forms of 
capitalist domination: 
this particularisation of the two forms of 
domination finds its institutional expression 
in the state apparatus as an apparently auto-
omous entity. It also finds expression in the 
separation of the individual's relation to the 
state from his immediate relation to capital, 
in the separation of his struggle into 'econ-
omic struggle' and 'political struggle' ... 27 
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Thus lies exposed the illusion of the autonomy of the 
state. The problem with Poulantzas's theory, then, is that 
he takes as his starting point this appearance of autonomy_ 
Rather, therefore than investigating the ways in which cap-
italist production relations assume apparently separate 
economic and political forms, Poulantzas sets out to argue 
that they actually are. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that the concept of overdetermination surfaces, for it is 
that concept which provides the glue with which to bind the 
various pieces together. Unfortunately, however, it does 
not serve that purpose well at all. The concept of polit-
ical overdetermination therefore remains problematic because 
the foundation on which it rests, the relative autonomy of 
the political, is an illusion. But there are problems also 
with Poulantzas's theory of class, and to them I now turn. 
Poulantzas's conception of class is technicist and 
non-Marxist. He makes a distinction between relations of 
production, on the one hand, and social relations of produc-
tion, on the other: 
relations of production do not denote simply 
interrelationships between the agents of pro-
duction, but rather these relations in specific 
combinations between agents and material-tech-
nical conditions of labour. On the other hand, 
social relations of production are relations 
among agents of production distributed in 
social classes, i.e. class relations. In other 
words, 'social' relations of production, class 
relations, manifest themselves at the economic 
level, as an effect of this specific combin-
ation: agents of production/material-technical 
conditions of labour constituted by the relat-
ions of production. 28 (original emphasis) 
In other words: 
the relations of production have as their 
effect •. , a distribution of the agents of 
production into social classes. 29 (emphasis 
added) 
Quite clearly, Pounantzas's classes are not constituted by 
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relations of production in the Marxist sense, but rather are 
distributive categories wherein membership is determined by 
one's technical function in the immediate production pro-
cess. 30 Again, the problem here is the untenable distinc-
tion between the political and the ideological: 
in social relations ... we can speak in all 
strictness of political 'social' relations and 
ideological 'social' relations. These ... 
manifest themselves as the effect of the polit-
ical and ideological structures on social 
relations. 31 
So political and ideological "effects" are superimposed on, 
but are not constitutively integral to, social classes. 
Despite this technicist definition of class, however, 
Poulantzas insists that it is at the "political level" that 
the struggles between classes are fought. Why? Because at 
the level of the immediate production process, nothing can 
be done about unequal power relations, because they are 
determined by the technical division of labour. And that 
division of labour is simply taken as given because it is 
determinant. There is not much, for example, that an un-
skilled worker on an assembly line can do about the little 
that he is paid compared with what his more technically-
qualified boss receives. In order, therefore, to defend 
their respective shares of the fixed material output of the 
immediate production process, classes need to "exist" at 
the political and ideological levels. Without representation 
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at those levels, their interests as a class will be at risk. 
So the political level is identified as the site of struggle 
and conflict: 
to the extent that the political superstructure 
is the overdetermining level of the levels of 
the structure ... the political class struggle 
is the overdetermining level of the field of 
class struggles. 32 
But he goes on: 
this is so to the extent that the political 
superstructure of the state has the function 
of being the cohesive factor in a formation, 
and to the extent that the objective of polit-
ical class struggle is the state. 33 
So the political class struggle, while concerned with main-
taining class division and domination, is now also concerned 
with seizing state power. But here too there are problems. 
Given that the state's foremost function is to ensure the 
global equilibrium of the structure-in-dominance, even if 
the working class were to seize state power, the logic of 
Poulantzas's analysis is that its foremost concern will also 
be to maintain global equilibrium. The crucial point that 
Poulantzas misses is that for the working class, state power 
is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, for the 
objective of the workers' struggle is the overthrow of the 
bourgeoisie. Its aim, in other words, is to negate the 
structure-in-dominance, not to maintain it. State power is 
a means to realise a classless society. It does not, of 
course, automatically guarantee the realisation of that 
society, and there may well be transitional struggles. But 
Poulantzas is not advancing a theory of transition. His 
basic argument is that state power is the object of the 
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political class struggle, and so the state becomes "neutral". 
What we are left with, then, is a working class that is 
concerned not so much with negating its opposite but rather 
with winning state power. And the exercise of state power, 
if we are to accept Poulantzas's theory, is concerned funda-
mentally with maintaining the structure-in-dominance, not 
with negating it. 
Poulantzas is here caught in a bind, but that is 
hardly surprising. He had, after all, got himself into a 
trap by setting out to advance a theory of the specificity 
and relative autonomy of the political, and in particular, 
its form, the state. He succeeded only is displacing the 
class struggle from centre stage and replacing it with a 
state which, teleogically, is concerned with equilibrium. 
Our task now is to put the class struggle back in its right-
ful place. 
3. CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE STATE 
By falling into the bourgeois trap of separating the 
political from the economic and the ideological, Poulantzas 
loses sight of the fact that production is a social activity 
and therefore that production relations are themselves 
social relations. It is in that sense that Marx understood 
class. The fixed product of the labour process is not, in 
the strict meaning of the term, "distributed" because the 
labourer's share is limited to the value of his labour power. 
Anything over and above that he gets no part of. The sur-
plus which he produces, therefore, is not "shared" or "dis-
tributed" between labour and capital. The latter simply 
20 
appropriates it. But before that can be done, the surplus 
must first be produced, and that can only be done if labour 
can be controlled and dominated. That is why both production 
and distribution relations are relations of class domination 
and, more importantly, why the latter have their origins in 
the immediate process of production. 
For Marx, then, social classes are defined not in 
terms of relations in the immediate production process, but 
in terms of the total process of social production. It is 
the totality of social relations which define them. Relat-
ions at the level of production are determinant because it 
is in production that the laws of motion of the capitalist 
mode of production are rooted. It is there that the surplus 
is produced. The worker, having "freely" contracted to sell 
his labour power, must honour his obligation, and capital, 
operating under the law of value, will pay him no more than 
the value of his labour power, and take the rest. That is 
the essence of the capital relation. 
But the requirements of the valorisation of capital 
are such that even social relations in fields apparently 
distant from production must come under the domination of 
the capital relation. 34 In other words, social relations 
beyond the immediate production process must be organised 
in such a way as to allow the process of surplus production 
and appropriation to take place. Individual capitalists may 
be able to manage class conflicts within their own estab-
lishments, and organisations of groupings of capitalists may 
even be able to contain class pressures at a somewhat wider 
level. Neither, however, is able to contain all instances 
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or forms of class conflict, particularly those at the 
society-wide level. Therein lies the function of the state. 
Its task, essentially, is to organise social relations, 
especially those at the society-wide level in such a way as 
to contain class tensions, and thereby allow capitalist 
production and exploitation to take place. 
Several important features of that function can be 
identified. First, it consists not only in suppressing open 
conflicts but also in minimising the possibility of their 
occurrence. Very importantly, the means by which it seeks 
to achieve the first of these may not be the same as those 
by which it seeks to achieve the second. The first may, for 
example, require mobilising the repressive apparatuses of 
the state, but the second may not. The state's approach to 
the second may, for example, take the form of political and/ 
or economic concessions to the dominated classes, conces-
sions which may even appear contradictory to the interests 
of capital. The state could, for example, acquiesce in the 
development of a workers' political party, approve increases 
in wages or welfare payments, improve factory safety regul-
ations, and so on. But whatever the strategy and the 
specific objective, the state's overall concern is to ensure 
that class pressures are kept within limits which, depending 
on the balance of class forces, may be stretched or narrowed, 
but which in the end allows the process of capitalist accum-
ulation to proceed. Second, integral to the state's 
function is the enforcement of the contractual obligations 
behind which are hidden the roots of capitalist exploitation. 
But that specific task is not confined just to the 
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particular contracts concluded between bosses and workers. 
It is much wider than that. At the root of contract enforce-
ment lies the institution of private property, and relations 
of private ownership pervade the whole society; hence the 
need for national bourgeois laws, law enforcement agencies, 
and penal institutions. Third, implicit in the state's 
function is the need to organise the society ideologically, 
and in such a way, that both its activities and the wider 
capital relation of which they are part appear to be legit-
imate. That involves perpetuating the dominant bourgeois 
ideology which hides class relations of dominance by empha-
sising the rights of the "individual" and the "national" 
interest. Finally, the broad political form which the 
state's function takes - bourgeois democracy - also needs to 
be understood as essentially a form of class organisation. 
A society - wide system of ideological and institutionalised 
political practices, it is organised around categories of 
people - individuals and groups of individuals - which do 
not correspond to classes. In that way, social cleavages 
other than class difference can be exploited in order to 
create the impression that the fundamental axes of conflict 
are anything but class ones. 
Clearly, then, and in a constitutively integral way, 
the state is subsumed under the capital relations. The 
former appears, however, to be separate from the latter, and 
it is precisely that appearance which creates the illusion, 
and the ideology, of state autonomy. That appearance, more-
over, is strengthened by state practices which create the 
impression of neutrality. Sometimes those practices favour 
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the dominated classes, at other times they favour the domin-
ant class. But this cannot be taken as evidence of the 
state's "relative autonomy", And the reason is this. with-
in the outer boundaries beyond which the viability of 
capitalist accumulation is seriously threatened, the limits 
of the class struggle are not fixed. And the precise limits 
at particular historical conjunctures are determined by the 
balance of class forces at those times. If organised labour, 
for example, has managed to put itself in a position of 
relative strength, then the state is likely to be fairly 
accommodating about worker demands. If, on the other hand, 
labour is plentiful and divided while capital is strong and 
united, then the state is much less likely to bow to working 
class pressure. When, therefore, the state acts in ways 
which appear contrary to the interests of the dominant class, 
it is not acting in a 'relatively autonomous' fashion, but 
rather is simply responding to the underlying balance of 
class forces. 
These, then, are the general theoretical principles 
which inform and guide this study. Through an analysis of 
state action as the product of underlying class pressures -
pressures which constitute the strongest tendential forces 
in capitalist society - it seeks to explain the dynamics of 
the class struggle in one country. The focus, therefore, is 
on broad structural changes rather than the details of those 
changes, details which give expression to the many weaker 
forces operating at the level of concrete reality. Where an 
examination of those weaker forces is necessary in order to 
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explain structural changes more clearly, they will be taken 
into account. On the whole, however, the study focuses on 
the broad dynamics of the class struggle in Fiji, the racial 
form which it takes, and the structural changes which it 
produced. 
PART ONE 
CAPITALIST TRANSFORMTION OF FIJI c.1SOO - lS74 
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CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN PRE-COLONIAL FIJI 
This chapter analyses Fiji's transformation into a 
capitalist society. It argues that precapitalist Fiji was a 
class society and that its internal contradictions gave rise 
to a process of profound social change. The struggles 
between the agents of the internal class forces were still 
in motion at the time of capitalist penetration and because 
those agents could not bring the conflicts to a determinate 
conclusion, they turned to the agents of capitalism for 
assistance. As the influence of the latter increased, the 
ability of the internal class forces to resist the establish-
ment of capitalist relations began to weaken, and over six 
decades the capitalist mode of production increasingly took 
root. Capitalist dominance, however was not achieved in 
that time, the major reason being the absence of a capitalist 
state. Only with the annexation of Fiji by Britain in 1874 
was one constituted, and with that the transition to a capit-
alist society was completed. Turning, then, to the details 
of that transformation, we begin by examining the structure 
and contradictions of precapitalist Fiji. 
1. STRUCTURE AND CONTRADICTION IN PRECAPITALIST FIJI 
Considerable gaps exist in our knowledge about con-
ditions in Fiji prior to contact with Europeans. Most of the 
written material is concerned with either the remote past, 
particularly the original peopling of the islands, or the 
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post-contact era. Little is known of the intervening period, 
which Thomson, displaying the ethnocentrism and paternalism 
typical of many of Fiji's early historians, described as "the 
centuries which lie between the age of myth and the age of 
history".l It is, as Williams concurred, "necessarily 
obscure".2 
One major reason for this is that the early Europeans 
were overly struck by what was the outstanding feature of 
Fijian society, the widespread warfare, and it was that which 
figured most prominently in the early historical writings. 3 
Later official accounts, too, were not altogether free of 
that bias; the inordinate amount of attention which they 
devoted to warfare is illustrated, for example, by the tribal 
histories which are preserved in the records of the Native ~ 
Commission. 4 They are full of accounts of turmoil and 
although peaceful interludes are also recorded the overriding 
impression of precapitalist Fiji which they project is one of 
social upheaval. To some extent that was inevitable given 
that the oral sources on which they were based were replete 
with tales of hostility and unrest. What is inexcusable, 
however, as France correctly points out, is the error of 
supposing that the normal condition of precapitalist Fiji was 
that described in the tales. s And that that was not necess-
arily the case is suggested, for example, by the extensive 
genealogies of the "hill tribes" of central Viti Levu which 
Brewster documented. They tell of times when IIfighting was 
unknown and a profound peace prevailed ll • 6 And yet the error 
persists, as the following recent statement bears out: 
war was an almost everyday way of life from 
the second half of the last century back far 
past the dimmest glimmerings of human history 
for eight hundred years and possibly longer. 7 
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Questions can therefore be raised about the view that 
warfare was endemic in Fijian society. On the other hand, it 
is nontheless true that by the time the first Europeans 
settled in Fiji, the country was caught up in a state of 
violence and unrest. That, above all else, was the country's 
outstanding feature so that, for the purposes of our dis-
cussion, the major significance of the wars is that they gave 
clear expression to a process of structural transformation. 
Our task is to provide a materialist explanation of that 
transformation and why capitalism, upon its entry, was able 
to influence the course of events and eventually come to 
predominate. 
Precapitalist Fiji was composed of small and relat-
ively autonomous social groupings which have been referred to 
variously as tribes, chiefdoms, kingdoms and states. The use 
of labels such as these underlines the:"way in which the 
early writers on Fiji were preoccupied with appearances, and 
in particular the diverse forms of social organisation. They 
saw the societies in terms of their degree of 'stratification', 
level of political development and so on. But in addition to 
the diversity, they also recognised that exploitation of 
commoners by chiefs was a universal phenomenon. And that was 
a class relation which they were unable to explain satis-
factorily. Hamstrung by their focus on appearances, they 
could not see that social organisation was in fact the form 
that class relations took. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
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chief-commoner relations were explained in a functional way. 
'Traditional' Fijian societies, the usual argument 
ran, were organised along 'communalistic' lines so that the 
relationship between chief and commoner had to be seen in 
terms of the unity and cohesion of the total society. Chiefs 
ruled because they provided protection for their subjects but 
chiefly power in turn depended on the support of the common-
ers. To ensure the continuing support of their subjects, 
therefore, the chiefs had to demonstrate caring and concern, 
and that took the form of returning to the community a por-
tion of material tribute paid to him by his subjects. By 
doing that his prestige was enhanced and his subjects recip-
rocated with respect, deference and loyalty. In that way, 
the cohesion of the society was maintained. 
The problem with this kind of explanation is that it 
is idealist. It says nothing about the material basis of 
chiefly power. A chief's concern for his subjects could not 
sustain him physically. He needed food, clothing and shelter. 
But those material requirements were produced not by himself 
but by his subjects - about that there is no disagreement. 
The critical question, therefore, is how did the chief 
appropriate material wealth and why was he able to do it? To 
answer that question requires an understanding of the dynam-
ics and material basis of class relations. To that end we 
first describe the class structure and the system of social 
organisation, and then we explain how the former assumed the 
appearance of the latter. 
Precapitalist Fiji was a class society and, very 
broadly, the class structure was as follows. Below the 
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chiefly class came the executives (sauturaga) and spokesmen 
(matanivanua), the priestly class (bete), the warrior class 
(bati) and then various classes of occupational specialists -
carpenters, canoebuilders, artisans, fishermen and so forth. 
At the bottom was the labouring class which consisted of the 
commoners and the slaves, the latter being people who had 
been captured in battle. 8 What, then, of social organisation? 
Much confusion about the nature of social organisation 
has arisen from the work not only of western anthropologists 
but also of colonial state functionaries, and Rusiate Naya-
cakalou's writings are an admirable effort at correcting 
their mistakes. 9 The details and complexities of the subject 
are well covered in his works so what follows is the barest 
outline. Apart from the family, which was the basic unit of 
production, the constituent units of the social structure 
were as follows. At the village level the "elemental" patri-
lineal descent groups, i tokatoka, were combined to form the 
primary division of the village, the mataqali. Mataqali 
which shared a common ancestry to an ancestor god formed 
yavusa and the various yavusa within particular localities 
combined to form a wider body politic, vanua. The latter in 
turn were joined, often by conquest, to form the widest 
political unit, matanitu ('state' or 'government') .10 How, 
then, did social organisation hide class structure? The key 
to our explanation is the mataqali. 
As the primary division at the village level, the 
mataqali served as the major determinant of a person's place 
in the wider social structure. One resided in a village but 
one's place in the broader structure was determined by the 
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mataqali to which one belonged. Why was that so? The answer 
lies in the particular function that, historically, came to 
be associated with particular mataqali. As the first male 
descendants of the original ancestors (who subsequently 
became deified) branched out and formed their own families, 
they assumed responsibility for one of the various chiefly 
functions that previously had been concentrated in the hands 
of their forefathers. And as the number of such families 
grew and formed themselves into mataqali (and in turn yavusa), 
each one eventually became the traditional custodian of that 
particular function. In the course of time, therefore, there 
emerged within a fully developed yavusa five broad categories 
of mataqali, each one exercising a distinct function. Those 
Derrick identified as follows: the chiefly (turaga), exec-
utive (sauturaga), diplomatic (matanivanua), priestly (bete) 
and warrior (bati) mataqali. 11 
Several points about this historical development can 
be made. First, the functional classification described here 
corresponds very closely to the class structure outlined 
earlier. Second, all five mataqali functions had to do with 
the exercise of power. Necessarily, therefore, the actual 
custodians of those functions were not the mataqali as such 
but rather the mataqali chiefs. Finally, functional special-
isation among the mataqali did not mean that mataqali were of 
equal rank - lower ranking mataqali chiefs deferred to higher 
ranking ones. In addition, therefore, to the fundamental 
class contradiction between chiefs and commoners (which we 
discuss in detail presently) there was also a secondary 
contradiction between chiefs of unequal rank and power. 
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What emerges from all this is that class relations 
took on the form of social organisation. With the mataqali 
occupying central place in the system of organisation, it 
acted as the basis for individual identification and attach-
ment, and because of that class relations became submerged. 
Respect and deference were of course accorded the mataqali 
chief, but his subjects' prime attachment was to the group; 
one belonged to the mataqali, not the turaga ni mataqali 
(mataqali chief). And it was that attachment to the group 
which served to hide class structure. Class relations, 
therefore, were mediated through, and took the form of, the 
system social organisation. 
It remains now to explain the broad dynamics of class 
relations. How was the material wealth of the society pro-
duced and distributed? How, in other words, was the pre-
capitalist mode of production constituted? 
The concept mode of production is defined in terms of 
the forces of production (techniques) and the relations of 
production (distribution and control of the means of produc-
tion), and the articulation between the two. Relations of 
production are determinant. Narayan has described the pre-
capitalist mode of production in Fiji as a "subsistence mode 
of production". 12 A major weakness of his description, 
however, is that it fails to capture the critical fact that 
precapitalist Fiji was dominated by chiefs to whom tribute 
was paid. Samir Amin's concept of the "tribute-paying mode 
of production,,13, on the other hand, captures better the 
conditions in Fiji and is therefore adopted here. For the 
sake of convenience his term is abbreviated to the tributary 
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mode of production. 14 This mode, Amin says, is operative in 
a "village community in which there is a social and political 
apparatus for the exploitation of .the community through the 
exaction of tribute". Two elements are central to this 
concept: first, the underlying mechanism of exploitation and 
second, the social and political forms which it takes. 
Knowledge of production relations in precapitalist 
Fiji is sketchy, but it is possible to reconstruct a picture 
that contains at least their basic structural characteristics. 
The productive forces were not highly developed, and working 
implements and land were the main means of production. The 
former, on the whole, were the property of the individual but 
they were also subject to the powerful, socially-sanctioned 
practice of kerekere. The full significance of kerekere will 
be discussed later, but essentially it was a form of custom-
ary borrowing that carried an obligation to reciprocate some-
time in the future when the need arose. 
Land was the most important means of production and 
although there appears to have been a small degree of private 
'ownership' 15 , it is clear that the predominant practice was 
for it to be held collectively. Land immediately contiguous 
to a family home was the e~~usive preserve of the family 
members but all land beyond that immediate area was held 
collectively by the wider social unit to which the family 
belonged. In general, the landholding unit was the mataqali, 
(although there were exceptions 16 ) and access to mataqali 
land was secured through the consent of the mataqali chief. 
Control over land, therefore, was the material basis of 
chiefly power. 
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The family was the basic production unit. Households 
were responsible for the production of their basic subsis-
tence needs and productive activity was undertaken by all 
able-bodied members. Superimposed on household production, 
however, was a society-wide division of labour that in turn 
determined the various classes of occupational specialists 
identified earlier. They, together with the labouring class 
of commoners and slaves were the productive workers. Very 
importantly, however, the various occupational specialties 
were also associated with particular mataqali. And because 
members of the labouring class belonged, and were seen to 
belong, primarily to a mataqali, it is clear that classes 
were fragmented and organised along mataqali lines. The 
critical importance of mataqali as the means by which class 
structure was hidden behind social organisation is thus 
demonstrated. The next question that needs to be considered 
has to do with the distribution of material wealth, but 
before doing that it is necessary first to say something 
about exchange. 
Although households were responsible for the produc-
tion of their basic subsistence needs, there were some mater-
ial requirements for which they were dependent on the labour 
of others. Considerable time was spent on growing basic root 
crops like taro and cassava and also on fishing. For other 
necessities, however, a fair degree of reliance was placed on 
those who specialised in producing them. Examples include 
masi (traditional cloth), salt, and various household articles. 
And it is in that light that practices like kerekere and 
solevu (intervillage ceremonial exchange) need to be under-
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stood. These forms of exchange - occasional borrowing which 
required reciprocation in the future and organised exchanges 
between villages - were the means by which households could 
secure items which they either could not produce or could 
not produce in sufficient quantity. It is clear, therefore, 
that the importance of these exchanges lay in the fact that 
they were central to the satisfaction of material needs. In 
other words, what was exchanged was use values. 
Often, however, the function of exchange has been 
misunderstood and, as a result, distorted and ideological 
views of social relations in precapitalist Fiji have been 
presented. In view of their critical importance, it is not 
surprising that institutionalised practices like kerekere 
and solevu occupied such a central place in Fijian society: 
great importance was attached to "giving", prestige was 
largely a function of "generosity", and "group-giving" was 
often highly competitive. By focusing largely on exchange 
relations, therefore, it is relatively easy to get the 
impression that Fiji was a fairly egalitarian, "group-
orientated" society. But to see the society in that way, 
i.e., to see exchange as an economic leveller, as Laura 
Thompson, for example, does,17 is to confuse exchange with 
distribution. Struck by the apparent generosity of the 
exchanges, she cannot see that some actually got more than 
others. Nor could she understand how and why that was the 
case. Relations of distribution, in other words, were often 
masked by relations of exchange, and it is because writers 
like Thompson focus on appearances that they serve to per-
petuate the whole ideology of 'traditional' Fiji as a group-
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orientated, accommodative, sharing, caring and co-operative 
society. Such a view is ideological precisely because it 
serves to blind us from, or at the very least confuse us 
about, class relations of distribution. How, then, was 
wealth distributed? In particular, how was the surplus of 
the producers appropriated by the non-producers? 
Surplus extraction took the form of lala whereby 
chiefs not only commanded certain types of labour but also 
were given the best produce. As Williams put it: 
In Fiji, subjects do not pay rent for their 
land but a kind of tax on all their produce, 
besides giving their labour occasionally in 
peace, and their service, when needed, in 
war ... 18 
As has been shown, control of land was the material basis of 
chiefly power. nn~d was allocated through the consent of 
the chief and in return material tribute was paid to him. 
The payment of chiefly lala, then, was the mechanism through 
which surplus was appropriated and was, therefore, the vis-
ible form of the basic class contradiction between the pro-
ducers on the one hand and the non-producers on the other. 
The latter, of course, included not only the chiefs but also 
his functionaries - the executives, spokesmen, priests and 
military. Chiefly lala therefore had to be applied to their 
maintenance also. 
That, then, was the fundamental contradiction in pre-
cap~talist Fiji and it is there that the origins of warfare 
lie. In order to support themselves and their functionaries, 
the chiefs appropriated the surplus of the producing classes. 
And especially with increasing numbers, exploi ta tion increased, 
and that in turn intensified the underlying class contradic-
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tions. In that kind of situation, increased tribute could be 
secured either by simply making greater demands on the pro-
ducers or by military conquest - or both. War, however, 
entailed the additional burden of having to contend with 
rival chiefs who themselves where faced with precisely the 
same problem. 
So a secondary contradiction was superimposed on the 
primary one. It is in those terms, therefore, that the 
'tribal' wars need to be understood. But how were the chiefs 
able to get away with all this? How, in other words, was 
chiefly dominance legitimised? The legitimating mechanisms 
were ideological and political; that is, chiefly power was 
mediated through ideological and political forms of dominance 
and .control. 19 
The ideological basis of chiefly power was mana, or 
spiritual authority. A chief's mana derived from a special 
relationship which he claimed to have with an ancestor-god, 
and by virtue of the spiritual authority so bestowed upon him, 
he was tabu, i.e. sacred. Placed above mere mortals, he was 
accorded the greatest respect, a respect which had as one of 
its critical dimensions the belief that manual labour was 
beneath the dignity of his position. Such work was meant for 
mere men and women, not chiefs. Charged with the divinely-
ordained task of ruling over and ensuring the welfare of the 
society, the chiefs were not meant to engage in the physical 
drudgery of producing food, clothing and shelter. Those were 
the tasks of lesser people whose obligations stretched to 
ensuring that the material requirements of their rulers were 
met. 
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The process of surplus extraction, however, need not 
cause too much stress so long as there was relative abundance 
and the demands made upon the producers were not intolerable. 
But that kind of situation could not exist for long and inev-
itable underlying class contradictions would produce tension 
and conflict. In order to stave off crises, therefore, some 
inbuilt mechanism of class containment was necessary. Means 
had to be found whereby the inherently exploitative nature of 
the system of social relations could be hidden. A part of 
the solution to that problem took the form of partial redis-
tribution: a portion of the appropriated surplus was returned 
by the chiefs to their subjects. Through that mechanism the 
chiefs were deemed to have demonstrated their 'caring' and 
'concern' and, consequently, their prestige and mana were 
secured and class antagonisms blunted - but only until a 
crisis threatened otherwise. 
Mana, then, was the ideological form through which 
chiefly power was mediated. It legitimised chiefly approp-
riation of surplus, but so as to blunt class antagonisms, a 
portion of the surplus was returned to the producers. That 
partial redistribution, therefore, served simultaneously as a 
mechanism of class containment and as a buttress for the 
ideological basis of chiefly power - mana. That is how such 
redistribution needs to be understood and not in the idealist 
way that writers like Thompson do. In Thompson's version, 
failure to effect such a redistribution meant that chiefs ran 
the risk of "losing face". 20 But what Thompson cannot see is 
that loss of face was only the surface appearance of a more 
serious penalty - the possible loss of power and material 
well-being. And that brings us to the political form of 
chiefly power. 
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As exploitation of the producers became increasingly 
problematic for the chiefly class in terms of maintaining 
both their power and the lifestyle to which they were accus-
tomed, the only other option open to them was the forcible 
sUbjugation of other societies. That of course had the dis-
advantage of having to contend with rival chiefly classes who 
were themselves confronted with precisely the same sort of 
internal contradictions. On the other hand, the fruits of 
victory were usually great - additional land would be secured 
and the number of tribute-paying subjects increased. But in 
addition to that, success in battle also enhanced the victor-
ious chief's reputation as a protector, and by exploiting that 
reputation he could consolidate his power. Military prowess, 
then, became the political form through which chiefly power 
was mediated. 
Before we take up the question of warfare, there 
remains one final aspect of social relations in precapitalist 
Fiji that needs to be considered - their apparent diversity. 
Most of the early writers believed that Fiji consisted of 
societies which, although broadly similar, were apparently 
different in certain fundamental respects; hence the various 
labels - tribes, chiefdoms, kingdoms, states. Unable to go 
beyond the level of appearance, those writers could not un-
cover the underlying class structure. And as for the diver-
sity which they were so struck by, it was, I would argue, the 
manifestation of the conditions of existence of tributary 
production relations. 
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Under any mode of production, relations of production 
are determinant. However, 
determinate relations of production cannot be 
specified without an explicit or implicit 
reference to certain effects of other relations 
and social practices. And those effects which 
are necessarily implicated in the specification 
of determinate relations of production can be 
called the conditions of existence of those 
relations. 21 (original emphasis) 
Determinate production relations in precapitalist Fiji, 
therefore, need to be specified with reference to their con-
ditions of existence, and the argument advanced here is that 
those conditions were expressed in the diverse forms which 
tributary production relations took. In other words, that 
diversity expressed the particular conditions existing in 
different regions, conditions which in turn specified the 
particular form that tributary production relations assumed 
in those places. In what, then, did that diversity consist? 
Only four dimensions will be considered here: differences in 
ecological environment, social stratification, political 
organisation and land tenure practices. 
with over three hundred islands of varying size 
scattered over a large area of ocean space and covering a 
wide range of ecological environments, it was inevitable that 
regional differences in social arrangements would emerge. 
The way in which production was organised would necessarily 
differ and that would in turn give a particular shape or form 
to the system of social relations. But the underlying 
structure remained the same throughout, for all Fijian 
societies were class societies dominated by chiefs. 
Differences in 'social stratification' are illustrated 
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most clearly by those which existed between the eastern part 
of the group, on the one hand, and the west and interior of 
viti Levu, on the other. Stratification was more highly 
developed in the east and in large part that was due to the 
much stronger Polynesian influence there than elsewhere. 22 
The eastern region had a much longer history of contact with 
Polynesia, particularly Tonga, and over the years new goods 
and skills were introduced. That had the effect of expanding 
the range of productive activity, raising the level of the 
productive forces, and aggravating uneven regional develop-
ment in the country. But the Tongans also brought military 
skills and technology which often were superior to those 
existing in Fiji, and in time Tongan chiefs, notably Ma'afu, 
extablished themselves in positions of power. with all that, 
in addition to the introduction of Tongan hierarchical 
divisions, it is not surprising that eastern Fiji became more 
highly stratified than other regions. In western viti Levu, 
for example, it appears that emphasis on rank was rather less 
marked and even less so among the hill 'tribes' of the 
interior. 23 Of the latter, Brewster, for example, argues 
that "under the old patriarchal system", although members of 
the clan were expected to die for it and sacrifice themselves, 
when necessary, for the chieftain, "all men were free and 
and equal, and tyranny and oppression not to be born with". 24 
The latter claim is surely exaggerated but it does seem that 
hierarchical divisions were not as great in the interior as 
they were in the eastern part of the country. But these were 
merely differences of degree. Whichever the region, all 
Fijian societies were class ones. So what was different was 
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the form of class relations, not the substance. 
Related to this were differences in political organis-
ation. Whereas the lower-level social units, i tokotoka, 
mataqali and yavusa, existed universally, the wider political 
groupings, vanua and matanitu, did not. By the time of 
capitalist penetration, matanitu in particular were peculiar 
to eastern Fiji, and by way of contrast, the largest stable 
political unit in Nadroga in western Viti Levu was the vanua, 
and in the interior hill country it was the yavusa. 25 But 
these regional differences can be explained in large part by 
the greater Tongan influence in the east 26 and also by the 
relative isolation of the west. With the densely-forested 
Nakauvadra Range running north-south down the middle of Viti 
Levu, contact between east and west was low. The resulting 
uneven development, therefore, simply expressed regional 
differences in the form but not the substance of social 
relations. Western societies, like eastern ones, were class 
societies ruled by a chiefly class. 
Finally, there is the matter of land tenure. Variat-
ions in land tenure practices have been well documented27 and 
although the predominant practice was for land to be held by 
the mataqali, there were exceptions. In some places, for 
example, it was held by i tokotoka. 28 Moreover, it appears 
that there were regional differences in the understanding of 
these notions. During an interchange at the 1878 meeting of 
the Council of Chiefs (a creation of the colonial state), for 
example, confusion arose over the precise meaning of the 
term mataqali, and out of the disagreements, France drew the 
following conclusion: 
it seems to have been generally agreed that the 
word was known in all parts of the group, and 
that it denoted a descent group of a greater or 
lesser order of inclusiveness. But its exact 
limitations were imprecise ... 29 
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But these differences notwithstanding, the fact remains that 
land was held collectively and, more importantly, that it was 
controlled by the chiefs. Regional variations in landholding 
practices, therefore, were simply expressions of the way in 
which specific regional conditions determined the particular 
form that the system of class relations took. Everywhere the 
chiefs controlled the land. So again only the form of social 
relations was different, not the substance. 
The diverse forms that class relations in precapitalist 
Fiji assumed, then, need to be understood as the conditions 
of existence of those relations. Beneath the diversity was a 
class structure whose inherent contradictions set the country 
on a trajectory of structural change, the visible manifes-
tation of which was warfare. Limited, however, by their 
inability to distinguish appearance from essence, the early 
writers saw those conflicts as 'tribal warfare'. Rather, 
therefore, than identifying class contradictions as the basic 
causes of the wars, factors such as chiefly ambition, greed, 
revenge and jealousy were advanced as explanations. But to 
criticise those writers in this way, is not to suggest that 
the factors which they identified were unimportant. At a 
certain level of explanation they clearly were. But our task 
is to get beneath the details in order to identify underlying 
causes. Our focus, in other words, has to be the strongest 
tendential forces that produce structural change and not the 
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details that surround the particular form that those forces 
take at the level of concrete reality. At that level of 
analysis, the wars become the visible manifestation of the 
underlying antagonisms between opposing class forces -
antagonisms which are acted out at the level of concrete 
reality by the agents of the respective class forces. And 
so to the wars we now turn. 
2. PRECAPITALIST FIJI IN TRANSITION 
It is believed that Fijians originally settled in the 
north of Viti Levu and oral sources tell of two early streams 
of migration from the northern coast of Viti Levu, one 
sweeping down towards the south-eastern coast, the other 
across the strait to the second-largest island, Vanua Levu. 30 
Subsequent migrations outwards, together with waves of 
migration from Tonga, led to the peopling of the smaller 
islands in the east and south of the group. 31 Considerable 
intercourse, mainly in the form of exchange of goods, existed 
between the various communities but there is little evidence 
of early expansionism, and it was not until the eighteenth 
century that the very first signs of power concentration on a 
large scale began to emerge. 
Some time in the early years of the eighteenth century, 
an event "that was destined to have a tremendous influence on 
the political destiny of the islands" occurred. 32 There 
appears to have been a "major upheaval" among the inland 
communities of Viti Levu and although there is no hard evid-
ence, nor even a tradition, which might throw some light on 
its causes, Thomson does speculate that the need for new 
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lands might have been the main reason. 33 with little else to 
go on apart from that, explanation becomes difficult But 
Thomson's speculation is not altogether implausible, espec-
ially in view of our earlier discussion of class relations 
in precapitalist Fiji. It is possible to retroduce back from 
'the need for new lands' to underlying class contradictions 
as the basic causes of the upheaval. 34 
The upheaval caused an outward migration towards the 
southern coast of Viti Levu, and among the emigrants were 
members of the Bau tribe who settled on the south-east coast 
between the leading societies of that region, Rewa and Verata. 
The Bauans were renowned for their fierce independence and 
military prowess and soon they were continually at war with 
their neighbours. But to explain that conflict in terms of 
Bauan courage and military skill would be to mistake appear-
ances for underlying causes. Wedged as they were between two 
established societies, it was inevitable that the Bauans 
would impinge upon the wealth of their neighbours, particul-
arly their land. They had, after all, to secure the material 
means of their subsistence and that necessarily entailed 
taking from others. No doubt their courage and military 
skill contributed greatly to their success, for by the middle 
of the nineteenth century Bau had become the political centre 
of eastern Fiji. But the underlying cause of their military 
adventures was the need to acquire their material require-
ments and beyond that to contain class contradictions emanat-
ing from both within their own society and from without. 
Similar struggles were also being waged in other parts 
of the country, and for essentially the same sorts of reasons. 
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They too left their imprint on the changing face of Fiji 
politics. But in the flux and fluidity of eighteenth century 
Fiji, the outcome of war was largely indeterminate: " insig-
nificant states waxed to importance; leading states suffered 
eclipse or waned into obscurity and servitude". 35 And it was 
not until the following century that large and powerful 
political groupings appeared. When that happened the more 
powerful chiefly classes were better able to contain the 
class contradictions inherent in their own societies and also 
those arising from their relations with rival chiefs. 
Thrown, then, into turmoil by the expansionist designs 
of rival chiefly classes anxious to contain class contradic-
tions, Fiji at the turn of the century was caught up in a 
process of profound social change. From a country that 
previously consisted of many small and relatively autonomous 
class societies, it was being transformed into one composed 
of a few but relatively large class societies. with the 
advent of capitalism, the transitional struggles had not yet 
come to a determinate conclusion,and in an attempt to bring 
them to such a conclusion, assistance was sought by various 
chiefs from t~e agents of capitalism. At it was precisely 
through the interventions of those agents, that capitalism 
was able, upon its entry, to condition the internal contra-
dictions that were still being worked through,and eventually 
subjugate them to its own. 
Very briefly, then, that was the situation in Fiji in 
opening years of the nineteenth century; but in order to have 
a better understanding of the impact of capitalist penetrat-
ion, it is necessary first to show what caused it. 
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3. THE GROWTH OF CAPITALISM AND THE 'DISCOVERY' OF FIJI 
Contrary to what the history books tell us, Abel 
Tasman did not discover Fiji in 1643; his 'discovery' was 
simply the first reported sighting of the island group by a 
white man. But that it was a turning point in Fiji's history 
is beyond question, for it marked the beginning of a series of 
events which would transform the country into a capitalist 
one and at the same time effect its incorporation into the 
international capitalist system. 
At the time that Tasman sailed into Fiji waters, 
Western Europe was still at the stage of merchant capitalism, 
and another one hundred and fifty years or so were to elapse 
before it made the transition to the next stage in its 
historical development - industrial capitalism. In order 
successfully to make that transition, however, all sorts of 
conditions had to be met. Of those, four were critical: the 
availability of an initial pool of capital; access to cheap 
sources of raw materials and labour; the availability of 
markets; and the development of science and technology. 
Driven largely by requirements such as these, the ruling 
classes of Western Europe embarked on a journey of inter-
national expansionism that led eventually to Fiji's 'discovery' 
and beyond that to its transformation into a capitalist 
society. This is the background against which the capitalist 
penetration into Fiji needs to be understood and which we now 
examine in a general way. 
Around the fifteenth century, the western centre of 
! 
international mercantile trade shifted from the Mediterranean 
to the Iberian peninsula, thus marking the beginning of 
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Europe's ascent to commercial prominence. A hallmark of that 
development was the so-called 'voyages of discovery', adven-
tures which at first were led by people like Columbus, de 
Gama and Magellan and which left in their wake a bloody 
history of robbery, piracy, slavery and conquest. For the 
Spanish and Portugese ruling classes, however, the voyages 
meant immense wealth and so it was that the process of 
primitive capital accumulation among the European merchant 
classes was given a major boost. 
By the seventeenth century economic dominance had 
passed to the Dutch and as they sought to consolidate their 
commercial superiority, they too set out on a course of 
vigorous expansionism. Intent upon making the kind of vast 
fortunes which their Spanish and Portugese predecessors had 
reaped before them, the Dutch took to the seas and headed 
towards the East Indies and beyond that to the Pacific. In 
the course of that imperialist drive the Council of India, 
which was the Supreme Council of the Dutch East Indies at 
Batavia, commissioned Abel Tasman to undertake a "voyage of 
'discovery and exploration of the unknown and known South 
Land', the south-eastern coast of New Guinea, and the islands 
in these seas". 36 That mission led to Tasman's sighting of 
Fiji. Bad weather and treacherous reefs, however, forced him 
to leave the island group without making contact with the 
Fijians. Unable, therefore, to provide the Dutch authorities 
with concrete evidence of Fiji's potential as a lucrative 
source of wealth, his 'discovery' was, as Derrick puts it, 
"coldly regarded [by them]". 37 It is not surprising, there-
fore, that by 1650 they "had come solidly to the conclusion 
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that the best way to make money ... was to concentrate on the 
wealth of India and the East Indies". 38 
About one hundred and thirty years were to pass before 
Europeans would encounter Fiji again,and that the next ones 
were English was not purely coincidental, for by the end of 
that intervening period two major and related developments 
had occurred in Europe; first, England had mounted a success-
ful challenge against Dutch economic hegemony and, second, 
the transition from mercantilism to industrial capitalism had 
been effected. 39 
In the intense commercial rivalry that developed 
between England and Holland, measures like the English Navi-
gation Acts of the early 1650s proved critical for English 
fortunes in that they provided increased protection against 
Dutch competition. 40 But they also had another effect, one 
which was to have profound consequences for Fiji and other 
countries which soon became victims of Perfidious Albion. 
Shielded by the increased protectionism, the volume of 
English trade grew and so too did English shipping, the two 
reacting on each other. And as this growth gathered momentum 
the tentacles of English mercantile imperialism spread 
further and further - westwards to the Americas and the 
Caribbean, southwards to Africa, eastwards to Asia, and beyond 
that to Oceania and Fiji. That outward push roughly coin-
cided with the centuries during which Western Europe made the 
transition from mercantilism to industrial capitalism. When 
the new era set in, the impetus which motivated and sustained 
the continuing outward thrust increasingly took on a new form 
as the former search for mercantile profit gave way more and 
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more to the needs of industrial capitalism. Imperialist 
expansion in the new epoch in other words, was guided by a 
new imperative, and with England $howing the way, its maritime 
adventures were put increasingly at the service of English 
industrial capital. 
By the end of the eighteenth century several major 
developments in western Europe had laid the foundations for 
the emergence of industrial capitalism. In Britain, for 
example, the enclosure movement sparked off a massive exodus 
from the rural areas which led in turn to the creation of a 
class of urban unemployed workers. In addition to this ready 
supply of cheap labour was the availability of a pool of 
initial capital which had been accumulated by various sec-
tions of the European ruling classes, the size of which owed 
much to plunder which resulted from the earlier voyages of 
"discovery". Purchasing raw materials, equipment and labour 
power, the owners of capital put these to work and approp-
riated the profits; capitalist production relations were thus 
constituted. 
But the growth of capitalism depended critically on 
finding new and more efficient methods of production. Capital 
was therefore applied to the development of science and tech-
nology and the fruits of that investment are illustrated 
clearly by the way that the invention of the spinning jenny 
and the stearn engine revolutionised the capitalist production 
process and made it immensely more profitable. 
Capitalism, however, is inherently exploitative 
because workers are paid less than the value of the commod-
ities which they produce for the capitalist. The underlying 
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class conflict, therefore, is a matter of concern to the 
capitalist. At the level of the immediate production process 
he is generally able to contain tnat conflict but at the 
society-wide level he is not. And it is in that light that 
the capitalist state needs to be understood. It performs the 
critical function of instituting political and ideological 
forms of class organisation and containment at the level of 
the wider society. So that, for example, constraints are 
placed on political activity and these are justified in terms 
of the various pillars of bourgeois democracy - respect for 
private property, freedom of the individual, sanctity of 
contact, the rule of law and so forth. 
The emergence of the capitalist state was therefore 
critical for the development of capitalism, and that, 
together with the various advances in the productive process, 
meant that the conditions were ripe for a new form of econ-
omic activity - large-scale manufacturing. So with the 
cornerstones in place, the way was clear for the emergence 
of industrial capitalism and the free and unfettered pursuit 
of private profit. In the field of international trade the 
impact of the new order was most clearly evident in the 
attempt to dismantle trade barriers, and the protectionism 
characteristic of the mercantilist era was increasingly 
superceded by both the ideology and the practice of free 
trade. 
In the struggle among capitalists to secure for them-
selves a greater share of the enormous profits Which the new 
order promised, competition was rampant and fierce. And in 
the frenzied and cut-throat rivalry, resort was made to all 
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sorts of methods to cut costs and maximise profits. England 
dominated the capitalist world but its continued hegemony 
depended very critically on its ability to find markets for 
its products, secure cheap raw materials for its factories, 
and maintain its technological advantage. And it was largely 
to these ends that its imperialistic adventures were geared. 
To be properly understood, Fiji's next encounter with 
Europeans needs to be seen against this background for it 
explains, in particular, why it was that the next white men, 
James Cook and William Bligh, happened to be English. The 
former's scientific voyages were essentially part of the 
wider English effort to stay at the forefront of science and 
technology; 1 and it was on one of those expeditions that, 
after exploring the coast of Aotearoa (New Zealand) and 
Australia, he sighted Fiji in July 1774. He failed, however, 
to make contact with the Fijians,but during one of his stays 
in Tonga he met William Bligh whom he informed about Fiji. 
Bligh, on returning from an assignment to collect breadfruit 
in Tahiti, sailed into Fiji waters in May 1798 but hostile 
Fijians and bad weather prevented him also from making con-
tact. So, as with Tasman and Cook before him, circumstances 
conspired against Bligh's attempt to explore the islands 
fully and chart them accurately. Despite their failure to 
make contact, however, what these men succeeded in doing was 
to put Fiji on the global map, an achievement that ultimately 
was the product of capitalist development in Europe. More 
ships were soon to follow and so too the inevitable contact 
with Fijians. When that finally occurred around the close of 
the eighteenth century, Fiji's long isolation from the West 
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carne to an end and immediately ahead lay the beginnings of 
its transformation into a capitalist society. The immediate 
causes of the impending transformation, however, are to be 
found not in the heartland of industrial capitalism but in 
the emergent colonial capitalism of Australia to which it 
gave rise. 
4. THE ORIGINS OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION 
Not long after its emergence in England, industrial 
capitalism's inherently contradictory and exploitative nature 
began to surface. It was expressed most graphically in the 
brutalisation of the human person: inhuman working condit-
ions, abuse of child labour, widespread poverty, disease, 
illiteracy and so forth. Not unexpectedly, the level of crime 
increased and a part of the attempt to cope with the problem 
was the occupation of Australia in 1788 and its use as a 
penal colony. Although intended primarily as an experiment 
in convict settlement, the occupation brought with it elements 
of the emergent capitalist order in England which, in the 
course of the subsequent "hard-fought struggles and grinding 
labour", set the basis for "colonial capitalism and an expan-
ding white settler society."42 The birth of Australian 
colonial capitalism marked the beginning of a process that 
was to determine in a most fundamental way the trajectory of 
development in Fiji. 43 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century merchants 
had pushed the level of trade between Australia and China. to 
a significant level,and it was that trade which ush~red in 
the first stage of capitalist penetration. 43 Soon after the 
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turn of the century, the schooner Argo, on its. return voyage 
from China with cargo bound for Australia, was wrecked on a 
reef in Fiji and some of its survivors are believed to have 
been the first white men to live among Fijians. They were 
joined soon afterwards by survivors of other wrecks and also 
"deserters,marooned sailors and derelict scourings of the 
ports of the Old World".44 A survivor of the Argo, Oliver 
Slater, had seen sandalwood growing on the coast of Bua Bay 
in Vanua Levu and later took news of it to Port Jackson, New 
South Wales, and as the news spread the onrush of fortune-
seekers quickly set in. Ships from Port Jackson, Calcutta 
and the New England ports of America soon arrived in increas-
ing numbers and, because sandalwood was eagerly sought in 
China, Fiji soon became integrated into the growing triangular 
trade between China, the Pacific and the north-west coast of 
America. Sandalwood was an extremely lucrative object of 
trade: profits averaged 600% but rose much higher in the 
peak years of 1808 and 1809 45 and the ruthlessness and un-
scrupulous practices of the visiting traders have been well 
documented. 46 
A major consequence of the sandalwood trade was the 
introduction of firearms, the means of violence and repression 
without which the successful penetration of capitalist rel-
ations would not have been possible. Charles Savage, a 
survivor of the wrecked sandalwood ship Eliza, managed to 
salvage some of the ship's supply of arms and introduced them 
to the chiefdom of Bau. The effect that this had on the face 
of Fiji politics is a matter of some dispute. One school of 
thought takes the view that it intensified internal warfare, 
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leading eventually to Bau's rise to prominence. Peter France 
challenges this and argues instead that rather than radically 
altering the balance of power between the native chiefdoms it 
served merely to consolidate the influence of those chiefs 
who had already established themselves in positions of 
power. 47 The debate will no doubt continue and whatever the 
merits of the opposing views it is certainly the case that 
firearms added a whole new dimension to the process of trans-
formation that was already in motion. For the fact remains 
that the rival chiefly classes turned to the early Europeans 
for assistance both in the form of firearms and in the actual 
conduct of battle. 
Although the sandalwood trade lasted for only ten 
years, it opened the way to the larger trade in beche-de-mer. 
Demand for the sea-slug among the wealthy classes in China 
was great and although its existenc~ in Fiji had been known 
for some time, the more lucrative sandalwood trade meant that 
its exploitation on a large scale had to await leaner times. 
As Derrick put it, "sandalwood was too profitable for cap-
tains to concern themselves with collecting and curing [the 
sea-slug ]".48 But with the lull which followed the collapse 
of the sandalwood trade attention shifted increasingly to it. 
More and more ships, especially from the New England ports, 
arrived and by 1829 the trade in beche-de-mer reached new 
heights. Around that time too whaling in Fiji waters had 
developed into a sizeable and profitable activity dominated 
largely by whalers from Port Jackson and New England. By 
1840, however, both whaling and the trade in beche-de-mer had 
gone into a state of decline. But by then Fiji was already 
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caught up in a process of capitalist transformation. 
Working largely through the chiefs, the traders were 
able to secure their labour requirements. For the sandalwood 
trade, trees had to be felled, cut to size and transported to 
the ships, and the procurement and curing of beche-de-mer was 
a highly organised activity often involving upwards of three 
hundred people.~9 Engaged thus in a labour process that was 
motivated by private profit, Fijians were drawn for the first 
time into the capitalist wage relation. Labouring under the 
constant supervision of white overseers, they had their first 
taste of capitalist discipline and because the scale of 
operations was such that absence from the village stretched 
into months, it was inevitable that tributary production 
relations came under stress. Capitalist relations, in other 
words, were beginning to condition the precapitalist ones. 
That influence was not extensive, however, and 
Narayan's assessment of it is contradictory. First he claims 
that "the Fijian social structure underwent a drastic and 
irreversible change,,50 but later he says that "the influence 
of [the early] trades did not penetrate deep enough to affect 
the production and organisational behaviour of the major part 
of the Fij ian population". 51 Neither of these positions is 
correct. Tributary production relations, as has been shown, 
were indeed affected but not to such a degree that there was 
a 'drastic and irreversible change'. The argument advanced 
here, therefore, is that while those relations were signific-
antly affected during the early states of capitalist pene-
tration, nevertheless they clearly remained dominant. 52 The 
sandalwood trade lasted only about ten years and was confined 
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to certain parts of the group. And as for the trade in 
beche-de-mer, after its peak in the forties it went into 
relatively quick decline and soon .only a desultory trade in 
the sea-slug was continued. Now had those activities pro-
duced 'drastic' changes, they should have been evident even 
after the activities dropped off. But in the period between 
then and the sixties, the level of export-oriented economic 
activity fell and Fijian intercourse with Europeans was 
confined to their dealings with a very small resident white 
community that consisted primarily of merchants and mission-
aries. (In 1860 the white population was about "thirty or 
forty") .53 In that interval, the tributary mode of produc-
tion wis not headed towards disintegration nor had it become 
subordinate to the capitalist one. The former, in other 
words, although clearly affected by the early stresses was 
able successfully to withstand them. Moreover, the next 
assault on it resulted not so much from the lingering effects 
of the early trade but from the attempt at constituting a 
capitalist agriculture in the sixties. This is not, however, 
to underrate the importance of the initial stages of capital-
ist penetration. All that is being argued here is that it 
was not until the sixties that the capitalist mode of pro-
duction began to assert itself over the precapitalist one. 
And only in the colonial period would it come to predominate. 
In the period of the sandalwood and beche-de-mer 
trades, then, capitalist production relations made their 
entry. But that period of plunder also saw the implantation 
of the political and ideological forms of capitalist relat-
ions and it was in those areas that capitalist penetration 
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had its greatest visible impact. And by the time tributary 
production relations were next subjected to attack, this time 
more systematically, the transformation of their political 
and ideological forms was well advanced. It is to the 
origins of that change that we now turn. 
Despite the influence of people like Savage,5~ the 
task of transforming the political and ideological forms of 
dominance in precapitalist Fiji could not be undertaken 
solely by the early survivors. Dependent as they were for 
their very survival on Fijian beneficence they were forced to 
conform to local custom and practice,and so the first 
systematic attempt at transformation had to await the arrival 
of first the traders, then the missionaries and later still 
the successive waves of white immigrants. Once the process 
of transformation began, however, the early survivors played 
a facilitating but nontheless crucial role because of their 
command of the Fijian language and their knowledge of indig-
enous customs. In their capacity as interpreters for and 
agents of the traders they explained to the Fijians not only 
the trading methods of the visitors but also the capitalist's 
system of payment for labour. And in so doing, they expedited 
the process of exposing the Fijians for the first time to the 
fundamentals of capitalist production. In the tributary mode 
of production, items like sandalwood and beche-de-mer had 
only a use value. Now production relations based on exchange 
value was being introduced. As France observed: 
Traditional economics had been based on public 
displays of largesse and the open acknowledge-
ment that goods or services had a specific value 
attached to them was foreign to Fijian ideas. 55 
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In respect of labour too a new practice was introduced. In 
precapitalist Fiji, as has been shown, work was undertaken to 
meet subsistence needs, communal obligations and tributary 
dues. Now, however, it was being undertaken as part of an 
agreement in which compensation was to be made. Initially 
payment was made in kind; later it would take the form of 
money. 
In order to consolidate capitalist production relat-
ions, the foundations of their political and ideological 
forms were also laid. In that exercise, missionary activity 
was critical. Upon their arrival at Lakeba on 12 October 
1835, Fiji's first missionaries, William Cross and David 
Cargill, were promised a piece of land and temporary houses 
by the local chief. After selecting a site outside the 
village and having the villagers build their homes on it they 
duly set about erecting fences around it. The importance of 
that act lies in the fact that it represented a fundamental 
challenge to the tributary mode of production. It marked the 
introduction of the bourgeois practice of private ownership. 
Here before Fijian eyes was the first visible symbol of the 
new order - private ownership. But more was yet to corne. 
Believing that the Fijians were locked in a state of 
spiritual darkness and unredeemed depravity, the missionaries, 
with great zeal, plunged themselves headlong into the task of 
rescuing the natives, an exercise that entailed a concerted 
attack on local religions. This was to have two unintended 
consequences of fundamental import for the wider process of 
superstructural transformation. On the one hand it hastened 
along the secularisation of traditional authority, a process 
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which was already in motion before the missionaries arrived 
and which was in large part the result of the introduction of 
firearms,56 and on the other, it led to the first attempt at 
establishing bourgeois government and law. 
Because of their pivotal role in the Fijian politico-
religious system, it was against the priestly class that the 
thrust of the missionary attack was directed. One effect of 
this was the gradual erosion of the spiritual basis of 
chiefly power. Traditional chiefly authority, as has been 
mentioned, rested largely on mana, or spiritual power. And 
because the priests were the only ones capable of imposing 
limits on chiefly mana, any successful attempt at discredit-
ing them would effectively dilute the chief's spiritual 
prestige also. That, precisely, was the effect of the 
missionaries' attack against the priests. With the chiefs' 
mana now increasingly threatened by the missionary effort, 
the ideological basis of chiefly power was increasingly 
undermined. With that achieved, the possibility of intro-
ducing bourgeois government and law was heightened. 
In the long term, the success of the missionary effort 
hinged critically on the establishment of bourgeois law. 
Christian morals, after all had to be enforced. To that end 
the missionaries sought to secure for the church a place at 
the highest levels of the indigenous system of 'Btratificatiorr', 
an objective which they achieved with some distinction in the 
eastern areas of the country. 57 with that success behind 
them they drew up 'rules for civil government' at Viwa in 
October 1847, and realising the necessity of chiefly approval, 
the intention was that the rules be "recommended to Christian 
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chiefs as soon as it appeared expedient to do so". S8 The 
whole exercise did not, however, meet with success. Never-
theless, the very existence of the rules did prompt a few 
initial experi1~ents in bourgeois legal procedures. S9 More 
,j/ 
importantly, the introduction of bourgeois legal concepts 
served the critical function of 'legalising' land deaiings, 
and it was in the l840s that they were applied in that way 
for the first time - a development that added fuel to the 
increasing rate of land alienation that reached new heights 
in the l860s. 
These, then, were the first attempts at constituting 
the political and ideological forms of capitalist relations. 
Presently we shall see how the agents of capitalism sought 
to build upon those early efforts, a task that would become 
increasingly urgent as they set about constituting a capital-
ist agriculture. 
5. CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND CLASS FORMATION 
By the end of the l850s the European community was 
still small and the major economic activity was merchant 
trading, although a few were engaged in coconut planting. 
Capitalist agriculture, therefore, effectively did not exist 
prior to the sixties and it was not until then that it took 
root. 60 The American Civil War produced world wide cotton 
shortages which in turn prompted industrial capital in 
Britain to search for alternative supplies from other parts 
of the Empire. Cotton was already being grown in the country 
but its economic potential was not known. At the request of 
the Manchester Cotton Growers' Association, therefore, the 
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secretary of State for the Colonies commissioned the services 
of a botanist, Berthold Seeman, to investigate the potential 
of Fiji cotton. Seeman's favourable report, together with 
rumours of impending annexation from Britain sparked a sudden 
influx of white settlers from Australia and New Zealand, an 
influx that soon developed into a "rush" when a trade depres-
sion hit Australia in the late sixties. 61 In addition to 
aspiring capitalists these waves of immigration also brought 
fugitives from justice and other undesirables. 62 with their 
(often limited) capital, then, they came in search of land 
and labour and in the course of the cotton boom of the 
sixties, the foundations of a capitalist-dominated export-
oriented agricultural economy were firmly cemented. 
The boom lasted for only about five years and in that 
time cotton overtook coconut products as the main export 
commodity. In 1864, for example, coconut oil and fibre 
brought in £15,350 as against £3,260 for cotton. Three years 
later, however, these figures changed dramatically to £3,260 
and £34,004 respectively.63 Proportionately, this repre-
sented for coconut a drop from 77.5% to 8% of total export 
earnings compared with an increase from 15.2% to 85.1% in 
respect of cotton. M But more than the increased level of 
income, the sudden massive expansion in economic activity 
that came with the cotton boom had more far-reaching effects 
on the social formation. In Legge's words: 
The development of planting upon a large scale 
drew with it the paraphernalia of commerce -
the establishment of trading houses, which not 
only provided the mercantile services of the 
community but also acted as credit institutions, 
financing the extension of planting; the growth 
of a busy harbour; the appearance of a small 
professional community, and the rest. This 
was very different from the commerce in native 
produce which had been carried on before the 
planting development began, and represented 
rather the equipment of a vigorous young soc-
iety [in which] Levuka ... became the thriving 
centre of the commercial activities of the 
group.65 
Plantation and commercial capital,66 then, along with a 
small professional class, had made their entry and it was 
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the activities of these groups that was to shape the course 
of Fiji history until the colonial period. Capitalist rel-
ations thenceforth began to assert themselves and the pres-
sures they put on the tributory mode of production were more 
than the Fiji chiefly class were equipped to deal with. 
The vast increase in land alienation during the six-
ties had been well documented 67 and so too the often unscrup-
ulous practices of plantation capital as it went out in 
search of labour.68 Fijian labour was secured primarily 
through deals with the chiefs but the inadequacy of the 
supply, due in large part to a general reluctance on the 
part of Fijians to work in the plantations, forced planters 
to resport to the pernicious labour traffic from other 
Pacific Islands that came to be known as 'blackbirding' ,69 
In the jostling for land and labour, the moralism of 
the agents of capitalism was clearly shown. Intent upon 
securing the means of production that were necessary for 
capitalist agricultural production, they resorted to all 
sorts of practices and "acts of tyranny" that earned for the 
white community the reputation for being the cause of the 
growing chaos and lawlessness. Yet that chaos itself height-
ened the settlers' sense of insecurity for it put serious 
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stress on the production process. Capitalist production, 
they realised, depended for its success on political stabil-
ity, the existence of a legal system that was premised on 
the principles of private property, contractual obligation 
and so forth, and the existence too of law enforcement 
agencies. And the struggles over the vital question of land 
ownership demonstrates this very clearly. As Peter France 
observed: 
The planters' fences, armed labour and 'No Tres-
passing' notices gradually forced upon Fijians 
the realization that land had an intrinsic value 
and could be 'owned'. The man of property who 
'saw from his window nothing but his own' had not 
evolved in the indigenous cultures of the Pacific 
Islands and there was no traditional appreciation 
of the inviolability of his boundaries. As 
European notions of real property were slow to 
take root among Fijians, there was an increasing 
demand from the planters for European instit-
utions of government to keep them in absolute 
possession. 7o 
If capitalist relations were to become dominant, then 
order had to be created and a system of law introduced. A 
proposal was therefore made for the establishment of "a 
native government aided by the counsels of respectable 
Europeans".71 (emphasis added) There soon followed three 
attempts at constituting bourgeois government and law - in 
1865, 1869 and 1871. 72 Plagued with suspicion, hostility 
and conflicting interests, and based as they were on constit-
utional principles that were manifestly inappropriate for 
Fiji at that time, it was inevitable that all three would 
fail - and they did. More important, however, is the fact 
that all three experiments were geared towards the exclusive 
protection of white settler interests. 73 Plantation capital 
figured rather more prominently than commercial capital in 
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the first two attempts but with the collapse of the cotton 
industry following the sharp drop in the London cotton price 
in 1870,commercial capital rose to. dominance. As Derrick put 
it, "the political centre of gravity shifted from the country 
to the town". 74 But despite this inter-capitalist struggle 
for dominance, the bonds that held them together remained 
firm. This is demonstrated very clearly by the response of 
their 'Cakobau Government' to the difficulties that plantation 
capital was experiencing in securing cheap labour. The 
Cakobau Government of 1871, which lasted for two years, was 
the last of the three capitalist attempts at constituting 
bourgeois government. It was called the Cakobau Government 
because Ratu Seru Cakobau, the paramount chief of Bau and the 
man who 'ceded' Fiji to Britain in the following year, was 
installed as its figurehead. 
Mounting pressure from Britain, then, compelled plan-
tation capital increasingly to abandon its abusive labour 
practices, which included the use of forced labour and 
slaves. 75 Confronted, therefore, with the need to find new 
and more acceptable methods of coercing Fijians into wage 
employment, the Cakobau Government introduced poll and labour 
taxes and other sorts of labour arrangements. Although the 
tax system was a useful means of raising finance, clearly its 
main objective was to draw Fijians into the capital-labour 
axis. As Roth put it: 
Under the government of Cakobau ... the system 
of taxation of Fijians had been not so much a 
revenue measure as a means of providing labour 
for white planters ... 76 
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6. CRISIS AND STATE FORMATION 
As each of the successive attempts at forming a 
government failed, capitalist anxiety and desperation inten-
sified and by the end of the Cakobau Government, the devious 
and disreputable practices of the settlers had given rise to 
an intolerable situation and caused the Governor of New South 
Wales to make the following assessment: 
... the present constitution of Fiji is 
[unsuitable] to the conditions existing in 
these islands, and it is ho~eless to expect 
that any government established on such prin-
ciples could ever be able to protect from 
oppression and spoilation the native population 
of the country ... 
More pointedly: 
The white settlers are striving to subvert the 
King's Government, so as to reduce Fijians to 
serfdom and a feud has begun by Her Majesty's 
subjects whose principal object is to kill off 
the Pijians and acquire by murder, treachery 
and fraud their lands. 
They were, he concluded: 
... incapable of exerclslng the privileges of 
self-government with justice or with any regard 
for the welfare of the great bulk of the pop-
ulation. 77 
By 1873, then, the situation had deteriorated to such 
a point that annexation by Britain was all but inevitable. 
Trade was at a standstill, the country verged on bankruptcy 
and the level of discontent had reached new heights. 78 Up to 
this point the British state had been reluctant to colonise 
Fiji. An offer to cede a part of Fiji was made by the Tui 
Levuka in 1855 and was repeated a year later. Cakabou made 
an offer of the whole group in 1858. But because Fiji did 
66 
not promise the kind of economic or strategic advantage that 
might have merited annexation, all the early offers were 
declined. 79 
At the level of appearance, annexation by the British 
state in 1874 was a response to the chaos and instability 
caused by British subjects in Fiji. 8o The zenith of British 
colonial expansion had passed and there was a reluctance to 
take on new responsibilities, expecially if that entailed 
incurring costs which would not be greatly outweighted by 
whatever advantages annexation might bring. 8l On the other 
hand, however, liberal opinion in Britain forced the British 
state to act in a way that was consistent with the 'benevolent' 
image it had created for itself. When, therefore, the chaos 
wrought upon Fiji by British subjects became more than the 
ideology of benevolence could withstand, the British state 
accepted Cakobau's offer of cession in January 1873, and on 
10 October 1874 the Deed of Cession was signed. 
All this, however, is at the level of appearance. 
Beneath that level lay the real causes of annexation. Private 
capital in Fiji was predominantly Australian and as early as 
the 1860s attempts were made, in defence of those interests, 
to secure British annexation. 82 And the new influx of 
Australian capital in the early seventies - the "rush" of 
1870-1871 - heightened the need to constitute a capitalist 
state in Fiji. The failure of the early attempts at doing 
that threatened the continued viability of capitalist relat-
ions in the country. It is no coincidence, therefore, that 
as when the level of instability increased in the early 
seventies, the representatives of Australian capital took up 
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the cause of annexation with renewed vigour. 83 Quite simply, 
the successful consolidation of capitalist relations in Fiji 
depended critically on the formation of a capitalist state 
there. It is in those t~rms, therefore, that the annexation 
of Fiji needs to be understood, and it was justified by the 
ideology of British benevolence. 
With the process of state formation complete, the way 
was open for the completion of the transition to capitalist 
dominance. Ahead lay ninety-six years of colonial rule and 
an economy dominated by Australian capital. 
Before we take up the colonial period, however, the 
process of capitalist transformation in Fiji will now be 
reviewed. Not only will that yield a useful bird's-eye view, 
it will also bring into sharper focus the way in which the 
dialectics of capitalist penetration underlined the necess-
ity for a capitalist state. 
". SUMMARY: CONSERVATION-DISSOLUTION OF MODES 
OF PRODUCTION 
As has been argued, at the time of contact with Euro-
peans, Fiji was gripped in a process of profound structural 
change. Internal warfare gave violent expression to the 
internal contradictions that were responsible for the trans-
ition from a social formation consisting of small indepen-
dent units to one composed of large socio-political groupings. 
Contact, firearms, trade and missionary activity conditioned 
both the internal contradictions that the tribal wars expres-
sed and the outcome of the wars themselves. And the more 
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economic activity was organised along capitalist lines, 
expecially with the onset of a capitalist agriculture, the 
more the indigenous tributary mode of production became sub-
ordinated to the capitalist one. It is in this sense that 
the argument was advanced that capitalism was able upon its 
entry to condition the internal contradictions of the indig-
enous society and subsequently to subjugate them to its own. 
The dynamics of change in this period, in other words, had to 
do fundamentally with the dialectical struggle between the 
capitalist and the tributary modes of production. And in 
Bettelheim's notion of conservation/disolution of modes of 
production is to be found a useful tool for understanding the 
transformations occasioned by the penetration of capitalist 
relations. 
Bettelheim distinguishes social formations in which 
the capitalist mode of production is predominant from those in 
which they are not. In the latter formations, although other 
modes of production predominate, "the main tendency is not to 
the dissolution of the non-capitalist modes of production but 
to their conservation-dissolution". 8lf (original emphasis) By 
this is meant that non-capitalist forms of production are 
"'restructured' (partly dissolved) and are thus subordinated 
to capitalist production relations and so conserved". 85 This 
broad theoretical account of the impact of capitalist pene-
tration into non-capitalist social formations is similar to 
other (supposedly) marxist ones. Taylor, for example, concep-
tualizes it in terms "displacement" while others speak in 
terms of the "articulation" or "combination" of modes of 
production. 86 The superiority of Bettelheim's notion (and 
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Taylor's), however, stems from the fact that, unlike the 
others, there is intrinsic in it the idea of struggle, domin-
ance and control. Combination, for example, simply suggests 
a coming together, and articulation merely connotes interaction. 
Intrinsic in neither is the idea that with the introduction 
of the capitalist mode of production into a non-capitalist 
formation there is, necessarily, a tendency towards super-
cession and dominance. The notion of conservation-dissolution, 
implies precisely such a tendency and that is critical, for 
inherent in the capitalist mode of production is an imperative 
for expanded reproduction, an imperative that entails remov-
ing, wherever possible, obstacles that impede or obstruct the 
pace and course of capitalist production. And in the struggle 
for supremacy, the capitalist mode of production has every-
where and historically been confronted with internal forces 
that have, sometimes successfully, sometimes not, resisted iL 
What emerges at first, therefore, is an initial transitional 
period in which the contending modes seek to assert them-
selves through the struggles of their class agents. Out of 
the transitional struggle, Bettelheim says, eventually emerges 
a social formation in which the capitalist mode of production 
predominates. At that stage the predominant tendency becomes 
the "dissolution of the other modes of production and [the] 
sUbsumption of their agents to capitalist production relat-
ions". 87 Note that the tendency is only a predominant one 
for, as Bettelheim says, it is "combined with [the] secondary 
tendency, that of conservation-dissolution". 88 (original 
emphasis) In other words, the tendency towards conservation-
dissolution that is characteristic of transitional formations 
now becomes secondary to the tendency towards dissolution. 
It persists even though it is no longer predominant. 
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On the basis of this kind of analysis, the following 
periodisation can be made. The Pre~Capitalist Period covers 
the few centuries or so before contact during which Fiji was 
locked in a process of structural transformation that had its 
origins in the internal contradictions of the indigenous 
tributary mode of production. Following this is the Period 
of Capitalist Penetration. It spans the period from'~ontac~' 
to about the early 1860s during which the contradictions of 
the tributary mode of production were conditioned by the 
introduction of capitalist relations and became increasingly 
subordinate to them. However, the tributary mode, although 
'restructured' to a degree, nontheless remained predominant 
and transformation in this period was greater, visibly, at 
the level of the political and ideological forms of capital-
ist relations. In Bettleheim's words, the predominant 
tendency during this period was towards the conservation of 
the tributary mode. In the Period of Transition (from the 
mid-1860s to the early 1880s, approximately), however, that 
tendency began to give way to the predominance of the capi-
talist mode. By the time of Cession in 1874, the transition 
to capitalist predominance was not yet complete and it was 
precisely the failure of the agents of the capitalist mode of 
production to consummate that transition that paved the way 
for intervention by the British state. In the next chapter 
we show how colonial state policies, despite their moderating 
effect on that transition, nevertheless allowed it to proceed. 
And with the establishment of the sugar industry in the 1880s: 
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the transition was completed and the capitalist mode of 
production became dominant. The fourth period, then, the 
Period of Capitalist Dominance, runs from about 1880 onwards 
but before taking up the colonial period it is necessary to 
concretise further what might appear to be a somewhat laboured 
and theoreticist analysis. In particular, it needs to be 
fleshed out by feeding back into it the broad outlines of the 
dynamics of class relations. 
The balance of class forces in Fiji just prior to 
Cession was delicately poised. Firearms, missionaries, 
traders and later commercial and plantation capital had all 
left their mark on the contours and outcomes of indigenous 
warfare. Eventually a matrix of chiefly power emerged in 
which Bau, led by Ratu Seru Cakobau, was clearly the dominant 
power. Its dominance, however, did not extend over the whole 
country - the west and interior of Viti Levu in particular 
lay outside its domain. This absence of chiefly hegemony and 
the concomitant persistence of chiefly rivalries created 
space for capital. But the latter depended for its survival 
on the support of chiefs and so alliances of sorts were 
forged. The relative weakness of these alliances was demon-
strated vividly by the failure of the various attempts at 
forming a 'national' government. And it was on the establish-
ment of a strong central state which it could dominate that 
capital depended most critically for its survival and success. 
In a situation, then, where no single class or class alliance 
was able to predominate, a power vacuum was created and that, 
,together with various conjunctural factors, opened the way 
for external intervention and ninety-six years of colonial 
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state power. The Fijian commoners, for their part, remained 
as they had always been - an exploited class of producers. 
Increasingly, however, their place in the production process 
changed; from tribute-paying subjects they become predomin-
antly peasant producers, and to a lesser extent wage labour-
ers. Apart from occasional stirrings that were suppressed by 
the colonial state, therefore, their history was predomin-
antly one of labouring under indirect forms of exploitation. 
And it was precisely because their exploitation was not 
visible, the appearance was created that they were 'protected' 
by the colonial state. The reality, however, was different, 
as we shall see in the next chapter where we examine the 
structure of colonial capitalism in Fiji. To that we now 
turn. 
PART TWO 
COLONIAL CAPITALISM IN FIJI 1874 - 1960 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
In the previous chapter the argument was advanced that 
by the time of Cession the predominance of the tributary mode 
of production was beginning to give way to the capitalist 
one. Had that transition been allowed to follow its course 
and corne to fruition without external intervention by the 
British imperialist state, the character of the Fiji social 
formation might have been rather,different. In that respect, 
annexation was important precisely because early colonial 
state policy exerted a moderating influence over the trans-
ition to capitalist dominance. 
If the transition were to follow its 'natural' course, 
the consequences for the Fijian commoners at least might have 
been disastrous. As the main victims of capitalist agents 
intent upon consolidating capitalist relations in the counITY, 
they might well have been reduced to landless peasants and 
proletarians. At that particular historical conjuncture, 
however, the possibility of such an outcome was considered 
much too inconsistent with the whole ideology of Pax Brit-
annica. It is not surprising, therefore, that the perpetra-
tors of violence and chaos in Fiji were identified as lawless 
"British subjects" rather than as lawless agents of capital-
ism. British 'benevolence' thus served as a ready and exped-
ient ideology with which to justify external intervention in 
order that the Fijians might be 'protected'. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the structure 
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of colonial capitalism in Fiji,and the myth of protection 
provides a useful starting point for our discussion. We 
begin, therefore, with a treatment of that question as a 
prelude to our analysis of Fijian productive activity and 
class formation in the early colonial period. That will be 
followed by an analysis of the sugar industry and the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of exploitation in the colonial 
economy. 
1. THE IDEOLOGY OF PROTECTION AND THE MYTH OF 
FIJIAN MARGINALITY 
Arthur Gordon, Fiji's first substantive Governor, 
instituted what has come to be known as the "separate" system 
of native administration. In Chapter VII I describe the 
nature of that system but its relevance for the present 
discussion has to do with the way in which it has been under-
stood. The myth perpetrated by colonial historiography, that 
the system of native administration served to protect the 
Fijians, lies at the heart of the received wisdo~ and that it 
continues to hold sway is demonstrated, for example, by this 
recent statement from Premdas: 
by virtually establishing a state within a 
state, the Native Fijian Administration pro-
tected ... the Fijian. l 
The argument will be advanced later that rather than 
being a means of protecting the Fijians, the native adminis-
tration needs to be understood as the colonial state's 
response to the question of social control. The natives were 
'administered' under a 'separate' system because that was the 
most effective method of containing potential indigenous 
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dissent and rebellion against colonial rule. And it is that 
apparent separateness which lies at the root of the confusion 
about the place of Fijians in the productive process. 
Among liberal social scientists there has emerged the 
somewhat critical view that, politically and economically, 
the system of native administration effectively "marginalised" 
the Fijians - as a race, it needs to be emphasised. So that 
in MacNaught's works, for example, they were thrust from "the 
mainstream to the millpond".2 The pluralist perspective 
which runs through the various versions of this argument has 
thoroughly dominated writings on Fiji, and its major effect 
has been to obscure the dynamics of class relations that lie 
behind the inequality and exploitation that is so evident. 
Moreover, in the process of doing so, it has, because of its 
reliance on racial categories, served to perpetuate the pre-
dominance of racialist ideology, that highly effective smoke-
screen behind which are hidden the underlying causes of Fiji 
politics. writers who are victims of pluralism include 
Norton, Mamak, Premdas, Ali, Meller and Anthony, Milne, Lal 
and the leading exponents of the 'dual economy' thesis -
Fisk, Burns, Spate, Watters, Belshaw and Desai. 3 
In broad outline, the dualist thesis argues that as a 
result of the system of native administration, Fijians were 
largely confined to the 'subsistence sector' where they 
languished under unprogressive traditional practices and 
therefore were unable adequately to participate in the 
'monetary' or 'commercial' sector. The price of marginality, 
the argument runs, has been their lack of economic and 
political success as they were overrun by their more 
76 
'competitive' European and Indian counterparts. To be sure, 
attempts have been made at isolating subgroups within these 
racial categories, but that is what they have invariably 
remained - subgroups. The demands of open and critical 
scholarship have of course yielded the manda/tory references 
to class, but pluralism nevertheless reigns supreme. Little 
wonder therefore that, in the most fundamental way, Fisk's 
'holy trinity' - Fijian land, Indian labour and European 
capital - still informs and guides a misguided debate. 4 
The concept of the subsistence economy remains rather 
vague but essentially it refers to a subsector of the economy 
which is organised along so-called traditional lines and 
which is, in some (presumably meaningful but unspecified) 
sense, separate from the other subsector, the commercial one. 
The explanatory impotence of this kind of approach derives 
ultimately from its theoretical inadequacy. Moreover, its 
various applications to the Fiji case have suffered addition-
ally from an ability to make any empirical or theoretical 
sense of particular aspects which do not appear to conform to 
the model. And because this approach has so predominated 
among writings on Fiji, it needs to be confronted so that 
its inferiority to an historical materialist approach can be 
exposed. 
The argument has been made that the colonial state, 
confronted by ideological pressures, was forced to adopt 
policies which were supposed to provide protection for the 
Fijians. That, however, meant limiting production and there-
fore state resources. Compelled, therefore, to find ways of 
increasing production, efforts were made to attract overseas 
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investors. As a consequence, the early 1880s saw consider-
able infusion of Australian capital and a massive growth in 
sugar production. until then, ho~ever, the colonial state 
was forced to rely on existing production,and essentially 
that meant copra, cotton and other minor commodities for the 
export market. 
With the continuation of that pre-Cession pattern of 
production, the transition to capitalist dominance was aLlowed 
to continue. But it was also moderated significantly by 
state policies which interrupted the flow of labour. Plan-
tation capital's need for labour was severely frustrated by 
the effect of the 1875 measles epidemic (about 40,000 Fijians 
died in the early months of that year alone).5 The situation 
was compounded further by the system of native administratio~ 
and also particular state policies which were designed to 
restrict the flow of Fijian workers. That the latter were 
not totally successful is suggested by the fact that up to 
about 2,300 Fijians were employed by 1882.6 Clearly, there-
fore, capitalist pressures remained powerful despite the 
constraining effects of the colonial state's 'protective' 
native policies. And the strength of those pressures is 
further indicated by the enactment of the Native Labour 
Ordinance of 1883 as a response to capital's growing need for 
Fijian labour on the copra plantations. 7 Before the passage 
of the Ordinance, however, the transition to capitalist 
dominance was already completed. 
By 1879 sugar production was already underway in Fiji 
but by that time too the question of labour had become 
increasingly problematic. In the tragic aftermath of the 
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1875 measles epidemic, Fijian numbers had fallen and, also, 
indigenous resistance to plantation work was mounting. When 
it became clear, therefore, that an adequate supply of labour 
for the sugar industry could not be secured from local 
sources, Gordon, drawing on his experience in Trinidad and 
Mauritius, effected a solution which in one stroke completed 
the transition to capitalist dominance and at the same time 
changed the form (but not the content) of capitalist pro-
duction relations. 
His solution to the labour problem took the form of a 
massive importation of indentured workers from India which, 
over the course of 37 years between 1879 and 1916, brought in 
60,965 people. s That produced the displacement of Fijians by 
Indians as the major group at the exploited end of the 
capital-labour axis. 9 Wage labour was now predominantly 
Indian rather than Fijian; the form, not the content, of the 
wage relation had changed. 
In the subsequent near-total dominance of the sugar 
industry, Fijian involvement in the wage relation became 
proportionately less than that of their unfortunate Indian 
counterparts. And it is that racial displacement, compounded 
by the supposed marginalising effect of the system of native 
administration, which seems to be the source of the confusion 
which plagues the dual economy thesis. What the dualists 
have failed to see is that the displacement described here 
did not entail a rupturing, nor even a radical alteration, in 
the nature of Fijian links with the now predominant capital-
ist mode of production. Their objective positions as 
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producers and non-producers remained essentially the same 
and, as we shall see shortly, as that changed they became 
even more subordinate to capitalist relations. Fijian ties 
with the capitalist mode of production, in other words, were 
not weakened, let alone severed, and yet that is precisely 
what the notion of the subsistence economy implies. Their 
greater subordination can be demonstrated in the first place 
by the fact that Fijians continued to be employed as wage 
labourers - even if in fewer numbers than Indians. In 1884, 
for example, about a quarter of all able-bodied adult Fijian 
males were employed in plantations}O and in the years beyond 
the number of Fijian wage labourers increased further still 
as they found work outside of the sugar sector. 
But there are two additional aspects of Fijian subor-
dination to capital which dualists, and pluralists generally, 
have failed to grasp and which explain their inability to 
understand how tributary production relations can actually be 
subordinate to capitalist ones even though they might appear 
to be quite separate. The first is this: to the extent that, 
for the reproduction of their labour power, Fijian wage 
labourers relied, in addition to their wages, on the fruits 
of the unpaid labour of the large reserve army of relatives 
and friends operating under tributary production relations, 
so that extent the cost of labour to capital was effectively 
subsidised. with free supplies of food and other items from 
the village, it was not necessary for capital to pay Fijian 
workers the full value of their labour power. Moreover, in 
the absence of any organised labour pressure, capital was not 
really forced into paying the full cost of labour power. 
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Wages, therefore, could be and were kept low. But all of 
this is lost to those who remain captive to pluralism; they 
cannot see that hidden in the wage relation are mechanisms 
that allow capital to subordinate apparently separate, and 
supposedly unrelated, non-capitalist production relations to 
its needs. 
The second aspect further underlines the theoretical 
bankruptcy of the pluralist paradigm. The dialectical 
relationship between the capitalist and the tributary modes 
of production is not confined to the level of production. 
Fijian links with the capitalist mode were not limited to 
wage work but were also mediated through relations of 
distribution and exchange. It is simply not the case that 
all Fijians relied totally for all their requirements, 
material and otherwise, on the outputs of the tributary mode. 
From capital they bought clothes, food, work implements and 
so forth. Granted, the degree of Fijian involvement at the 
level of circulation may have been rather limited initially, 
but it certainly did not remain so for long. 
what all this points to are the continued and unin-
terrupted links between capitalist and tributary production 
relations. There are no separate sectors, only a continuing 
dialectical relationship between two modes of production 
which, with the establishment of the sugar industry, was 
altered in two major respects,but neither of which has been 
adequately understood by pluralists and dualists: first, 
there was a qualitative change whereby the transitional 
tendency towards the predominance of the capitalist mode of 
production,which had its origins in the cotton boom of the 
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sixties, was completed; and second, the racial character of 
the labour force changed from be'ing predominantly Fijian to 
become predominantly Indian - thi$ was a change only in the 
form of capital-labour relations. 
Bourgeois social science has been fooled by surface 
phenomena such as the small number of Fijian farmers, the 
absence of Fijian businesses and the supposed Fijian lack of 
'entrepreneurship' into believing that Fijians have been 
'marginalised' from the 'cash economy' and therefore need to 
be 'drawn back in'. The confusion clearly stems from the 
failure to distinguish ~gents (people) from their positions 
(producer/non-producer/consumer) in a system. Fijians were 
never 'left out'. They had always been 'involved' in the 
system of capitalist relations by virtue of the positions 
which they occupied in the sphere of production or circula-
tion or both. Rather, therefore, than not having been 
'integrated', they were not integrated enough - precisely 
the same sort of argument is made by radical women about the 
mythical 'exclusion' of women from the development process 
that male social scientists are so fond of talking about. 
Quite clearly, then, the pluralist approach cannot 
provide an adequate theorised account of the dynamics of 
capitalist penetration in Fiji. Handicapped severely by the 
absence of any notion of the dialectic and a pretence at 
being able 'objectively' to explain developments in Fiji, it 
has fallen consistently into the trap of supposing that an 
economy can be meaningfully broken up into separate cocoons. 
Its inability to make adequate theoretical and empirical 
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sense of the changes which have been described here thus lies 
exposed. Blinded by the very 'apparent' system of native 
administration, Fijian 'marginality' is then explained as an 
effect of that system rather than the wider process of 
capitalist penetration. The continuing viability of capital-
ist relations depends very critically on political stability 
and therefore adequate social control. It is in that light 
that the native administration needs to be understood; social 
relations in Fiji had to be restructured in order to provide 
an environment conducive to capital accumulation. We develop 
that theme more fully in a later chapter and turn now to the 
question of Fijian productive activity and class formation in 
the early colonial period. 
2. FIJIAN PEASANTS AND SEMI-PROLETARIANS 
In Chapter VII we discuss the way in which a certain 
section of the Fijian chiefly class carne to constitute itself 
as a Fijian 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. As for the commoners, 
two broad classes can be identified - the peasants and the 
semi-proletarians. 
Peasants are here defined as people engaged primarily 
in subsistence production. ll Their integration into the 
capitalist productive process is mediated through two con-
crete forms: their status as a reserve army and their role 
in the reproduction both of labour power and capital. As a 
reserve army, they constitute a pool of employable people who 
can be hired and fired as the requirements of capitalists 
dictate. Even when they are not actually engaged in wage 
work, however, their subsistence production effectively 
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serves to reproduce their labour power which is then contin-
ually available to capital. And because subsistence activity 
is unpaid, the cost to capital of reproducing labour power is 
effectively subsidised. In addition to this, Fijian peasant 
production also contributed to the reproduction of capital 
for, as we shall see, they were coerced through tax obliga-
tions to produce various types of commodity capital for the 
colonial state. 
Mao identifies various types of peasant but includes 
them all under one category - the semi-proletariat. 12 Here, 
however, the latter is retained as a separate category and 
basically for two reasons: first, to denote the process of 
proletarianisation and, second, to indicate that that process 
was incomplete. Fijians were hired as wage labourers from 
the first decade of the eighteenth century and initially were 
paid in kind. Most of them, however, were engaged only in 
part-time or casual work and it was not until the growth of 
the sugar industry that the trend towards full-time wage 
employment really began to surface. with the establishment 
of the mining industry in the 1930s that trend gathered pace. 
In the absence of statistical data, it is not possible 
to establish the size of the two classes of Fijian workers 
with any degree of accuracy. Some indication of the number 
involved in plantation work at various times has been pro-
vided but beyond that the picture is unclear. A further 
complicating factor is that it is often difficult in practice 
to sustain the distinction simply because most, indeed if not 
all, semi-proletarians reverted to being peasant producers 
when they were not engaged in wage work. These difficulties 
aside, the significance of these classes in terms of their 
place in the wider process of capitalist production can be 
readily established. 
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Fijian worker involvement in capitalist production in 
the period up to Cession has already been discussed. Follow-
ing the demise of the sandalwood and beche-de-mer trades, 
Fijian labour was employed in copra production on European-
owned estates. The cotton industry of the l860s drew many 
Fijian workers to the cotton plantations but with its 
collapse they were again concentrated in the copra estates. 
That was the situation at the time of Cession and it was to 
persist for many more decades. 
As an indication of the importance of Fijian labour in 
the early years of the colonial economy, figures for export 
earnings can be cited. In 1878, for example, the combined 
export earnings for copra and cotton were £142,194 compared 
with a mere £18,640 for sugar. 13 And as Table 4.1 below 
shows, it was not until 1883 that sugar surpassed copra as 
the main export commodity. 
Until such time as sugar established itself as the 
backbone of the colonial economy, then, copra and, to a 
lesser extent from 1877 onwards, bananas, would remain the 
most important commodities. The problem, however, was that 
at the time of formal colonisation they were not producing 
enough to meet the financial requirements of the colonial 
state. A critical question of the time, therefore, was how 
to increase production. A method had to be found which was 
politically acceptable, given the ideological constraints 
under which the colonial state was forced to operate. The 
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Table 4.1 Sugar and Copra Exports as Percentages 
of Total Export Earnings 1871-1885 
Copra Sugar Total 
Year £ % £ % £ 
1875 40,058 51.5 3,417 4.4 77 ,806 
1876 46,226 57.2 10,433 12.9 80,786 
1877 79,865 69.9 16,170 14.2 114,222 
1878 122,764 83.6 18,641 12.7 146,845 
1879 61,967 46.8 26,687 20.1 132,514 
1880 109,758 61. 7 20,920 11.8 177 ,912 
1881 87,084 66.7 23,254 17.8 130,534 
1882 66,672 40.8 58,587 35.8 163,435 
1883 81,772 25.5 175,555 54.8 320,183 
1884 69,642 20.7 218,224 65.0 335,646 
1885 64,390 20.1 211,729 66.1 320,504 
Source: F.E. Wilkins, Labour Proplems in Fiji 1860-1940, 
pp. 101, 102. 
problem of securing labour was worsened by the measles 
epidemic and increasing Fijian reluctance to work, and yet 
overtly coercive measures could not be employed to bring more 
Fijians into the wage relation - they had, after all to be 
'protected'. To resolve the dilemma, the colonial state 
introduced a system of "communal" taxation by which villages 
were required to pay their taxes in kind, in agricultural 
produce. That system was preferred over the poll-tax system 
which was introduced by the Cakobau Government in 1871 
because the latter, as Gordon realised, would not yield much, 
especially with "a popUlation nine-tenths of which possess~d] 
no money". 14 
The "communal" taxation system proved successful, for 
not only did it bring much-needed export earnings (£457,776 
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between 1877 and 1881, for example), 15 it also boosted tax 
revenue. Between 1875 and 1879, for example, as the table 
below shows, it accounted for an average of 30% of all total 
state revenue. Up to 70% of native taxes were paid in 
copra 16 and most of the copra and bananas were produced by 
Fijians. 17 
Table 4.2 Native Communal Taxes 1875-1879 (£) 
Native Tax as % of 
Year Native Taxes Total Revenue Total Revenue 
1875 3,499 16,255 21.5% 
1876 9,343 38,524 24.3?6 
1877 15,150 46,688 32.4% 
1878 18,178 61,021 29.8% 
1879 19,885 67,771 29.3% 
Source: F.E. Wilkins, Labour Problems in Fiji 1860-1940, p. 85. 
Politically and ideologically, the system of communal 
taxation was the most expedient method of coping with the 
colonial state's financial needs. The Fijian peasants were 
not required to work for the planters and could produce 
their tax obligations as they wished. But for capital too, 
the system had its advantages. To the extent that the 
state's financial needs could be partly met through the 
peasants' taxes, the tax pressure on capital was corres-
pondingly reduced. So in that way too peasant productive 
activity contributed to the reproduction of capital. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth c~ntury, then, 
class transformation among the Fijians was quite advanced. 
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From a system of class relations based upon peasant produc-
tion and the appropriation of tribute by the chiefly classes, 
the class structure was determined primarily by capitalist 
relations. A semi-proletarian class had emerged, and 
surplus peasant production was now appropriated increasingly 
by the colonial state. In Chapter VII we shall see how in 
the early years of the twentieth century fundamental attacks 
were made by the state on the payment of chiefly tribute. 
We will also see how those attacks were linked very closely 
to the other major dimension of Fijian class transformation -
the emergence of the Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie. But 
for now we turn to the very foundation of colonial capital-
ism in Fiji - the sugar industry. 
The sugar industry dominated the colonial economy and, 
as the following table shows, accounted, an average, of over 
60% of total export earnings. Because of that dominance the 
struggles that were fought in the sugar sector had a funda-
mental influence on the wider class struggle. Sugar capit-
al's dominance, together with its personal connections with 
the state apparatus, meant that it was able to deal directly 
with the colonial state and, therefore, there was no need to 
secure special representation in it. For the Indian workers, 
on the other hand, until they formed trade unions in the 
1940s, such representation was absolutely vital as there 
were no other avenues through which they could realistically 
advance their interest. And it was that struggle for 
representation that dominated Fiji politics from about 1916 
Table 4.3 
Year 
1885 
1890 
1913 
1923 
1937 
1948 
1958 
1965 
1970 
Sugar Exports as Percentages of Total 
Export for Selected Years 
Percentage 
66% 
74% 
73% 
75% 
65% 
55% 
64% 
71% 
65% 
Sources: See Footnote 18. 
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to the mid-thirties. The dynamics of that struggle, however, 
can be fully understood only against a background of the 
material deprivation and exploitative social relations which 
spawned it. 
3. STATE AND SUGAR CAPITAL: THE EARLY YEARS 
with respect to economic policy, Gordon's attitude 
was shaped by the basic axioms of British colonial policy. 
One of these was that colonies should at the very least live 
within their means, the other that rapid economic develop-
ment of a colony would automatically serve the interests of 
the empire and hopefully also its inhabitants. Moreover, 
there was the added belief that "the quickest way of devel-
oping a colony's resources was obviously to encourage the 
investment of European capital and the employment of native 
labour, subject [of course! ] to reasonable safeguards to 
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protect the natives from exploitation".19 
The point has been made that because the level of 
production in Fiji at the time of.Cession was insufficient to 
meed the colonial state's financial needs, attempts were made 
to attract foreign capital into Fiji. Gordon's faith in the 
white settlers in Fiji was clearly not very great. As he 
put it: 
It will require a new set of men to come in 
before there is any real properity in the 
colony. Most of the present holders of land 
will sell, and as is usual in all new settle-
ments, the first-comers will be ruined and go 
to the wall. 2o 
Local Europeans woulq not do, but other Europeans might, and 
so he turned to New Zealand and, more importantly, to 
Australia in search of capital. The major result of his 
approaches was the entry of the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company into Fiji. 
In the early stages, the company was able to exert 
considerable leverage on the state. Land and labour would 
have to be available, so much depended on the state ensuring 
that would be the case. Resident white settlers had been 
pressing Gordon to ratify their claims to about 854,000 
acres of land which they had alienated before Cession. Tied 
as he was, however, to his (supposed) commitment to the 
principle of the inalienability of native land, only 517 of 
the 1,683 applications were granted. On the other hand, the 
pressing need to attract foreign investment was growing ever 
more urgent. In that situation, he 
was determined that his land policy should not 
prevent the inflow of new capital, and that 
sufficient freehold land for plantation agri-
culture should be left in the colony so that 
the short terms of native leases would not 
deter investors.21 
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And so it was that the colonial state facilitated the acquis-
ition of land for sugar capital. Examples of the early 
instances of state activity in that respect were the sale of 
500 acres to Stanlake Lee & Co. and 1,000 acres to the CSR, 
both of which, moreover, as Moynagh argued, were clear 
violations of the principle of native land inalienability.22 
Curiously, after having established that they were violations, 
Moynagh then rather timidly suggested that "perhaps" the 
sales reflected state sympathy for big business. 23 
In the years to come more and more land was to be 
bought by sugar capital, most especially by the CSR, and 
invariably the supportive hand of the colonial state lurked 
somewhere in the background. Not always, however, for there 
were instances of Fijian resistance to the alienation of 
their land. In October 1905, for example, the CSR sought, 
with the assistance of the colonial state and one of its 
Fijian functionaries, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, to alienate some 
7,000 acres of land at the back of Nausori. The landowners, 
however, successfully resisted. 24 
The main point to be drawn from all this is that in 
the early years of colonial rule, the whole thrust of the 
colonial state's economic policy was to provide the condit-
ions necessary for private foreign investment, most espec-
ially in the sugar industry. Land was made available and, 
as noted in the previous chapter, the state's response to the 
question of an adequate labour supply was the introduction of 
the diabolical system of indenture. Gillion's assessment of 
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the relationship between the colonial state and the CSR 
during these years is therefore clearly wide of the mark. 
The critical importance of. that relationship is beyond 
dispute,and because Gillion's assessment of it holds so much 
sway, a close examination of his views is necessary. The 
relationship, he said, was one of "mutual respect and part-
nership".25 On what grounds did he advance this argument? I 
quote him at length: 
In these years the role of the C.S.R. Company 
in the determination of the policy of the Fiji 
Government was undoubtedly an important one, 
although it was not as great as it is popularly 
believed in Fiji today to have been. It is true 
that the company was directly or indirectly res-
ponsible for a considerable proportion of the 
colonial's revenues: that the government tried, 
insofar as was consistent with other policies, 
to meet its wishes in regard to labour, land, 
communications, and other matters; that on the 
local level there were many opportunities for 
the company's officers to influence government 
officials (intentionally or unintentionally); 
and that ... the company knew more about emig-
ration from India than the Fiji Government and 
on occasion even made its own representations 
to the Indian authorities. Still the extent of 
the company's power should not be overestimated. 26 
Before considering Gillion's particular reasons as to 
why the company's power should not be overestimated, it is 
necessary first to comment on the particular issues which he 
raises here. The crucial point that seems to have eluded 
Gillion is that if the CSR was to invest in Fiji, then 
conditions in the country would have to be attractive. More 
importantly, no party except the colonial state was in a 
position to provide those conditions. Granted, the state had 
certain 'obligations' to the Fijians, but if in meeting those 
obligations the state created an investment climate which was 
not very attractive, then it would have been forced into 
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deciding between discharging its obligations to the Fijians 
and foregoing potential overseas investment on the one hand, 
or, on the other, neglecting those responsibilities and 
drawing in the much-needed capital. As it turned out, 
however, the need for such a choice did not arise. Political 
stability had been largely achieved and sufficient land and 
labour could be provided without having to reverse its native 
policy. So the central point is that an inflow of new 
capital was what the colonial state actively sought. It 
could not afford, therefore, to jeopardise its chances of 
success by letting its native policy deter potential inves-
tors. Not did it. While, therefore, Gillion is correct in 
saying that the company "was prepared to work within condit-
ions laid down by the government", 27 that is not the crucial 
point. The point is that those conditions had to be, and 
were, made attractive enough for the CSR to come in and stay 
for nearly a century. 
Now the basis on which Gillion argued that the power 
of the company should not be overestimated is the following: 
firstly, company policy was that managers should not sit in 
the Legislative Council; and secondly, the company "did not 
interfere in affairs which did not interest it".28 The first 
of these is discussed at length in the next chapter but, to 
anticipate, company officials were not allowed to sit in the 
Council simply because special company representation was not 
necessary. Indeed, as we shall see later, politically, it 
was against the company's interests to have separate repre-
sentation. As for the second reason, Gillion elaborated by 
saying that the company's interest was in making profits and 
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not in running the colony. That kind of bourgeois thinking 
explains his apologetics. Running the colony and making 
profits were both parts of a single process. Rather like 
Poulantzas, Gillion is here implying that production relat-
ions are confined to the immediate production process when in 
fact they encompass social relations in their totality. For 
Gillion, wider social relations were not the concern of the 
company although "of course" there were some aspects of them 
that "interested it". Of particular importance were those 
state actions which for Gillion, constituted evidence that 
the company did not always have things its way. He gives the 
following examples: 
the government refused on several occasions to 
meet its wishes over proposed land acquisitions, 
and imposed restrictions in immigration and 
labour matters once prosperity had returned to 
the colony [after the economic crisis of the 
late '80s/early '90s] and there was no danger 
of economic collapse. 29 
Here again the limitations of Gillion's analysis shows 
through. The dynamics of struggle in Fiji was not confined 
to the state and the company. There were other forces at 
work which cannot be ignored - the vagaries of the inter-
national market, Fijian jealousy over their land, the growing 
pressure on the colonial state to get rid of at least the 
worst forms of labour exploitation, and so forth. So if the 
state acted against the interests of the company it was 
because the balance of forces in the wider class struggle 
allowed or forced it to do so. And that it never at any 
stage seriously jeopardised the company's operations is 
demonstrated most clearly by its reaction to the various 
threats that the company made to withdraw from Fiji. As 
Moynagh argued: 
Whenever officials felt that CSR might be 
forced to withdraw they would intervene - how-
ever reluctantly - to provide it with support. 30 
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Gillion himself, in his second book, documented very well the 
reaction of the colonial state and the British imperialist 
state to the company's 1921 threat to withdraw from Fiji. 
And yet with all this evidence he still failed to see how it 
was that, on the whole, the state acted in the interests of 
the company. Moynagh too falls into the same trap. As a 
rider to his statement quoted above, he added this qualific-
ation: "on the other hand, the government never wanted CSR's 
interests to be paramount". 31 (emphasis added) Victims of 
empiricism, neither Moynagh nor Gillion were able to go 
beyond statements of intention nor use the evidence to under-
stand and explain the real dynamics of the relationship 
between capital and the state, so that the best that they 
have to offer are empiricist explanations. And the problem 
is that they pose the wrong question, which is whether or 
not, observably, the state acted in the interests of capital. 
The real issue, however, is whether or not the state main-
tained the general conditions necessary for capital accumul-
ation. And that it did. 
It is quite clear, therefore, even on the basis of the 
evidence that people like Gillion and Moynagh provide, that 
the colonial state acted in the interests of the company. 
The whole burden of the foregoing discussion has been to show 
that this was the case from, and especially at, the beginning 
of the CSR's operations in Fiji. As Wadan Narsey put it, in 
what is by far the most penetrating and incisive analysis of 
the CSR in Fiji: 
CSR from the beginning had the most powerful 
leverage on the Colony that it could possibly 
have - power over its survival. 32 
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And it had that power because of its sheer size in relation 
to total social output. 
The onus of attracting foreign capital into Fiji, then, 
fell almost totally on the colonial state and, because that 
was the case, it was not necessary for sugar capital in the 
early years to rely on the support of local capital. A 
sufficiently attractive environment had been created and 
sugar capital was set to get on with the business of making 
profits. 
The dominant faction of sugar capital, the CSR, knew 
well from its Australian experience that costs were usually 
greatest at the level of production. From the outset, then, 
the company was concerned to concentrate its activities as 
much as possible in the branch of the production process 
which not only was the most profitable but also which it had 
the greatest expertise in, i.e. milling. The dynamics of 
class struggle in the colonial sugar economy can therefore be 
understood through an analysis of how the company pursued 
that strategy. 
4. THE PLANTATION SYSTEM 
Initially the company had hoped to be able to rely for 
its supply of cane on planters already living in the vicinity 
of its mills.- As it transpired, however, they were unable to 
meet all of the company's requirements,and so it was forced 
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to develop its own plantations on a much larger scale than it 
had originally intended and would have preferred. Neverthe-
less, an early start was made on the process of shifting the 
burden of cane production on to others. As early as 1890, it 
began leasing parts of its estates to some of its former 
plantation managers and "others possessed of some little 
capital", i.e. local Europeans, who in turn employed Indian 
labour. 33 Although initially slow, this process soon gath-
ered pace and by the early 1900s the size of these non-
company plantations ranged from 600 to 1,000 acres. 34 Other 
local Europeans soon joined these planters as cane suppliers 
but, unlike the latter, they produced on a subcontracting 
basis, and the land which they farmed was either owned by 
themselves or leased from other local European landowners. 
By about 1914, the plantation system was fairly well devel-
oped and although it was a success in terms of the company's 
broad strategy, it was also inherently contradictory. 
Central to this strategy was the perceived advantage 
of spreading costs and risks. Economically it was beneficial 
in that it shifted the burden of labour control and minimis-
ing production cost from the company to the white planters. 
Politically, also, it seemed to hold some advantage, for by 
engaging local Europeans (who were well represented in the 
Legislative Council) in the industry, the company just might 
secure an additional line of defence in the colonial state. 
But in that, it was, to a very large extent, to be disappoin-
ted. What is more, it could hardly have been otherwise. 
Ranged as they were against each other as rival factions of 
the capitalist class, but with the company being much more 
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powerful than the planters, it was inevitable that the latter 
would resort to political means in an attempt to redress the 
balance. By the turn of: the century, for example, the 
planters had become increasingly concerned about the kind of 
control which the company was exerting over their economic 
activities, and when planter pressure increased, the company 
threatened to withhold advances if the planters publicly 
criticised it. One of the planters' responses to that threat 
was to elect as their representative in the Legislative 
Council one J.B. Turner, a longstanding critic of the CSR. 35 
But what, precisely, was the nature of the company 
control over the planters? For the company, the overriding 
consideration was the procurement of cane at minimum cost, as 
there was little that it could do about the price of sugar in 
the international market. To maximise its profits, then, it 
had to minimise the cost of cane, and its refining. 
Over its own estates, it maintained a virtual strangle-
hold, the most unfortunate victims of which were, of course, 
the indentured Indian workers. Such direct exploitation of 
the planters, however, was not possible. Alternative and 
more subtle forms of control were therefore necessary, and 
the bluntest of these was the company's ability to determine 
the price of cane that it would pay. But it also had 
recourse to other methods which took the form of control over 
cultivation methods, tenancy agreements, rent charges and 
credit facilities. Through methods such as these, the 
company was able to ensure minimum costs and maximum profits. 
Its control over the planters was not absolute, however, and 
the planters' political clout was something it had constantly 
to heed. But that notwithstanding, company control was 
sufficient to "realise the aim of getting cheaper supplies 
than had it grown the cane itself~.36 
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So long as the company could maintain a high degree of 
control over the planters, then, the plantation system would 
be maintained, provided, of course, that ample cheap labour 
was available. In the end, that was the critical issue, so 
that when it became evident around the mid-1910s that the 
system of indenture was likely to end, the company was forced 
to change tack. The plantation was about to give way to the 
small farm. 
5. THE SMALL FARM SYSTEM 
As knowledge of the brutality of plantation life 
spread, international pressure against the indenture system 
intensified and in 1916 the last shipload of workers left 
India. The response by the CSR on the one hand, and the 
planters on the other,to the potentially serious labour 
shortage that would follow the end of indenture took differ--
ent forms. Because the planters were much more dependent on 
it than the company, they openly agitated for the retention 
of indenture. But their importance as producers was rapidly 
decreasing,and eventually they lost. The company, on the 
other hand, responded by accelerating the restructuring of 
the production process. Forced by the threat of a labour 
shortage it decided upon the large scale settlement of 
Indians as tenant farmers. 37 The company was now mov~ng to 
expand, not establish, the small farm system for its origins 
lay way back in the mid-1890s. 
99 
From 1894, the company began leasing some of its land 
in relatively small lots - typically between 100 and 200 
acres 38 - to Indians who had completed their indenture. As 
the number of Indian tenant farmers began to grow, planter 
concern increased, for the Indian canegrowers were now direct 
competitors and threatened to do them out of business. As 
Gillion put it: 
This rise of the Indian cane farmer was a pointer 
to the future of Fiji ..• To the planters, the 
unindentured Indian was a potential competitor, 
who picked the eyes out of the land available 
for leasing and, with his frugality and industry, 
was a threat to cane prices. 39 
It is not surprising, therefore that 
as early as 1903 there was unrest among planters 
who believed that the C.S.R. Company intended 
to replace the European planter with the small 
Indian farmer who could accept a lower price 
for cane, and some wanted a law passed to forbid 
Indians to produce except as paid labour. qO 
History was to vindicate that view, for while the small farm 
system was, up to 1912, seen primarily as a means of augment-
ing the supply of labour in the plantations, from that year 
onwards it came increasingly to displace the plantation as 
the backbone of the industry. And with the cessation of 
indenture, the demise of the white planters was hastened 
along. The CSR would have preferred to continue buying its 
cane from the white planters because it doubted the capacity 
and reliability of Indians when working without supervision. 
Settlement of disindentured Indians, on the other hand, meant 
that the company would no longer be dependent on labour from 
India. q 1 
By 1912, then, as the threat of a labour shortage 
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loomed large, the CSR turned its attention increasingly to 
the settlement of Indians as tenant farmers. The General 
Manager of the company wrote: 
The only means by which the position could be 
rendered really secure would be to make the 
industry independent of immigration by perman-
ently attaching to it the people introduced for 
plantation work. 42 
One of the early problems in settling the Indians had to do 
with their lack of security. Both in terms of assets and 
land ownership, it was so hopelessly inadequate that a state 
proposal for a scheme to provide financial assistance to 
allow them to establish themselves as farmers was held in 
abeyance pending the outcome of another suggestion, the 
leasing of Fijian land. Attempts to secure more Fijian land 
failed, however, and by 1918 the need for it no longer 
existed, for by then indenture had ended and the problem now 
confronting sugar capital was how to cope with the threat of 
an ever-growing labour shortage. About 3,000 indentures were 
expiring each year and if new land were to be made available 
to these newly 'freed' workers, there would not be enough to 
work in the plantation. To overcome thRt problem, the 
company accelerated the transition to the small farm system, 
and the restructuring of the production process went through 
three stages. 
Between 1912 and 1916, the company instituted the 
'settlement area system' whereby individual Indian tenant 
farmers were allocated company plots of between four and 
eight acres. The smallness of size meant, however, that 
family members were forced to take off-farm employment. 
Moreover, the productivity of these farms was generally lower 
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than that of the large plantations. Q3 From 1916, therefore, 
a new system was adopted. Here a larger area of land was 
leased jointly to a group of farmers and it was divided into 
equal strips each of which became the responsibility of one 
member of the group. But this too failed. The company had 
hoped to benefit both from a sense of group responsibility 
for the whole farm and a sense of individual identification 
with respect to individual strips. On both counts, however, 
its hopes were not realised. For although farmers tended to 
gang together and work the whole farm on a co-operative basis, 
differences in land quality produced varying yields which in 
turn produced different incomes. Moreover, there were dis-
putes between growers and labourers,and in the end the exper-
iment was abandoned. Now at the same time as this system of 
production was operating, another experiment was also being 
conducted. Under the latter/whereby large farms, ranging in 
size from 50 to 70 acres, were leased to individual farmers. 
Many of those farmers, however, subdivided their land and 
sublet plots at a profit. Legal disputes were common and 
with the growing squabbling and dissatisfaction, this exper-
iment was abandoned in 1923. 
The failure of these experiments resulted in a major 
re-think and in 1925 it was decided that while settlement of 
Indians as tenant farmers was still central to corporate 
production strategy, the size of the farms had to fall some-
where between the two extremes that had been experimented 
with. Rather, therefore, than "leasing farms of only four 
acres, or of between forty and fifty acres, it was decided to 
lease them in sizes of eight to twelve acres". QQ That was 
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the optimum farm size, and by the early 1.930s settlement on 
that basis was effectively completed, and so was formed the 
small farm system of the Fiji sugar industry. 
6. EXPLOITATION IN THE SUGAR SECTOR 
During the indenture period, the extraction of surplus 
value hinged on long working hours - 50 hours per week - and 
the task system whereby set pieces of work had to be comple-
ted within specified periods of time. 45 At first, adminis-
tration of the indenture system was not rigorous but the 
economic crisis of the mid-1880s soon changed that. Just a 
few years after the CSR commenced operations in Fiji, the 
sugar price on the London market fell from 19 shillings per 
hundredweight to 13s.3d in 1883 and Ils.9d in 1884.46 To 
complicate matters, the company was unable at that time to 
secure enough labour because it was in short supply in India. 
In February 1883, the company threatened to withdraw and 
"transfer all its interests to some more favourable quarter ".47 
with the drop in sugar prices, the situation became even more 
desperate and the colonial state, whose "solvency was depen-
dent on the company's survival", knew it. As the Acting 
Colonial Secretary wrote: "were the affairs of the Colonial 
Sugar Company to be crooked, the colony would utterly 
collapse" . 48 Sugar capital's costs clearly had to be red-
uced and, for its part, the colonial state, as Gillion put it, 
"anxious to prevent the colony from becoming insolvent, was 
reluctant to put difficulties in their way". 49 Cost reduc-
tion essentially means heightened exploitation of labour and, 
as the table below shows, it took fully years for the 
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abysmally low wages of the indentured workers even to double. 
Table 4.4 Average Indenture Daily Wage Rates (Pence) 
Year Male Female 
1887 7.28 4.43 
1890 9.64 5.39 
1901 11.17 6.05 
1908 12.05 6.13 
1915 12.52 6.54 
1919 15.62 8.79 
Source: W. Narsey, "Monopoly Capital, White 
Racism and Superprofits in Fiji", 
p. 85. 
That workers in Fiji were being exploited much more intensely 
than the company's white field workers in Australia is 
suggested by the fact that the wage differential between them 
was of the order of one to seven. so 
The hand of the colonial state in the heightened 
exploitation of labour is shown most clearly in its failure 
to ensure adequate conqitions of employment and also in the 
bias of its legal apparatus. Before they were accepted, 
indentured workers were passed by health inspectors, but the 
effect of the appalling conditions of plantation life was . 
tragic. This is reflected in the large number of suicides 
and the "frightful" mortality rate. From 1902 to 1912, for 
example, there were 926 suicides and between 1909 and 1914 an 
average of 8% of all adult Indian immigrants died within five 
years of their arrival. 51 The significance of the latter 
figure is further underlined by the fact that 70% of all the 
immigrants were between the ages of 20 and 30 years -
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precisely the age group when the mortality rate, theoretic-
ally, should be low. 52 
In the face of a harsh work pace, physical brutality, 
sickness, and a general air of misery and low morale, it was 
inevitable that the level of work performance would fall 
below that which sugar capital would have preferred. And it 
did. But in addition to its own methods of dealing with the 
problem, sugar capital also relied on the state's legal 
machinery to exact further punishment upon the workers, and 
for that purpose, the centrepiece of colonial labour law was 
the insidious and highly repressive Master and Servants 
Ordinance of 1888. 53 An indication of the effect of the law 
on Indian workers is shown in the tables below. As Table 4.5 
shows, not only was the overall conviction rate among Indians 
very high but also their conviction rate for labour offences 
was even higher. The incidence of the major types of labour 
'offences' - unlawful absence, failure to complete tasks, 
refusal to work, and want of ordinary diligence - are shown 
in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.5 Annual Conviction Rates Among Indian Immigrants 
Year Overall Rate (a) Rate for Labour Offences 
1889 60% 73.4% 
1894 81% 82.5% 
1901 62% 91.8% 
1907 59% 91.3% 
1910 64% 89.9% 
Sources: (a) W. Narsey, "Monopoly Capital, White Racism 
and Superprofits in Fiji", p. 90. 
(b) 
(b) V. Naidu, The Violence of Indenture, p. 53. 
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Table 4.6 Categories of Labour Offences Among Indian Immigrants 
Failure to Complete 
Tasks or Refusal want or Ordinary 
Year Unlawful Absence to Work Diligence 
1887 1,814 52% 357 10% 1,308 38% 
1894 1,295 72% 504 28% 
1904 947 49% 820 42% 171 
1909 379 34% 732 66% 
Source: W. Narsey, "Monopoly Capital, White Racism and Super-
profits in Fiji", p. 90. 
So when profits were threatened by the behaviour of the 
9% 
workers, the legal apparatus of the colonial state was put 
into action to ensure that they were punished. The legal 
system, as Narsey put it 
was quite amenable to trumping up criminal 
categories and treating large parts of the 
population as 'criminals' if the interests of 
capital so demanded. In the era concerned, 
could this also have been done to whites in 
the British Empire? 54 
So much for British justice. 
with the end of indenture and the onset of the small 
farm system, sugar production relations underwent a change 
in form but not in substance. Sugar capital's major concern 
remained the same - to keep the cost of cane as low as 
possible. But as the table below shows, although the small 
farm system was fast becoming the backbone of the industry, 
company plantations remained an important source of supply 
until the early thirties. 
The period between 1914 and the late twenties, then, 
was the period of transition from the plantation to the small 
farm system. with two systems existing side by side, it was 
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Table 4.7 Areas of Cane Cultivated 1925 - 1944 ( % ) 
Table Area Company European Tenant 
Year Cultivated Estates Planters Farms Contractors 
1925 64,396 52 7 10 31 
1926 67,494 45 6 13 36 
1927 70,526 41 5 16 38 
1928 75,007 32 3 28 37 
1929 77,645 26 3 33 38 
1930 78,250 22 2 36 40 
1931 78,373 16 1 44 39 
1932 80,939 11 1 49 39 
1933 83,692 9 1 51 39 
1934 84,497 6 1 53 40 
1935 87,738 5 1 52 42 
1936 89,924 5 1 52 43 
1937 91,197 5 1 50 44 
1938 91,474 4 52 44 
1939 91,812 3 52 45 
1940 91,624 3 52 45 
1941 92,628 3 50 47 
1942 94,046 3 50 47 
1943 90,913 3 50 47 
1944 89,059 3 51 46 
Source: C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry of Fiji, p. 38 
inevitable that the major form of surplus appropriation would 
be different in each. In the plantation sector it involved 
keeping wages to a minimum and in the small farm sector it 
involved control over both the price of cane paid to the 
farmers and also production methods. 
Taking the plantation sector first, for 1921, for 
example, when the daily wage was 2s.6d, Ali estimated that 
the annual income for a family of four was a deficit of 
£11.11.3~.55 His general conclusion, therefore, was that 
a cane labourer with a wife and two children 
at the best could eke out an existence and at 
the worst live under deprivation. This of 
course assumes that each man had only two 
children, and ignores the .tendency of Indians 
to have large families; those with more than 
the average accepted here would have had con-
siderable difficulty. 56 
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It is instructive to note here that while most of the estim-
ates put forward at the time were similar to Ali's,57 the one 
advanced by H.V. Tarte, plantation capital's leading spokes-
man in the Legislative Council and the largest copra plant-
ation owner in the colony, purported to show that the average 
Indian couple could save over £39 per year! 58 Such a 
ridiculous claim served only to expose his class interests, 
for it is clear that not only were Indian wages totally inad-
equate for a decent standard of living, but also that black 
workers were paid far less than white workers. Table 4.8 
below shows the wage differential in 1921, and it demon-
strates very clearly that racism was absolutely central to 
capitalist profit. 
Table 4.8 Pay Levels for Black and White Employees 
(£ per year) 
White - Artisans 
- Clerks 
- Overseers 
- Managers 
Black labour, whether 
of Indians or Fijians, 
including food. 
£156 - 185 
£144 - 300 
£200 - 250 (plus house - £500) 
£300 - 400 (plus house - £500) 
£40 
Source: W.A. Chapple, Fiji: Its Problems and Prospects, 
pp. 161-163. 
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In the small farm sector, exploitation of labour took 
two forms. The first of these was the company's control over 
the price that it paid for cane. By the mid-twenties, as 
Table 4.7 above shows, white planters were quickly being 
squeezed out by the CSR. The low cane prices that it paid to 
the Indian farmers were insufficient to maintain white living 
standards and the company simply was not prepared to forgo 
profits by paying white planters high prices. Implicit in 
this strategy, of course, and as Narsey correctly pointed 
out, was a thorough-going, deep-rooted racism. The assump-
tion was that "white planters could not be forced to accept, 
or could not be expected to accept, low prices for cane but 
that Indian farmers would". 59 What is more, precisely the 
same attitude was taken by the colonial state, as the follow-
ing statement from an official publication shows: 
the price offered by the company (CSR) though 
not sufficient to enable European planters to 
produce sugar cane at a profit is sufficiently 
high to enable Indian farmers to extract a good 
livelihood from the cultivation of cane and the 
company has thus been able to maintain its 
60 normal level of output of manufactured sugar. 
The second form of exploitation of Indian labour under 
the small farm system had to do with various types of con-
trol that the company was able to exert over the production 
of sugar: regulation of cultivation practices; surveillance 
by company overseers; legally binding agreements with stip-
ulations on the tending and harvesting of cane and also the 
varieties of cane to be grown; control over fertilisers and 
other means of production through the use of hiring arrange-
ments; and finally control over tenancy agreements and the 
provision of credit. 61 Of these, the last two were 
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particularly important. Tenancies could always be terminated 
and although one year's notice was required, the CSR, as a 
clear warning to the colonial state, inserted a clause into 
its tenancy agreements that they could be terminated without 
notice "in the event of legislation being passed limiting its 
freedom of action in the manner of buying crops ... or other-
wise affecting the conditions under which it carries on its 
operations".62 With regard to the provision of credit, the 
company understood well its importance as a method of control. 
Having limited resources with which to finance their consump-
tion and production expenses, especially in the eighteen-
month period between planting and harvesting, farmers found 
it extremely difficult to escape this instrument of control. 
All the more so, moreover, as company interest rates were 
well below the exorbitant rates that were charged by Indian 
storekeepers and money-lenders. 63 
with these forms of control over the farmers and the 
low wages of the plantation labourers, it is not surprising 
that the company was able to reap a massive amount of 
profit. Some idea of the size of that profit is provided by 
Narsey. On the basis of conservative estimates of produc-
tion costs and a generous definition of a reasonable rate of 
return, he estimated that over the ten-year period between 
1914 and 1923, the CSR made "superprofits" of about thirteen 
million pounds. 64 Compared with a mere £3.7 million profit 
for its Australian operations for the same period,65 the 
results of the Fiji operation clearly show just how important 
the country was for the CSR. Little wonder, then, that the 
company's historians were able to make this observation: "in 
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Fiji during the 1914 - 1924 period, CSR enjoyed the most 
spectacular monetary success in its history". 66 Moreover, 
the vastness of the profits enabled the company to sell Fiji 
sugar very cheaply to its New Zealand branch. Consequently, 
as those historians added, "New Zealand consumers received 
the benefit and the company was thanked by the New Zealand 
Government". 67 
The thirties was a period of relative calm in the 
sugar industry, but the outbreak of the second world war soon 
plunged it into crisis again. The main allied basYs in Fiji 
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were located in north-west viti Levu and stationed there were 
about 70,000 Allied troops. 68 It is not surprising that the 
economic effects of the war were felt most keenly in that 
sugar-dominated region. As prices and the costs of sugar 
cane production soared, the burden on the farmers weighed 
progressively heavier. In 1937 the first farmers' associa-
tion, the Kisan Sangh, was formed and in March 1943 it 
pressed the CSR to increase the price of cane. But sugar 
wage workers too were feeling the pinch of rising costs and 
in the following June 600 mill workers in Ba and Lautoka went 
on strike in support of demands for higher wages. In July, 
the farmers followed suit. 
Like the first farmers' strike of 1921 (which is 
discussed in the next chapter), the farmers' strike of 1943 
lasted about six months. The company, with its vast resour-
ces, was well-placed to sit out the strike and so refused to 
bow to the farmers' demands. 69 Mill workers were given a 
wage increase 70 but as for raising the price of cane, that 
was another matter altogether. What is more, the company 
111 
benefitted from the support of the colonial state, acting as 
it did "on the assumption that the existing basis of the 
industry - the ownership of the mills by a private company -
should be maintained". 71 This is illustrated, for example, 
by its attitude towards farmer representatives who approached 
it towards the end of the year. The farmers, it said, were 
not prepared to sell cane to the company at the existing 
price but were willing to sell to the state at a IIfair price". 
That, however, the state would not sanction, as it "would 
imply that its intervention had put an end to the existing 
cane purchase agreement" between the company and the farm-
ers. 72 Any resolution of the dispute would therefore have to 
be on terms that would allow the CSR to continue in Fiji. 
Adequate returns to the company and the international price 
of sugar were given in the company-farmer equation, and the 
income of the farmers simply had to be adjusted to these. 73 
The state appointed the Jenkins Commission to inves-
tigate the dispute and as to be expected it recommended 
against raising the price of cane. 74 The farmers of course 
rejected all the findings of the Jenkins Commission and it 
was only the combined influence of two developments that 
caused the strike to end. One was the address by Ratu Sukuna 
to farmers in Nadi in January 1944. To the farmers he took a 
message from the governor advising them to return to work. 
Upori delivering the message he added a contribution of his 
own which took the form of a threat to farmers who were 
leasing Fijian land. Failure to return to work, he threat-
ened, meant that they might have difficulty renewing their 
leases. 75 That of course broke the back of the strike and 
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the farmers returned to their fields. However critical 
Sukuna's intervention was, the strike had already begun to 
crumble well beforehand because of (and this is the second 
major reason for the failure of the strike) the bitter 
rivalry between the two cane-growers' associations - the 
Kisan Sangh and the Maha Sangh. The details of that rivalry 
will be taken up later when we consider the growth of organ-
ised labour. Suffice to note at this point that it put the 
striking farmers at a distinct disadvantage and also that 
behind it lay the machinations of Indian commercial capital. 
Against the united front of sugar capital and the colonial 
state, therefore, the farmers were deeply divided, s6 it is 
not altogether surprising that they were defeated. Behind 
that division were personal, religious, and cultural differ-
ences, but its major cause lay in the threat which the Kisan 
Sangh's proposed co-operative store posed for Indian traders. 
As part of its counter-offensive, Indian commercial capital 
encouraged the formation of the rival Maha Sangh and in the 
subsequent bitterness and rancour, it was the farmers who 
lost out. Yet again were they victims of bourgeois Indians. 
Defeated, the farmers could only hope that the 1944 
Shepard Investigation into the economics of the sugar 
industry, which had been proposed late in the previous year, 
might recommend more favourably than the Jenkins Commission. 
But again they were to be disappointed. Farmers' real 
incomes had clearly declined, but the Shepard Report recom-
mended that the cane price remain unchanged. 76 There was no 
question at all of the report jeopardising the company's 
operations, designed as it was simply to reconcile the 
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growers to the continued presence of the CSR in Fiji. 77 And 
that it did so very well is shown by the high profits that 
the company was able to continue to make. Now Shepard, des-
pite acknowledging that the company had claimed excessive 
depreciation allowances by revaluing their assets, neverthe-
less accepted the company's profit figure for the period 
1930 to 1942 of £625 million. Narsey, however, taking 
excess depreciation into account, estimated the true profit 
figure to be around £2,994 million. 78 Now the price of sugar 
rose in the late forties so that would have accounted in part 
for the company's continued high profit levels and, as 
Moynagh pointed out, the CSR was able, in the late forties, 
to increase its profits by more than twice the 1942-43 
level.79 But Moynagh was working largely on the company's 
reported profits. If excess depreciation and transfer 
pricing were to be taken into account, the true figures 
would in all likelihood have been much greater. 
The strike of 1943, then, was the most significant 
expression since 1921 of the fundamental contradiction 
between sugar capital and the cane producers. On both 
occasions capital not surprisingly won, given its vast res-
ources and the helping hand of the colonial state. For the 
next twenty years it would continue to reap high profits, 
and farmer agitation for a better cane price in 1960 would 
fail yet again. Not until 1970, when the company could no 
longer count on a compliant state, would the farmers record 
their first significant victory. But that would only be 
after nearly a century of blood, sweat and tears. Caught as 
they were in a vice-like grip of sugar and plantation 
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capital, receiving little support from the colonial state, 
and subjected to the worst forms of white racism, there was 
little option but to labour on, relatively powerless to 
alleviate to any significant degree their poverty and misery. 
Here, however, an important qualification needs to be made. 
It was not the case that all farmers were equally powerless, 
and the varying degrees to which they were able to cope with 
the exploitation by sugar capital was a function of class 
differentiation among the farmers themselves. So it is to 
that question that we now turn. 
Reference is occasionally made in the writings to 
large, wealthy Indian farmers and small, poor ones. Never, 
however, has the question of class differentiation within 
the Indian farming community' been fully investigated. Such 
a detailed analysis, however, lies outside the scope of this 
study, so what follows is only a brief sketch. 
The point has been made that by the early 19308 the 
small farm system had effectively been established as the 
backbone of the sugar industry. Now justification for the 
use of the term small farm system derives from the smallness 
of the farms under this system compared with those under the 
plantation system. Typically, farms in the plantation 
sector were well in excess of 100 acres but if that figure 
is taken as the basis for comparison, then by far the 
majority of the farms in the non-plantation sector were very 
small. As Table 4.9 below shows, in 1944 82.2% of the tenant 
farmers and 75.5% of the contractors had farms of 13.9 acres 
or less. The fact that by 1944 97% of the total sugar 
acreage was cultivated by 'small farmers', together with the 
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Table 4.9 Size of Farms in 1944 
Acres Tenant (Nos. ) % Contractor (Nos. ) % 
Small Farms 
Up to 1.9 141 
2 - 3.9 22 640 
4 - 5.9 105 711 
6 - 7.9 114 440 
8 - 9.9 595 373 
10 - 11.9 1,502 378 
12 - 13.9 960 238 
3,298 82.2 2,921 75.5 
Medium Farms 
14 - 15.9 440 214 
16 - 17.9 189 132 
18 - 19.9 41 82 
20 - 21. 9 24 101 
22 - 23.9 6 67 
24 - 25.9 2 70 
702 17.5 666 17.2 
Large Farms 
26 - 27.9 2 51 
28 - 29.9 1 39 
30 - 39.9 3 99 
40 - 49.9 4 48 
50 - 59.9 2 19 
60 - 69.9 11 
70 - 79.9 6 
80 - 89.9 3 
90 or over 4 
12 0.3 280 7.3 
Total 4,012 100.0% 3,867 100.0% 
I 
Source: C.Y. shepad', the Sugar Industry in Fiji, p. 39. 
/ 
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fact that the range in farm size within the small farm 
sector was quite wide, makes it important to inquire into 
the significance of variation in farm size. The argument 
advanced here is that it was precisely because of that kind 
of variation that there were significant differences in the 
farmers' ability both to withstand the exploitative pres-
sures of sugar capital and also to accumulate wealth. In 
both these respects, those with large farms were much better 
placed than those with small ones. In Table 4.9, therefore, 
the distribution of farms according to size has been class-
ified into three broad groupings - small, medium and large. 
That classification is based on Mao's analysis of the peas-
antry in China. 80 
As the table shows, the vast majority of farmers had 
small plots. Also, the proportion of tenant farmers with 
medium-sized farms was similar to that for contractors -
about 17% in each case. Out of a total of 292 large farms, 
however, only twelve were held by tenant farmers while the 
remaining 280 were held by contractors. In proportionate 
terms, only 0.3% of tenant farmers compared with 7.3% of 
contractors were large farmers. What is significant, more-
over, is that the acreage of the latter was much greater 
than that of the former. As Table 4.10 below shows, while 
the few large tenant farmers accounted for only 1% of the 
total tenant farm acreage, the large contractors accounted 
for 25.7% of the total contractor acreage. The total tenant 
farm acreage was 45,332 acres; the total contractor acreage, 
41,105 acres. 
Table 4.10 
Small Farms 
Medium Farms 
Large Farms 
Total 
Actual 
Total Acreage 
Estimated Distribution of Sugar Acreage 
in 1944 (%) 81 
Tenant Sector Contractor Sector 
Acres Tenants Acres Contractor 
75.2 82.2 45.2 75.5 
23.8 17.5 29.1 17.2 
1.0 0.3 25.7 7.3 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
45,332 acres 4,687 acres 
.1 
Source: C.,Y. Shephar~, The Sugar Industry in Fiji, 
p. 39. 
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Two important features emerge from this body of evi-
dence. The first is the existence of a class of large 
farmers who, more importantly,were almost certainly capital-
ist farmers. That they were capitalist is based on the 
argument that they depended on wage labour. Statistics on 
wage employment on these farms are not available but a strong 
case can be made that such employment was considerable. In 
the first place, with the large size of these farms it is 
unlikely that family labour would have been sufficient. 
Also, as Moynagh pointed out, with the changing demographic 
structure of the Indian farming community, by the mid-1940s 
the responsibilities of farm management was passing increas-
ingly to a new generation of young farmers who "were less 
willing than their fathers to undertake the very unpleasant 
job of harvesting cane, preferring to pay for substitutes 
instead". 82 Finally, it has been estimated that in 1943 
approximately 50% of the cane cutters in Viti Levu were 
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hired. 83 Now in terms of our understanding of the nature of 
exploitation in the sugar industry, the existence of this 
class of capitalist farmers had important implications. On 
the one hand, they were exploited by sugar capital but, on 
the other, they exploited Indian workers. What this means is 
that while they had an objective interest in the struggle 
against sugar capital, they also had a contradictory interest 
to keep their involvement in that struggle to a minimum 
because they had the most to lose. 
The second important feature about class differenti-
ation within the Indian farming community is that most of the 
large farmers were contractors. This is highly significant 
for it strongly suggests that the comparative inability of 
tenant farmers to expand their activities and accumulate 
wealth had much to do with the highly restrictive conditions 
of their tenancy agreements. It also reinforces the point 
made earlier that those conditions served as forms of com-
pany control and exploitation of tenant farmers. But another 
aspect of that exploitation is also important. Although most 
of those farmers were tenanted to the CSR, many landlords 
were Indian and that the latter were not averse to exploiting 
their tenants is confirmed by the fact that quite often the 
security of their leases was less than that of CSR tenant 
farmers. 84 What is also very important is that included in 
the Indian landlord class were leading Indian political 
figures. A.D. Patel, for example, a champion of the farmers' 
cause and one of the main Indian political leaders, was 
himself a landlord and he too exploited his tenants. In 
1947, for example, the gross rental from one of his leases 
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was four times as high as that of similar CSR leases. 8s 
In addition to the dimensions of class differentiation 
discussed so far, there is one other. Indentured workers 
who, upon completion of their contracts, decided to remain 
in the country, tended either to take up sugar farming on 
their own account (and many of them prospered 86 ) or to branch 
out into other sectors of the economy. Of the latter, some 
took up wage employment while others set up small businesses,87 
principally in the wholesale and retail trade and public 
transport. Often those businesses were family concerns but 
increasingly they hired wage labourers. Of the Indians who 
came to the colony as free immigrants, especially those who 
arrived in the early twenties, many soon made an impression 
on the economy as agriculturalists, shopkeepers, artisans, 
and professionals, notably as lawyers. 
As a result of these developments, there appeared 
within the Indian community small capitalists, a petty bour-
geoisie, and a professional class. And because these bour-
geois classes conducted business primarily within their own 
racial community, the Indian working classes, particularly 
the poorer farmers and the wage earners, were subjected to 
further exploitation from members of their own race. Further-
more, as we shall see in the next chapter, because the 
Indian political leadership was drawn primarily from the 
Indian bourgeois classes, the interests of the small farmers 
as a class, and similarly those of the wage labourers, were 
seriously compromised in the course of the struggle for 
Indian political representation. But before we take up that 
question, it is necessary first to consider the nature of 
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exploitation in the non-sugar sectors. 
7. EXPLOITATION IN THE NON-SUGAR SECTORS 
Although the sugar industry continued to be the most 
important through the inter-war years, the 1930s also saw 
the emergence of the gold-mining industry. Employment 
statistics for the period are not available but it has been 
estimated that the number of wage workers probably never 
exceeded 10,000. 88 It is reasonable, on two grounds, to 
expect that most of those workers were concentrated in the 
sugar and gold-mining industries: first, in 1946, for 
example, only one third of all working males were wage or 
salary earnersi 89 and secondly, sugar and mining capital 
were by far the largest employers. What this suggests, 
therefore, is that exploitation through the wage relation 
was concentrated in the sugar and mining sectors, at least 
up to the end of World War II. After the war, there was a 
dramatic increase in wage employment (see Table 4.11 below). 
Sparked off initially by the reconstruction effort, it was 
later sustained by the impact of "the world-wide post-war 
economic boom. As a result, the level of exploitation of 
wage labour outside the sugar and mining sectors increased. 
And it is not coincidental that the immediate origins of the 
organised labour movement as it exists today lie in the 
immediate post-war period. 
In a later chapter that development will be taken up 
in some detail, but here the point should be made that for 
the greater part of the colonial period the exploitation of 
labour outside the sugar and mining sectors was mediated 
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Table 4.11 Wage Employment 1946 - 1960 (' OOOs) 
Year Number Year Number 
1946 14.5 1954 20.7 
1947 15.5 1955 21. 7 
1948 16.1 1956 23.1 
1949 16.8 1957 23.4 
1950 17.5 1958 23.6 
1951 17.8 1959 22.4 
1952 19.1 1960 23.9 
1953 19.7 
Source: Narayan, Fiji: A Case Studl;' in 
Political Economy, p. 141. 
predominantly through mechanisms other than the wage rel-
ation. The argument advanced here is that those forms of 
exploitation had to do essentially with confining labour 
(which, as we shall see, was predominantly Fijian) to two 
types of unprofitable activity: production of export cOmIDod-
ities or subsistence production. The former yielded little 
return, and the latter had the important effect of keeping 
the cost of labour power to a minimum 
Since aggregate economic statistics for Fiji were 
compiled for the first time in the early 1950s, the most 
reliable set of figures to show the relative importance of 
the various sectors of the colonial economy before that time 
relates to exports. These are presented in Table 4.12. 
Taking broad historical averages, sugar accounted for 60%, 
coconut products 20%, and bananas 2% of total export earn-
ings. It is instructive to compare the productivity of 
these sectors by comparing these export figures with the 
total acreage for each sector. Table 4.13 below shows 
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estimated acreages for the period 1949 to 1958. 
Table 4.12 Major Exports for Selected Years (%) 
Coconut 
Year Sugar Products Gold Bananas Others 
1917-21 (a) 69 21 10 
1937 66 19 4 8 3 
1938 55 11 29 3 2 
1939 54 8 35 1 2 
1948 58 25 14 1 2 
1953 65 21 8 3 3 
1958 64 23 9 1 3 
1968 (b) 82 17 1 
Sources: (a) Colony of Fiji, 1921, pp. 71, 75. 
(b) The Role of Investment in Fiji, p. 123. 
For other years, S. Ali, Economics and Economic 
Development in Fiji, p. 305. 
Table 4.13 Estimated Acreages for Major Crops 
1949 - 1958 ( % ) 
Year Sugar-Cane Coconuts Bananas Others 
1949 31 42 0.8 26.6 
1950 28 48 0.9 23.1 
1951 28 48 1.1 22.9 
1952 29 47 1.3 22.7 
1953 29 47 1.4 22.6 
1954 30 46 1.4 22.6 
1955 32 47 1.4 19.6 
1956 31 45 1.4 22.6 
1957 33 45 1.6 20.4 
1958 34 44 1.3 20.7 
Source: S. Ali, Economics and Economic Development ..... , 
P. 273. 
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Again taking broad historical averages, sugar accounted for 
30%, coconuts 46% and bananas 2% of total cultivated acreage. 
The two sets of averages are set out in the table below and 
so too, as a rough index of productivity, the percentage 
ratio of export earnings for each acre of cultivated land. 
Table 4.14 A Broad Historical Comparison of the Productivity 
of the Major Agricultural Exports 
A 
% of Total 
Export 
Earnings 
Sugar 60 
Coconut Products 20 
Bananas 2 
B 
% of Total 
Cultivated 
Acreage 
30 
46 
1.3 
C 
Productivity 
AlB 
200% 
43% 
154% 
The two most important points to emerge from this set 
of data is the comparatively low productivity of the coconut 
industry and the marginal importance of the banana industry. 
The major significance of these points is that it was pre-
cisely in these two industries that Fijian workers were most 
heavily concentrated. Carleen O'Loughlin, who compiled the 
country's first set of national statistics, classified 70% of 
gainfully employed Fijians under the heading "Agriculture and 
Villages" but she also noted that the vast majority of these 
were either part-time or casual workers. Less than 5% were 
hired on a full-time basis. 90 So not only was Fijian labour 
concentrated in export sectors that were either relatively 
unproductive or of marginal importance in the wider context 
of the national economy, but also very little of it was 
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hired on a full-time basis. The general conclusion to be 
drawn from this is that for the majority of Fijian workers, 
cash income was insufficient to r~produce their labour 
power. And the other side of this is, of course, the heavy 
involvement of Fijians in subsistence production. 
Table 4.15 Acreages Under Crops in 1958 (%) 
Europeans and 
Crop Fijians Indians Part-Europeans others Total 
Root Crops 88.2 8.0 3.8 100 
Bananas 92.0 0.2 0.4 100 
Coconuts 50.0 3.1 45.2 1.8 100 
Sugar-Cane 6.6 91. 7 1.7 100 
Source: Burns Report, p. 35. 
As Table 4.15 above shows, root crops, which form a 
major part of the diet of the greater part of the total pop-
ulation, were produced primarily by Fijians. Table 4.16 
below reinforces that point but it also reveals another 
important feature which is that cash income from the sale in 
local markets of root crops and other subsistence commod-
ities like fish and vegetables accounted for a very small 
percentage of total Fijian income. Fijian agricultural cash 
income accounted for an average of about 25% of total income. 
The sources of agr icul tural cash income are shown in Table 
4.17. Copra earnings and agricultural rents account for the 
greater proportion of the total agricultural cash income. 
Included in the 'Other' category are earnings from banana 
exports and the sale of forest products. If we assume, 
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conservately, that those two sources account for one half of 
all 'other' agricultural cash sources, then proceeds from 
the sale of subsistence goods in domestic markets would 
account for about 3% or 4% of total Fijian income. 
Table 4.16 Fijian Income 1950 - 1953 (%) 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
Total Income 
Cash Non-Cash 
45 
49 
49 
51 
55 
51 
51 
49 
Agri. Income as % 
of Total Income 
75 
76 
77 
75 
Agri. Cash Income as 
% of Total Income 
21 
25 
27 
26 
Source: Abstracted from C. O'Loughlin, The Pattern of the Fiji 
Economy, p. 37. 
Table 4.17 
Year Copra 
1950 12.2 
1951 16.1 
:1952 18.4 
1953 16.7 
Fijian Agricultural Cash Income as % of 
Total Fijian Income 1950 - 1953 
Agri. Cash Income as 
Agri. Rent Other % of Total Income 
1.5 7.3 21 
1.2 7.7 25 
1.1 7.5 27 
1.0 8.3 26 
Source: Abstracted from C. O'Loughlin, The Pattern of the 
Fiji Economy, p. 37. 
The very low level of Fijian cash earnings from the 
sale of subsistence goods in domestic markets holds the key 
to our understanding of the other major mechanisms of 
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exploitation in the non-sugar agricultural sector. How is 
that low level to be explained? In the absence of hard data, 
no firm explanations can be given but reasonable inferences 
can be drawn. with a large area of the total agricultural 
acreage under Fijian subsistence cultivation (about 12% in 
1958 91 ) there was clearly an ample supply of subsistence 
commodities for sale locally. Because earnings from that 
source were so low, however, it is likely that prices were 
also low. Another possible 
is that supply was probably 
explanation for the low prices 
,f '( + "Vc!LS; 
greater than demand, for ~ ~ 
was less, then prices would have been higher. And so too 
earnings. The strong suggestion, therefore, is that Fijian 
subsistence production served the very useful purpose, as 
far as capital was concerned, of supplying cheap subsistence 
goods to the local market. The effect of that was to keep 
the cost of labour power low. Fijian subsistence production, 
in other words, subsidised the cost of reproducing labour 
power and thereby enabled capital to minimise wages. That, 
then, was the second major mechanism by which Fijian labour 
was exploited. 
Most bourgeois writers, however, have been to 
grasp this because they have concentrated on surface appear-
ances. The foremost example of this is Fisk, who writing in 
1970, saw in the Fijian condition a "leisurely way of life" 
which he described as "subsistence affluence. 92 Hence the 
notion of a Fijian subsistence sector which is "marginal" to 
the "economic mainstream". Such is the stuff of which myths 
are made. What Fisk and his dualist colleagues fail to see 
is that the so-called subsistence sector was actually 
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integral to the wider process of capitalist production. The 
standard explanations of Fijian economic backwardness that 
these writers advance are therefore couched in terms of 
Fijian lack of motivation and entrepreneurship and the con-
straining influence of the communal social system. 93 Although 
these sorts of factors might have some importance, they beg 
the prior question as to why it is that Fijians are lacking 
in these respects? 
Shunted as they were into export sectors that offered 
little hope of economic success, and confined to a very 
limited range of occupations, it is not surprising that they 
did not develoWl the kind of confidence, skill or entrepre-
neurship that is considered so vital for economic advance-
ment. Subsistence production too held out little hope of 
success in that respect. The point, therefore, is that the 
Fijian labouring class suffered from a structural disadvan-
tage that simply got progressively worse as "entrepreneurs" 
in other racial groups built upon their historically-evolved 
competitiveness. One of the major aims of the post-colonial 
state, as we shall see, was precisely to redress that bal-
ance. The whole thrust of its strategy in that respect was 
to develop the weak indigenous bourgeoisie. A major reason 
for its failure, however, is that its policies to not take as 
their point of departure the immense structural disadvantage 
identified here. How can an indigenous bourgeoisie be 
expected to develop when the scale and extensiveness of 
established capitalist competitors are so large and state 
assistance to prospective indigenous capitalists is so small? 
We take up that question in greater detail later, but it 
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does have some relevance for the present discussion. 
Fiji is an agricultural country and the state has 
always emphasised the need to develop agriculture. It has 
also stressed its commitment to indigenous welfare and the 
need to secure Fijian economic advancement. The evidence 
suggests, however, that this is little more than lip-service. 
Between 1950 and 1953, for example, the non-sugar agricul-
tural sectors, precisely where Fijians were concentrated, 
accounted for slightly more than one third of the net domes-
tic produc t. 94 State expenditure on agriculture over the 
same period, however, was a mere 4% (see Table 4.18 below). 
With such meagre assistance from the state, little wonder 
that the Fijian labouring classes were kept economically 
backward. 
Table 4.18 State Expenditure for Selected Years ( % ) 
1938 1950 1951 1952 
Administration 32 25 26 26 
Law and Order 6 7 7 7 
Social Services 20 30 32 33 
Agriculture 3 4 4 4 
Infrastructure 16 14 15 15 
Defence 1 5 5 4 
Public Debt 16 6 5 5 
Pensions 6 5 5 5 
Subsidies 4 1 1 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: C. O'Loughlin, The Pattern of the Fiji 
Economy, p. 49. 
1953 
27 
7 
31 
4 
16 
4 
5 
5 
1 
100% 
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With that kind of disadvantage, moreover, there was 
always the potential for class tension. Various means had 
to be found, therefore, of containing that tension; hence 
the average of 30% of state expenditure spent on social 
services. Furthermore, lest Fijian labour or another section 
of the exploited classes decide to wage open struggle, it 
was necessary that the repressive apparatuses of the state 
be adequately equipped to cope with such action. The average 
of 12% of state expenditure spend on order and defence, 
therefore, needs to be understood in that light. 
8. SUMMARY 
Such, then, was the nature of exploitation in the 
colonial economy, an economy which was dominated by Austra-
lian sugar capital. The way is now clear for the next 
chapter where the question of bourgeois class organisation 
will be examined. A central theme of that chapter will be 
the way in which the class struggle took the form of the 
struggle for Indian political rights. And the argument will 
be advanced that the historically-evolved, society-wide 
forms of bourgeois organisation were largely responses to 
the increasingly assertive Indian working classes. In the 
course of the struggle for Indian political rights, however, 
the interests of the Indian labouring classes were seriously 
compromised by an Indian political leadership which was 
dominated by the emergent Indian bourgeoisie. 
Before taking up these issues, however, and by way of 
a general background, something needs to be said at this 
point about that section of the ruling class which was to 
playa pivotal role in the struggles - local commercial 
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capital. 
Although the whole of the capitalist class benefitted 
from the expansion in economic activity generated by the 
growth of the sugar industry, all was not always well between 
its various factions, and those of rivalries, that between 
sugar and commercial capital was the most significant by 
far. In the early years, for example, the CSR, as a means 
to keep costs down, imported some of its supplies. That, of 
course, hurt commercial capital, especially two of its 
leading members, Henry Marks and Maynard Hedstrom, who 
incidentally were members of the Legislative Council. 95 In 
western Viti Levuj moreover, the company established several 
of its own retail outlets and drew much business from shop-
keepers there. 
Competitors though they were, when labour threatened 
their profits, sugar and commercial capital closed ranks and 
one of the major effects of the crises of the early twenties 
was the increased collaboration between them: 
from at least the First World War, the company 
had patronised local traders where possible and 
had directed its custom specially to those with 
political influence. It purchased farm imple-
ments, for example, not from Burns Philp but 
from Morris Hedstroms because J.M. Hedstrom, 
who had a large stake in the firm, was a prom-
inent European and sat on the Executive Council 
(as also did H.M. Scott, CSR's legal advisor 
in Fiji) .96 
with those sorts of linkages, the chances of the working 
classes securing representation in the colonial state as a 
means by which to advance their interests were greatly 
reduced. And for the Indian working classes in particular, 
those chances were reduced even further by the bourgeois 
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nature of the Indian political leadership. Above all, how-
ever, the formidable power of white capital, and in partic-
ular local white commercial capital, was the decisive factor. 
This will become evident as the names of its leading mouth-
pieces, names like Hedstrom, Scott, Marks, Crompton, Barker 
and Ragg, recur again and again. And it was precisely 
people like these that the governor had in mind when he 
wrote in 1937: 
Fiji is a peculiar colony - sui generis indeed. 
The presence of a resident European population, 
their long isolation from the world and the 
limitation even of recent contacts to Australia 
and New Zealand has bred a particular insular-
ity of its own. A few big men have obtained a 
stranglehold on the place - they have won their 
way to the top and mean to stay there. The 
underdog is underpaid and powerless. A few men 
control everything behind the scenes and even 
Government has been run with a strong bias. 97 
The Colonial Secretary, J. Barton, was rather more specific 
about who het~ought were the powerful in Fiji. As he 
commented in 1942: 
a main factor in the government of Fiji was 
the influence wielded by a small oligarchy of 
local commercial interests. 98 
We turn now to the question of bourgeois class organisation 
and the struggle for political representation. 
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CHAPTER V 
FORMS OF ORGANISATION I: BOURGEOIS ORGANISATION 
Of the entire population just before Cession, local 
white capitalists were by far the most familiar with bour-
geois government. They also had the most to gain from such a 
system of government, and if they could not dominate such a 
government, then, at the very least, they could still benefit 
from having a direct part in it. Little wonder, therefore, 
that they sought, successfully, to carve out a niche for 
themselves in the capitalist colonial state. Later their 
participation in the state would take other forms, but 
initially it consisted of membership in the Legislative 
Council. 
The early system of representation in the Legislative 
Council formed the basis of the electoral system as it is 
known today. But how, theoretically, is the electoral system 
to be understood? 
As has been argued, the function of the capitalist 
state, essentially, is to provide a society-wide system of 
organisation within which the process of capitalist produc-
tion and accumulation can be conducted. In order to manage 
class conflict,capital, for its part, is able to institute 
various forms of bourgeois organisation - employer organis-
ations, political parties, and social clubs within the firm, 
for exaTIlple. In terms of managing the totality of the class 
struggle, however, the effectiveness of these forms of 
bourgeois organisation is limited. What is needed, therefore, 
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is a society-wide system of organisation the purpose of which 
is to manage class contradictions at that wider level. There 
is a need, for example, for bourgeois law and a national 
legal system, penal institutions, a police force, and so on. 
Furthermore, bourgeois democracy has as one of its corner-
stones, the ideology of "fair representation", and in the 
electoral system that ideology supposedly finds concrete 
expression. Theoretically, then, state organisations and 
practices need to be understood as constituent parts of a 
society-wide system of bourgeois organisation designed to 
manage underlying class tensions. And the electoral system 
is simply one (but nevertheless an important) dimension of 
that wider system. 
In the previous chapter, the underlying class contra-
dictions in colonial Fiji were identified. The task here is 
to explain how the organisations and practices of thebour-
geois colonial state served to contain those contradictions. 
The chapter begins with a brief outline of the early state 
apparatuses and then examines the evolution of the electoral 
system. The latter will be the major concern of the chapter 
simply because it was around the struggle for representation 
in the Legislative Council that the underlying class struggle 
came to revolve. The central argument which I advance is 
that precisely because class relations assumed a racial form, 
the colonial ruling class (the composition of which will be 
described) was able to evolve an electoral system based on 
racial and not class representation. As a society-wide, 
bourgeois form of organisation, then, the electoral system 
served as a highly effective means by which to contain class 
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conflict. Inevitably, therefore, the way in which electoral 
politics carne to be organised effectively meant that the 
representation and defence of the exploited and oppressed 
classes was severly compromised. And the failure of the 
electoral system to provide that kind of class representation 
within the organs of the state made it necessary for the 
labouring classes to evolve organisations of their own. But 
that is the subject of the next chapter. 
In colonial Fiji, then, labour was predominantly 
Indian, and capital predominantly European. And in the 
field of electoral politics, the contradiction between those 
opposing classes took the form of a struggle between Indians, 
on the one hand, and white capital and the Fijian chiefly 
class, on the other. After providing a brief outline of the 
early origins of that conflict, I examine its subsequent 
development in detail. The chapter concludes with a close 
analysis of an historic debate in the Legislative Council in 
July 1946. The justification for that analysis is that the 
debate brought into sharp focus the,way in which the ruling 
class, in response to intensifying class contradictions, was 
forced into reaffirming its racial definition of the class 
struggle. 
1. ORIGINS OF BOURGEOIS ORGANISATION: STATE 
APPARATUSES AND ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION 
Immediately after Cession on 10 October 1874, the 
interim governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, established an 
Executive Council. with a complement of seven and composed 
entirely of Europeans, the Council was intended primarily as 
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a temporary device until such time as more permanent arrange-
ments could be instituted. Its function, essentially, was to 
install and legitimise the new British regime, and in that 
task, it concerned itself more with the preservation of order 
and the day-to-day affairs of government than with matters of 
policy. The year-long temporary arrangement came to an end 
on 1 September 1875 when Fiji's first substantive governor, 
Sir Arthur Gordon, proclaimed the Charter of the Colony. 
In addition to an Executive Council, the Charter also 
provided for a Legislative Council. Initially, the latter 
consisted entirely of nominated members, four official - the 
Governor, the Colonial Secretary, the Chief Justice, and the 
Attourney General - and four unofficial. Of the latter, two 
were representatives of plantation capital, R. Ryder and G. 
Hennings, and one a representative of the commercial capital, 
J. C. Smi th. 1 From the very outset, then, the system of 
electoral representation - a major form of society-wide 
bourgeois organisation - was heavily biased in favour of 
capital. As for the other major forms of bourgeois organis-
ation, the organisations of the state, more were added to 
the existing ones. To the Colonial Secretary and Receiver-
General's Office which had been set up by his predecessor, 
Gordon added the Departments of Audit, Survey, Post, Lands, , 
Immigration, Medical Services, Judicial Services, and Police 
and Goals, and these were all dominated by expatriate 
personnel. 2 
Two aspects of Gordon's administration proved partic-
ularly irksome to local capital, one being the preservation 
of Fijian ownership rights in land, and the other, the 
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unavailability of native labour to work European plantations. 
Moved largely by their resentment of Gordon's position with 
respect to these two crucial issues, they resorted to agita-
tion for constitutional reform. Central to their cause was 
the demand for an enlarged Legislative Council which should 
include both nominated and elected members. And by their own 
admission, they saw this as a means by which to "enlarge the 
powers and constitutional rights of the white population". 
The upshot of this sustained pressure was the Letters Patent 
of 21 March 1904, which provided for an expanded legislature 
consisting of ten official members, six elected Europeans, 
and two nominated Fijians. with this greater representation 
in the colonial state, local capital sought to influence 
state policy in ways that would accommodate its needs. By 
and large, however, its hankerings had little effect as most 
of its needs entailed impositions on indigenous welfare, and 
that the state would apparently not sanction. The (predomin-
antly working class) Indians, for their part, were totally 
excluded from the state, but their struggles over the next 
twelve years would finally bear fruit - of sorts. 
Further constitutional reform in 1916 increased the 
size of the Legislative Council from eighteen to twenty-one. 
Of that number, Fijian membership increased to seven, and 
the nominated members increased to twelve. Indian represen-
tation was restricted to one of the twelve nominated seats. 
This was, at best, token representation and it obviously 
failed to satisfy Indian aspirations. Understandably, 
therefore, their campaign to secure elected representation 
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was intensified and this they finally achieved in 1929. 
In May of that year, new Letters Patent took effect 
and in the reconstituted legislature there were fourteen 
official members, three nominated Fijians, three elected 
Indians, and six elected Europeans. That Indians were gran-
ted elected representation so late after their arrival in the 
country - fifty years in fact - is not difficult to explain. 
Quite simply they lacked political clout, having been locked 
into a regimented and highly brutal and repressive plantation 
environment to which (political) rights did not extend. From 
1920 onwards, however, their situation began to change 
markedly, and by 1929, it had altered sufficiently to force a 
significant change in the balance of class forces. The 
uneven racial representation in the 1929 Legislative Council 
described above suggests something about the new class align-
ments that were about to materialise. Before examining how 
the changed circumstances of the Indian working class pro-
voked the realignment, however, it is necessary to return 
briefly to the first decades of colonial rule. 
Required by London to make Fiji largely self-financing, 
the colonial state in Fiji was concerned to ensure that 
conditions were sufficiently attractive to keep private 
capital in the country and even, hopefully, to attract more. 
In view of its apparently substantial contribution to state 
revenue, capital had to be kept reasonably happy. Sugar 
capital commanded the dominant position in the economy, and 
was by far, the largest contributor to the treasury's coffers. 
That was the source of its strength and it was sufficient to 
ensure that state policy would not impinge too much on its 
138 
profit levels. Direct representation in the state, therefore, 
was not vital to the interests of sugar capital, and the only 
time that such representation was afforded, was when the 
Nausori manager of the CSR, Mr R. Robertson, was nominated to 
the Legislative Council by the governor in 1884. But indeed, 
when the idea that the company be given separate represen-
tat ion in the assembly was mooted in 1903, " ... the opposit-
ion from CSR was so great that the idea was dropped".4 Knox, 
the general manager, feared that such a move might create the 
impression that the CSR member was a delegate of the company 
rather than a representative of a public constituency and 
therefore lead people to assume that the interests of the 
company and the country were not "interdependent".5 It was 
patently obvious to the company that separate representation 
in the colonial state was contrary to its interests, as it 
would undermine the myth that anything which was good for the 
CSR was also good for the country. Quite simply, its domin-
ant position in the economy allowed it to deal directly with 
the state. Moynagh described the company's attitude very 
well: 
CSR preferred to exert influence by dealing 
with officials direct. After all, it was they 
who made the final decisions [and with] its 
automatic majority in the Legislative Council, 
government could enact any measures it had 
decided upon. To try and alter policies after 
they had been agreed and placed before the 
Council was much less effective than lobbying 
quietly while they were still in preparation. 
And CSR could lobby with great effect. 6 
Local plantation capital was in a much weaker position 
than sugar capital during this early period and therefore 
had to rely rather more heavily on direct representation in 
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the colonial state in order to press its demands. Foremost 
among those, of course, was the demand for more native land 
and labour but that the state was able successfully to 
resist. It had, after all, to protect the natives. As a 
consequence, the inf1uence of the white planters became pro-
gressively weaker. Their demise in fact started with the 
collapse of the cotton boom of the 1860s and was hastened 
along by the failure of their subsequent attempts at coffee 
production. Many went bankrupt but those who switched over 
to sugar enjoyed a brief respite. However, as the transition 
to the small farm system gathered momentum, they were 
squeezed out in increasing numbers and by the late 1920s they 
effectively ceased to be a significant faction of capital. 
Those who took up coconut planting, on the other hand, 
remained something of a force because coconut products were, 
for most of the colonial period, the second most important 
export after sugar (see Table 4.5, page 104). The more 
Fijians came to figure in the coconut industry, however, the 
less the influence of white planters became. By 1958, for 
example, Fijians accounted for fully one half of the total 
coconut acreage. 7 
For commercial capital, prospects were much brighter. 
Its continuing importance was guaranteed by its vital func-
tion in the sphere of circulation and distribution, and also 
by its ample supply of willing and articulate spokesmen. 
And in the Legislative Council, they saw a forum of strategic 
importance for the furtherance of their interests, which is 
why they sought constantly to dominate it. 
For their part, and apart from occasional agitation, 
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the Fijian labouring classes exerted very little influence. 
Hamstrung by persistent precapitalist social arrangements 
that served to keep them servile and subservient, and locked 
into a system of administration that was seriously disadvan-
taged by its subordinate status within the wider state struc-
ture, their impact on state policy was negligible. Only the 
chiefly class was able to have any kind of influence, but even 
that was limited largely to matters directly affecting the 
"sheltered" existence of the indigenous community. To say, 
however, that chiefly influence on state policy was limited 
in this way is not to suggest that their role was insignif-
icant. Quite the contrary for the initial viability of the 
colonial administration depended very critically on chiefly 
co-operation,and their co-optation into the colonial state is 
the clearest evidence of this. And it was precisely that 
co-optation which served as the chief's initial mode of class 
representation. Class origin, in other words, was the init-
ial basis for the chiefs' factional presence in the colonial 
state, and the major forms which that presence took were jobs 
as subordinate state functionaries and nominated membership 
of the Legislative Council. Other forms of representation 
followed later - elected membership in the Legislative Coun-
cil, nominated membership of the Executive Council and repre-
sentation in various official committees. By then, however, 
the chiefs' representatives had developed a high degree of 
contact with expatriate state functionaries, working with 
them, oRserving them, learning from them, and imbibing their 
ideology. Furthermore, as they took increasing advantage of 
their privileged access to state resources, their sense of 
loyalty and obligation to white capital and the colonial 
state correspondingly increased. 
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The importance of chiefly representation in the 
colonial state lies in the fact that it provided the major 
means through which the chiefly class sought to defend its 
interests when the system of native administration carne under 
increasing attack from the colonial state from 1913 onwards. 
(This is discussed in Chapter VII.) There was, however, 
another respect in which their representation in the colonial 
state was critically important. The virtual exclusion of the 
Indian labouring classes from representation in the state 
ended in the late 1920s, and the consequences for capital 
were highly problematic. with their new-found access to the 
colonial state, there was now the possibility of that access 
being used to counter the pressures from capital. Thanks, 
however, to the Fijian chiefly class's acquired political 
and ideological proclivities, capital found in the natives, 
whom it had previously held in so much contempt, valuable, 
indeed indispensable, allies. Heightened awareness and 
assertiveness on the part of the Indian working classes, in 
other words, led to demands for political representation, 
demands which, in the eyes of capital threatened to under-
mine profit levels. Those demands led, therefore, to the 
realignment of class forces referred to earlier, i.e. the 
corning together of capital and chief. And it is to the 
dynamics of that process that we now turn. 
2. CRISIS AND CLASS REALIGNMENT 
Indian success at achieving elected representation in 
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1929 was the outcome of a whole series of developments which 
had their origins in the early years of the century. Back in 
India, the indentured labour system was corning under increas-
ing attack and the efforts in India of people like G.K. 
Gokhale and M.M. Maliviya echoed Gandhi's heroic struggles on 
behalf of the Indians in South Africa. 8 Moreover, hUmanitar-
ian opinion in Britain lent added weight to the battle that 
was being waged by Fiji Indians against a system which, in 
their eyes, was not far removed from slavery. And as the 
international community became more and more aware of the 
inhuman treatment which Indian workers in Fiji were suffering 
at the hands of sugar capital, so did international sympathy 
for their predicament grow. A central figure in the unfold-
ding drama was C.F. Andrews, whose untiring efforts in Fiji, 
and elsewhere, served to focus the spotlight on the intrans-
igence of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, and in partic-
ular, its aging and obstinate general manager, E.W. Knox. But 
in terms of local leadership, it was Manilal Maganlal Doctor 
who more than anyone else was responsible for harnessing the 
welling resentment of the Indian labouring class and give it 
political direction. An Indian from Mauritius, Manilal 
arrived in the country in 1912 with something of a record of 
concern for Indian rights. A lawyer by profession, he spent 
his first five years in Fiji providing legal assistance to 
Indians and occasionally wrote against the indenture system. 9 
From 1916 onwards, however, he threw himself much more vigor-
ously into the cause, although most of his activity was con-
centrated in the south-eastern corner of Viti Levu. His 
contribution to the political organisation of the Indians 
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began with his leading role in the formation of the Indian 
Imperial Association of Fiji. This was followed by the con-
vening of numerous meetings during which Indian grievances 
were discussed and action planned. The culmination of all 
this activity was the December 1919 meeting in Suva, where a 
whole set of demands were drawn up for presentation to the 
colonial state. Included in it were calls for an end to 
indenture and also for an equal political franchise for all, 
Indians included. So by the time Indian labourers in the 
Public Works Department in Suva struck on 15 January the 
following year, political awareness among Indians in and 
around Suva had reached new heights. The strike had to do 
essentially, with "economic" issues - low wages, the twelve-
hour working day, rising prices, and so forth. Capital and 
the colonial state, however, saw it as a political and 
racial conflict. Ali is correct in his view that the state 
saw it in that light " ... because the labourers were Indians 
and the employers Europeans". 10 By limiting his explanation 
simply to that, however, he was unable explicitly to make the 
class connections between the state and capital. The general 
drift of his analysis seems to suggest collaboration between 
the state and capital, but he does not develop that point 
explicitly. And that state and capital did collaborate is 
suggested, for example, by the fact that as it set about 
suppressing the strike, the state enlised the legal aid of 
two of capital's leading spokesmen, Robert Crompton and Henry 
M. Scott. 11 The latter became the CSR's legal adviser in 
Fiji a few years later. 12 
Ali is correct in that for the Indian strikers, racial 
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animosity was not the ,dominant or guiding force. On the 
other hand, it is equally true that the strike did acquire a 
"political" character and it was that, coupled with its 
racial character, which provided the ruling class with the 
kind of excuses it needed to suppress it. For the Indians, 
the strike served to heighten political awareness, not only 
among the workers but throughout the community generally. 
That was a crucial development because it was to give added 
strength to their subsequent efforts to secure political 
rights. Their increased political awareness, moreover, could 
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not havekbeen bolstered by the manner in which the strike was 
put down. Prosecution, the use of Fijian and European 
policemen and reinforcements from Australia and New Zealand, 
and the way that the state exploited the betrayal of the 
workers' cause by "loyal" Indians hammered home to the 
strikers that the task ahead would be a daunting one. 13 
~his was further underlined by the treatment that was meted 
out to the leading "political agitator", Manilal. Invoking 
one of the earliest pieces of repressive legislation, the 
Good Order Ordinance of 1875, the colonial state banished 
Manilal from the country in 1920. 
The 1920 strike did not spread to the sugar areas. 
Poor communication facilities meant that co-operation between 
Suva workers and their counterparts in the cane-fields was 
difficult to achieve. Consequently, the kind of political 
consciousness and political organisation that developed in 
the Suva area did not emerge in the sugar plantations. 
Trouble, nevertheless, was brewing there. Retrenchment by 
the CSR following the 1920 drop in the international sugar 
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price, together with increasing restiveness among the Indian 
workers about their low wages, led to a six-month strike in 
1921. Led by Sadhu Bashishth Muni, the strikers presented to 
the CSR a list of sixteen demands, most of which had to do 
with work and living conditions but a call was also made for 
" ... the release of those innocent strikers (of 1920) who 
are rotting in Suva Gaol". 14 Of course, the company "branded" 
the strike as "political" (as if they never are!!). The 
state's first response to the strike was to appoint a commis-
sion to investigate the workers' grievances. The membership 
of the commission is suggestive of the state's class bias: 
the Chief Justice of Tonga, anf Indian merchant, and H.H. 
Ragg, a Ba shopkeeper. Initially, the third member was to 
have been a Mr Harricks, a planter, but when he refused, Ragg 
was called in. The strikers' refusal to recognise or co-op-
erate with the commission eventually led to its withdrawal by 
the s ta te . 15 But their victory was more apparent than real. 
By this time, as has been shown, the company was 
reaping huge profits and at no stage did it deny its ability 
to pay higher wages. 16 Yet, it refused to budge and persis-
ted with its claim that the strike was purely political and 
racial. The other important aspect about the whole event has 
to do with the fact that the company was at this stage making 
the transition to the small farm system. If the strike was 
prolonged then the planters, who were in a much more vulner-
able position than the company, might be squeezed out and 
leave room for more Indian small farmers. And this, as Ali 
argued, the state realised. I7 On the other hand, it was not 
prepared to bow to pressure from the planters and the press 
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to act firmly and end the strike. The main reason was, as 
Ali put it, that the state" ... could not afford to fight 
the Company which held the economic well-being [sic] of Fiji 
in its hands". 18 It believed that the company was the 
culprit and also that it was quite capable of meeting the 
strikers' economic demands. 19 What is more, it was even 
impressed with the peaceful and orderly manner with which 
the strikers conducted themselves. 20 Yet, despite all that, 
it refused to intervene and resolve the strike one way or 
another: 
Direct Government intervention might have 
tipped the scales in favour of the Indians but 
Government refused to so SO.21 / 
It was that kind of non-action that eventually led to 
the defeat of the strikers. with the company adopting 
delaying tactics by shifting the burden of decision-making 
to its headquarters in Sydney, it put the ball firmly in the 
strikers' court. To make matters worse, three Australian 
Methodist "reverends", Amos, Jarvis and Long, collaborated 
with the company and secured Fijian scab labour, and even 
went to the extent of dissuading Fijians from supporting the 
Indian strikers. And for their efforts, they were amply 
rewarded by the company. 22 In the end, the ability of the 
strikers to maintain pressure weakened. without sufficient 
resources to sustain the struggle any longer, and with no 
prospect of a favourable settlement, dejection set in and in 
August, six months after it began, the strike ended. In 
terms of their particular demands, then, the strikers failed 
and, as one writer put it, it may even have been merely the 
"spontaneous action of a large number of men who had 
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despaired of attaining redress". 23 On the other hand, 
however, it allowed the workers to see more clearly the 
nature of the connections betweeh their material deprivation 
and their lack of political clout. 
The major significance of the strikes of the early 
twenties, then, is that they brought to the fore for the 
first time the fundarrlental contradictions of the capitalist-
dominated colonial economy. The 1920 strike in particular 
did so with such force that capital and the state had to 
resort to their means of violence in order to suppress the 
workers. But in another major respect, too, the strikes 
stand out as important events, for never before had the 
country witnessed the direct use of Fijians against Indians 
on such a large scale. state and capital, the dominant 
factions of the ruling class, feared that Fijian sympathy for 
the Indian workers might turn the upheavals into a more 
generalised conflict against them. By dissuading them from 
offering support to the strikers, and by ranging Fijian 
policemen and special constables against them, therefore, 
the antagonistic relationship between capital and labour 
(which was the root cause of the conflicts) was manipulated 
so as to appear racial. 
Gillion noted that II 
It was at this time, after all, as 
the argument began to be heard that 
European dominance was necessary to protect the Fijians 
against the Indians [and that] the Deed of Cession was ... a 
request for protection, not just by Britain, but by the 
European settlers [as well ].24 
An historic process of class realignment had begun. 
Labour's challenge and capital's inability to cope with it 
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independently forced upon capital the realisation that hence-
forth its dominance could no longer be guaranteed by the 
support only of its expatriate allies on the colonial state 
as had been the case in the past. Henceforth, Fijian support 
would be vital and as it set about striking an accord with 
them, its major weapon was an ideological one. To coax the 
Fijians into an alliance with it, the carrot (or stick, 
depending on how one sees it) was the argument that they too 
were being threatened by the advancing Indians. PersUaded, 
the Fijian chiefly class entered into a partnership which was 
to be capital's salvation. 
From the strife of the early twenties, Indian workers 
were able to secure some economic improvement but they were 
also harshly reminded of their status as the exploited and 
disadvantaged. Forty years of white racism and a brutal 
plantation existence had left deep scars on them and their 
suppression in 1920 and 1921 carne close 'to opening those 
scars again. As far as their struggle for political equality 
was concerned, therefore, the tortuous road that they were 
treading stretched way into the future. 
3. COMMON ROLL, BOURGEOIS INDIANS, AND THE EXCLUSION 
OF LABOUR 
Although it was first promised in 1920, the delegation 
from India to investigate the plight of Fiji Indians did not 
arrive until 1922. Its commendable efforts to secure, among 
other things, an equal political franchise for the Indians 
were, however, frustrated by the machinations of capital and 
the state. Early in 1922, for example, the acting governor 
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reported to London that the idea of an equal franchise for 
all races was firmly opposed by both Fijian and European 
opinion. 25 Later that year, J.J~ Ragg, a "European agitator" 
connected with a prominent hotelling family, sought to ensure 
that Fijian opposition stood firm, or better still, inten-
sified. He wrote to a chief and suggested that he 
... endeavour to permeate the whole of the 
Fijian race with the fixed idea that the 
granting of the franchise and equal status to 
the Indians in Fiji, would mean the ultimate 
loss of all their land and rights, and later 
their final extinction from the face of the 
earth. 26 
The threat of Fijian extinction, which the represen-
tatives of capital played upon, was born of both Indian 
demands for political equality and rising Indian numbers. 
As the table below shows, in 1911, Fijians accounted 
for 62% of the total population and Indians 29%. By the time 
of the 1921 census, those figures had changed to 54% and 39% 
respectively, and in 1936 they stood at 50% and 43%. The gap 
between the two races was narrowing rapidly, and by 1946 
Indians had outnumbered Fijians, a numerical superiority 
which has persisted to the present day. Fijian concern about 
demographic trends was therefore understandable but for 
capital it provided the perfect cover behind which to cope 
with the task of class containment. Labour's representation 
in the colonial state had to be resisted as much as possible, 
and it was to capital's great advantage that labour happened 
to be predominantly Indian. 
Therein lies the key to our understanding of the 
politics of class containment. Sets of objectively antagon-
is tic cl~ss positions (classes) were occupied by agents 
Table 5.1 Population of Fiji 1881 - 1956 (OOOs) 
Fijian Indian European Part-European 
Year No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1881 115 90% 1 1% 3 2% 1 1% 
1891 106 88% 7 6% 2 2% 1 1% 
1901 94 78% 17 14% 2 2% 2 2% 
1911 87 62% 40 29% 4 3% 2 1% 
1921 84 54% 61 39% 4 2% 3 2% 
1936 98 50% 85 43% 4 2% 5 2% 
1946 118 45% 120 46% 5 2% 6 2% 
1956 148 43% 169 49% 6 2% 8 2% 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, January 1973, p. 4. 
Chinese 
No. % 
1 1% 
2 1% 
3 1% 
4 1% 
Others 
No. % 
8 6% 
5 4% 
5 4% 
7 5% 
4 3% 
4 2% 
8 3% 
10 3% 
Total 
No. 
127 
121 
120 
140 
157 
198 
260 
345 
f-J 
Ul 
o 
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(people) drawn predominantly from different racial groups. 
Capital was predominantly European, labour predominantly 
Indian, and that broad convergence of class and racial 
cleavages opened up the possibility of managing class pres-
sures by subsuming them under racial tensions, and it was by 
following precisely that course of action, that capital was 
able effectively to obstruct any form of direct represen-
tation in the state apparatus for labour. But labour's 
failure in that regard was the product of other factors also, 
factors which had to do with the political and organisational 
weakness of the working class, the changing class structure 
within the Indian community, and the bourgeois character of 
the Indian leadership. Before examining these in some 
detail, however, it is necessary first to consider the way in 
which the Indian demand for a common roll bore upon the 
question of labour representation. 
As had been argued, the whole debate about political 
representation provided for capital a convenient cover for 
its more fundamental concern, that of class containment. 
For the colonial state, on the other hand, it was much more 
a "political" problem. Pressure, both international and 
internal, had forced upon it the need to accommodate Indian 
political aspirations, at least in some degree. Some kind 
of political franchise had to be given but the burning 
question concerned the particular form that it might take. 
And the controversy which surrounded that issue was even-
tually to lead to the exclusion of labour representation 
from the legislative and executive organs of the colonial 
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state. 
Before the constitutional reform of 1929, commitment 
to the principle of a common roll. had strengthened consider-
ably among the Indian leadership. Inspired by a similar 
position adopted by their counterparts in India and Kenya, 
and also by the sterling efforts of the leading lobbyist in 
London for Indians abroad, H.S. Polak, the local Indian 
leaders pressed their demands even harder. But a common 
roll had such threatening consequences for the ruling class 
that it resolved never to introduce it. Some kind of polit-
ical franchise for Indians it was prepared to entertain, a 
common roll not. As Gillion observed: 
It was obvious ... that with the Indian popu-
lation increasing in numbers, education and 
wealth, and in Fiji's plural society, where 
people were likely, for the forseeable future, 
to vote along racial lines, a common roll with-
out reservation of seats for each race would 
have led eventually to an Indian majority in 
the Legislative Council, and that, of course, 
is why it was unacceptable to the other com-
munities. 28 
And so it was that Indians were given just three seats in 
the Legislative Council. That is why the constitutional 
reform of 1929 stands out as a major event in Fiji's history; 
it represented the response of the ruling class to mounting 
political pressure from the Indian community and in partic-
ular the singularly threatening demand for a common roll. 
To contain that pressure, some elected representation had to 
be given but the idea of a common and equal franchise for 
all was out of the question. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that in the campaign leading up to the September 1929 
elections, the contest for the Indian seats was "uneventful 
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and unexceptionable from the standpoint of race relations 
but ... not for the European seats".29 J.R. Pearson, the 
secretary for Indian Affairs, had. listened to campaign 
speeches made by Henry Scott and Henry Marks in which they 
launched bitter attacks against the Indian community. 
words: 
I .,. was amazed at the way racial prejudices 
were worked upon and cheers raised from the 
audience at successive jibes against the Indians. 
The general attitude was that Indians were not 
wanted except as labourers and small farmers 
and must be kept in their place. If they did 
not like it they could clear out and make room 
for a more docile set of plantation workers. 3D 
In his 
But the fight for a common electoral roll was not 
quite over. Using their newly-won representation in the 
Council, the Indian leadership sought to force the issue. On 
5 November 1929, Vishnu Deo moved in the council that Indians 
be granted a common franchise with the other members of the 
community. On hand, of course, were the mouthpieces of 
capital, in particular, J.M. Hedstrom and H.M. Scott, to 
unleash the usual dose of white racism. And not unexpectedly, 
the motion was rejected overwhelmingly; thereupon the three 
Indian members resigned their seats in protest. A similar 
attempt was repreated three years later, but it too ended in 
similar fashion. On that occasion, however, the colonial 
state had the additional advantage o£ having at its disposal 
a new rift within the Indian community which could be used to 
turn the tide against the fight for a common roll. Following 
the trend in India, political separatism had emerged within 
the Indian community and Muslims were demanding separate 
representation. Although their demand was unsuccessful, 
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Governor Fletcher was able very effectively, to exploit it in 
order to break the back of the common roll struggle. 32 And 
in that he soon succeeded, for in.1932 the battle for a 
common roll effectively died. 
with hopes for a common roll now well and truly dashed, 
labour's chances of securing direct representation in the 
state were lost. With a common electoral roll, there was at 
least the possibility of forming electoral alliances of 
workers from all racial groups. And in the future the number 
of non-Indian workers would increase. But with racial repre-
sentation now firmly established as the basis of the elec-
toral system, labour would, henceforth, have to seek alter-
native forms of representation. The 1940s would see the 
birth of labour organisations, and soon thereafter, would 
follow, for the first time, labour representation in the 
state. Initially, it would take the form of membership in 
various official committees and inquiries. But as far as 
legislative representation, as a means of defending class 
interests, was concerned, by 1929 the dialectics of race and 
class had effectively ensured that, for labour, it ceased to 
be an option. The reason of course, as the argument presen-
ted here has sought to establish, was that the fundamental 
contradiction facing the country, that between capital and 
labour, had effectively become a conflict between Indians and 
non-Indians. Moreover, as has been argued, credit for that 
highly successful exercise in ideological mystification goes 
primarily to the indenture system set up by the colonial 
state to meet the needs of sugar capital. But the machin-
ations of the dominant factions of the ruling class do not 
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by themselves fully explain labour's exclusion from represen-
tation in the state. As has already been intimated, within 
the Indian community itself, other explanatory factors are 
to be found. 
The first of these is that Indian workers were not 
organised. Yet, this was hardly surprising given the highly 
oppressive environment in which they laboured, and also their 
deplorable lack of educational facilities, their meagre 
economic resources, and the failure of an able and committed 
leadership to emerge from within their own ranks. Moreover, 
although most of them were agricultural labourers, some were 
employed as clerks, domestics, mill-workers, engine-drivers, 
and sirdars (overseers) .33 with this range of occupations, 
the possibility of any organised activity was greatly reduced, 
and one factor of particular importance in that regard was 
the role of the sirdar. To him was delegated a significant 
measure of responsibility for discharging capital's function 
of surveillance and control. So not only did this entail 
relieving capital of some of its more repressive tasks, it 
also had the added advantage of splitting Indian solidarity. 
Together, then, lack of organisation, strict control by 
functionaries of capital, absence of leadership, underdevel-
oped political consciousness, and the lack of the material 
wherewithal necessary for successful struggle all contributed 
to the Indian working class's political powerlessness, which 
in turn, partly explains their failure to secure represen-
tation as a class within the colonial state. 
A second reason behind labour's exclusion from 
repre~entation in the colonial state has to do with the fact 
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that by 1929 the class composition of the Indian community 
was becoming increasingly differentiated. Typicaly, disin~ 
dentured Indian workers who remained in Fiji either took up 
sugar-cane farming (and many of these prospered34 ) or branched 
out as wage workers or petty capitalists into other sectors 
of the economy, principally into the wholesale and retail 
trade and public transportation. Furthermore, Indians who 
later arrived as free immigrants, particularly those who came 
in the early twenties, also made an impact on the changing 
pattern of class relations. As has been noted in the prev-
ious chapter, many were agriculturalists, artisans, shop-
keepers, and professionals, notably lawyers. 
As a result of these developments, the Indian class 
structure underwent a process of transformation. Now appear-
ing within the Indian community were small capitalists, a 
petty bourgeoisie, and a professional class. The most impor-
tant effects of this development for the purposes of this 
discussion are two-fold. The first is that white capitalists, 
particularly in the commercial sector, were now faced with 
increasing competition from newly-emergent Indian rivals. 
Any political development which might give an edge -to the 
latter had therefore to be resisted, and all the more so as 
it was from their ranks that those who led the fight for a 
common roll were largely drawn. The failure of the common 
roll struggle, therefore, was tied intimately to the 
increased inter-capitalist rivalry that came with the 
changing Indian class structure. Capital's opposition to a 
common roll derived ultimately from its desire to control 
labour, and the threat of growing competition from the 
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emerging Indian bourgeoisie made it more resolute. 
The second effect of the changing Indian class struc-
ture was that because the dealings of the nascent Indian 
bourgeois class tended mainly to be with their fellow 
Indians, it inevitably imposed its class interests on 
Indian workers. Not only,therefore, was the Indian working 
class now held in bondage to white capital, it was also fast 
becoming victim to the embryonic Indian bourgeoisie, and the 
clearest expression of this was the growing indebtedness of 
Indian workers to often unscrupulous Indian money-lenders. 
It was cornmon, for example, for Indian shopkeepers and money-
lenders to charge up to 60% interest on loans. 36 For the 
Indian working class, then, the process of class tranform-
ation described here meant that they were now tied in an 
ambivalent way to antagonistic class interests within their 
own community. The rising Indian bourgeois class spearheaded 
the struggle for Indian political rights but at the same time 
exploited Indian farmers and workers. On the one hand, 
therefore, the Indian working classes shared a cornmon politi-
cal interest with bourgeois Indians but, on the other, were, 
in their daily lives, exploited by them. What energy Indian 
workers might have had to defend their interests by fighting 
for representation as a class in the colonial state, there-
fore, became increasingly dissipated by the need to cope with 
objective class enemies on two broad fronts. 
Force of circumstance, however, required them to join 
forces with bourgeois Indians for, divided, neither would 
achieve very much. Unorganised, leaderless, and lacking in 
material resources, Indian workers nevertheless had the 
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numbers, which is what the Indian bourgeoisie lacked. Thus 
it was that their common political interest, coupled with the 
advantages which each had to offer the other, was sufficient 
to override the antagonisms between them. utter subordin-
ation in the cane plantations had weakened the Indian workers, 
and the defeats of the early twenties sapped their strength 
even more. So if better political representation was to be 
secured, then the only realistic option open to the Indian 
community was to close ranks. That forced alliance, however, 
was to be labour's undoing as far as its class representation 
in the colonial state was concerned. The rising Indian 
bourgeoisie was economically stronger, better educated, and 
more articulate. It was no accident, therefore, that they 
came to monopolise the leading positions in the wider strug-
gle for Indian representation. And in those positions, they, 
like the ruling capital-chief alliance, defined the struggle 
as a racial one. The fundamental contradiction between 
capital and labour had already assumed a racial form; the 
bourgeois Indian leadership made it even more so. 
In large part, and especially because anti-Indian 
sentiment was so intense, the Indian leaders' racial defin-
ition of the struggle was understandable. To concede that, 
however, is not to exonerate them entirely. The fact is that 
they were simply not prepared to organise the workers and 
wage a labour-versus-capital struggle. To do so would have 
meant risking their own positions, and their roots, after 
all, was not in the working class but in an emerging Indian 
bourgeoisie. An examination of the occupation of some of 
the leading Indian figures bears this out: A.D. and S.B. 
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Patel, lawyers; B.L. Hiralal Seth, cane-grower; Tandhir 
Singh, a "rich" cane-grower; Vishnu Deo, and accountant and 
commission agent, who drew much of his business from the 
Gujerati community which was heavily involved in commerce; 
M.N. Naidu, V.M. pillay and Sadhu Kuppuswami, merchants; and 
C.M. Gopalan and A.D. Sagayam, doctors. 37 Without wishing, 
necessarily, to question the commitment of people such as 
these, the fact is that they saw the struggle as essentially 
a racial one. And as members of an emerging bourgeoisie, 
they could not afford to redefine it as a class one. Armed, 
therefore, with bourgeois principles about fair representa-
tion and an ability legitimately to accuse the ruling class 
of racial discrimination, they fought the battle in a way 
which did not undermine their class positions. To have 
advanced the cause of the Indian working class, in other 
words, would have required them to commit "class suicide", 
but that they were unwilling, perhaps unable, to do. In the 
end, therefore, the interests of the workers as a class were 
seriously undermined. 
In summary, then, Indian political agitation stemmed 
ultimately from the contradiction between capital and labour. 
The strikes of 1920 and 1921 were essentially expressions of 
that fundamental contradiction, and on both occasions labour 
lost. By the end of the twenties, worker agitation had 
subsided somewhat, and by that time too, the Indian political 
struggle had corne to centre around the demand for a common 
electoral roll. Very importantly, the preoccupation with 
that demand was the result of an Indian leadership which was 
bourgeois in character. As Gillion noted, although they were 
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willing to give tacit support to a cause that was concerned 
with Indian interests and honour, "the majority of the 
Indians knew and cared little about common roll". 38 They 
were, after all, workers whose daily lives were consumed with 
the task of simply surviving. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that their passive role in the fight for a cornmon roll 
contrasted sharply with the greater depth and commitment 
which characterised their involvement in struggles which had 
to do with improving the material condition of their daily 
existence. All the more so, what is more, because the 
Indian leadership did not spell out the nature of the connec-
tions between the political struggle and the deep-rooted 
contradictions of which the workers were the worst victims. 
Worse still, they refused to build the struggle around those 
contradictions; contradictions which the ruling class had 
already cast in racial terms, and which they were unwilling 
to redefine in class terms. Intense white racism may have 
forced upon them a racial definition of class conflict, but 
because they were bourgeois, it was in their interests also 
to adopt such a definition. In the struggle for represen-
tation, then, the Indian labouring classes were compromised 
by the bourgeois Indian leadership. As a class, labour was 
thus excluded from representation in the colonial state, 
while the emerging Indian bourgeoisie was not. As will be 
shown later, however, it was not until about the late sixties 
that the Indian bourgeoisie was able to use its represen-
tat ion significantly. The alliance between capital, the 
state, and the (primarily eastern) chiefs which was forged 
in the late twenties would continue to lump them, as Indians, 
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with their labouring kin. As far as the ruling class was 
concerned, they were Indians first and bourgeois second, and 
it was only when the country approached Independence, and 
the ideology of multiracialism emerged in the course of the 
struggle for state power, that the Indian bourgeoisie began 
to reap the benefits of its class representation. But that 
was some years away, and until then, what mattered most in 
the eyes of the ruling class was that they were Indians. 
4. WAR AND THE STRIKE OF '43: FARMERS AND RELUCTANT SOIDIERS 
To recapitulate, then, elected Indian representation 
to the Legislative Council was introduced on 1929, but by 
1932 the struggle for a common electoral roll had effectively 
ended. Indian members of the council did, of course, con-
tinue to advocate it but, as Meller and Anthony put it: 
in the minds of European and Fijian members 
it was synonymous with an attempt at political 
domination by Indians, and each proposal was 
voted down. 39 
In 1936 an attempt was made "to turn back the clock" by 
reverting to a wholly nominated system of representation and 
the outcome of that struggle was the compromise of 1937, 
whereby parity of racial representation in the council was 
introduced for the first time. qO Each of the three major 
races were to have five members. For Europeans and Indians, 
three members were to be elected from separate electoral 
rolls and two were to be appointed by the colonial state as 
unofficial members. The five Fijian members were all appoin-
ted by the governor from a list of ten names submitted by the 
Council of Chiefs. Against these fifteen members were 
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sixteen expatriate state functionaries - the "official 
members" . The latter, therefore, held the balance of power. 
From 1937 until 1963 the composition of the Council 
remained unchanged, and although the question of constitut-
ional development was debated periodically over that period, 
in the main those debates were variations on old themes: 
... an unofficial majority, extension of the 
franchise, the Muslim demand for a separate 
elected seat, the combined opposition of the 
Europeans and Fijians to changes leading to a 
common roll, and their desire to maintain the 
communal roll system. 41 
The relative political quiet which characterised this 
period was jolted by a momentous debate in the Legislative 
Council in July 1946. The country was poised at an histor-
ical crossroads. The pressure of the wartime economy was 
barely beginning to lift and recent changes in metropolitan 
colonial policy forced policy changes upon the state of Fiji. 
But more importantly, the balance of class forces had changed 
significantly. This will be taken up in detail later. To 
anticipate, however, sugar capital was still dominant, but 
the chiefly class was now in a rather stronger position and, 
also, labour was organised. Local white capital, however, 
was in a shaky position, and in Chapter VIII I show how it 
sought to influence state policy in its favour. But that 
task would be easier if it could mount an ideological offen-
sive which might help to consolidate its position. What was 
its strategy? The ruling class had been troubled by labour, 
and labour was predominantly Indian. It was time, therefore, 
to reaffirm the capitalist path, consolidate the hegemony of 
the ruling class - and local capital's place in it, and to 
put Indians in their place - yet again. It is in those 
terms that the historic debate of July 1946 needs to be 
understood. 
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The immediate causes of the debate can be traced to 
the 1943 cane-farmers' strike which later was labelled "a 
stab in the back". When the call went out for men to enlist 
for military service, the Indians were not very forthcoming!2 
Their reluctance, however, was perfectly understandable, 
consumed as they were with the daily struggle to maintain a 
decent standard of living, especially in the face of high 
wartime inflation. Why should they want to fight for the 
British ruling class when it was partly responsible for their 
material hardships. Similarly, it was perfectly reasonable 
that they should expect to be paid the same as Europeans if 
they did choose to enlist. But the ruling alliance saw 
things differently. Not only were the Indians criticised 
for their "disloyalty" but also their activities during the 
1943 strike were seen as positively selfish and unhelpful. 
So against the patriotism of the Fijians, the Indian contrib-
ution to the war effort came under much criticism, and not 
least from the Fijian leaders. When, for example, the 
strike was debated in the Legislative Council at the end of 
the year, two leading chiefs, Ratu Sukuna and Ratu E. 
Cakobau, criticised the Indians, accused them of trying to 
hold the country to ransom, and they offered Fijian scab 
labour to cut the cane if the state would undertake to buy 
it. 43 However reasonable Indian objections to military 
service might have been, then, as far as the Europeans and 
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the Fijians were concerned, the fact remained that they were 
not prepared to fight. Not only did that mean that their 
patriotism and courage were suspect, but more importantly, 
their case for equal political rights was seriously under-
mined. In terms of the political realities, Mayer is quite 
correct in arguing that "equal citizenship ... called for 
equal sacrifice".44 What he failed to consider, however, was 
that that kind of belief, which was indeed widespread, was 
part of a ruiing ideology which was totally blind to the 
sacrifices which Indians had made since 1879 and what is 
more, were expected to continue to make. It was perfectly 
all right that they were thoroughly exploited in the cane 
fields, but political obligation really had nothing to do 
with that. That was a totally different matter altogether 
because politics and economics are quite separate. Bour-
geois ideology, like bourgeois social science, depends very 
critically on this wholly untenable distinction. 
The legacy of mistrust and hostillty left by the 
Indians' wartime policy was something which they could not 
help. Had they been more forthcoming, their struggle for 
political equality might have been more successful, but it 
is difficult to see how, after years of intense anti-Indian 
feeling, matters could have suddenly improved. Also, had 
they fought, it would probably have been the lives of Indian 
workers rather than Indian capitalists that would have been 
sacrificed. And when the survivors returned, they would 
probably have simply gone back to the cane-fields and expec-
ted, as usual, to make more sacrifices there. Although this 
is speculation, the lessons of history do lend it a great 
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deal of support. In any event, racist feelings against the 
Indian community were given a major boost during the war, 
and soon they would be openly flaunted in the Legislative 
Council. 
That, then, is the i.mmediate background to the his-
toric debate of July 1946, an event which saw the represen-
tatives of the ruling class give open and vehement express-
ion to their racist feelings against the Indian community. 
More importantly in terms of the argument being developed 
here, the debate served as an occasion not only to reaffirm 
the virtues of capitalism but also to consolidate the 
position of the ruling class, especially local capital. 
5. CATHARSIS IN THE CHN1BER: THE ENTRENCHMENT 
OF RACIAL POLITICS 
In the chambers of the Legislative Council on 16 July 
1946 the European mmeber for the Southern Division, A.A. 
Ragg, tabled a motion which touched off a debate of historic 
importance but about which little is known. 45 Quite apart 
from it being the major instance of racial catharsis in the 
Council up until then, the importance of the debate had to 
do with the fact that Fiji was at a crucial historical 
juncture. The confluence of recent developments of major 
importance had fundamental consequences which the ruling 
class was intent upon addressing itself to. Those develop-
ments were the war, changes in British colonial policy, the 
1943 strike, and the rise of the indigenous bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie and organised labour. And all this against 
some three decades of struggle the intensity of which the 
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country had never before experienced. It is necessary, 
therefore, to examine the debate in some detail for not 
only did it foreshadow the shape of things to come but also 
captured in a most graphic way the essentials of the strug-
gles that preceded it. Ragg's motion read: 
That in the opinion of this Council the time has 
arrived - in view of the great increase in the 
non-Fijian inhabitants and its consequential 
political development - to emphasise the terms 
of the Deed of Cession to assure that the inter-
ests of the Fijian race are safeguarded and a 
guarantee given that Fiji is to be preserved and 
kept as a Fijian country for all time. 46 
As he spoke to the motion, the underlying racist 
motives became evident for the whole thrust of his delivery 
was directed against the Indian community. Highly provoc-
ative and inflammatory, his speech was nontheless a success, 
for the Honourable European Member was able, very effectively, 
to play upon justifiable Fijian concern about their political 
and economic postion. Lest he be branded a racist, however, 
Ragg was quick to point out that his representations were not 
due to any desire to belittle the Indians,47 and in any case, 
as he went on to say, he did not have an axe to grind. 48 But 
the attempt to soften the impact of his attack was unconvin-
cing; he had, in fact anticipated that the Indian members of 
the Council would take strong exception to his views,49 which 
is precisely what happened. Vishnu Deo, in particular, res-
ponded very strongly and his suspicions about the real motive 
of the motion was not wide of the mark, as we shall see. 
Ragg's broadside against the Indian community repres-
ented nothing less than a frontal assault that was motivated 
by a desire to consolidate the historically-forged alliance 
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between white capital, the colonial state and the Fijian 
chiefly class. Before examining the immediate causes of 
Ragg's offensive, it is necessary to consider the manner in 
which he set about his task. First came the justification 
and this took the form of, one, invoking the commitment of 
the Deed of Cession to the paramountcy of Fijian interests, 
and two, reiterating the point that the Fijian race was still 
locked in a political, social and economic backwater. 50 
These arguments provided for him a point of departure which 
was unchallengeable and they set the stage for an anti-Indian 
offensive and a glorification of the alliance of which he was 
a part. 
The Indians, he argued, were introduced to assist in 
the commercial development of the colony but "mostly at the 
expense of the Europeans". 51 No mention was made of the 
profits that European capital derived from Indian labour. 
Moreover, he contended, the "aliens" had "been granted 
equality in the political field with the Europeans" and they 
enjoyed "complete freedom of action and enterprise throughout 
the colony". 52 (sic) But inspi te of that, they displayed 
singular ingratitude and aUdacity: "their contribution to 
the war effort was lamentable" and they had even attempted to 
use the war as a bargaining instrument to further their 
(political) demands. 53 Most important of all, however, the 
Indians had "no responsibility under the Deed of Cession". 54 
In the end that was the crucial argument for, after all, what 
the debate was all about was the need to implement both the 
spirit and the letter of that hallowed document, a task, 
moreover, in which the Europeans had a major part but the 
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Indians none at all. And it was on the basis of that oblig-
ation that Europeans could claim a legitimate right to remain 
in the country. They were, as Ragg put it: 
co-trustees with the Imperial Government in the 
Deed of Cession and the care that should be 
given to the native race. 55 
To ensure that the point would not be missed, he reiterated: 
the duty of trusteeship devolves upon Europeans 
and in this duty the Indians have no part. 56 
And what of the Fijians? The original owners of the 
land, Ragg noted, "had placed their fate fully and freely 
(sic) in the hands of the British Crown,,57 and they had 
always displayed unstinting loyalty to it. It was necessary 
therefore to take steps to protect them from the Indian 
threat and beyond that to secure their overall advancement. 
But there were obstacles within Fijian society itself: the 
Fijian communal system, its institutionalised form, the 
Fijian administration, and, of 'course, the Fijian's lack of 
"character" . 
themselves: 
On the last matter, Ragg's words speak for 
... character is just what the natives have not. 
We who work for and among them, know, too pain-
fully, how deficient in all manly qualities they 
are. Courage, honour, firmness, pure ambition, 
truthfulness, unselfishness - these and kindred 
qualities are all to rare ... they mean well, 
but being deficient in character they are weak 
and the victims of circumstances. 58 
That such open affrontery was allowed to pass unchall-
enged testifies to the hegemony of white capital within the 
ruling class. Ragg had, on the one hand, slighted both the 
Fijian "communal" system and its institutionalised form 
within the colonial state, the Fijian Administration, and on 
169 
the other, heaped scorn on the Fijians for their supposed 
"lack of character". That such a frontal attack could be 
mounted against the Fijians without incurring their wrath, 
especially as they had so recently displayed selfless courage 
in the field of battle, is clear evidence of the subordinate 
status of the Fijian faction of the ruling class. Not a 
single Fijian member of the council rose to defend his people 
against the disparaging remarks that had been meted out with 
such arrogance and impudence. 
As for Ragg, it was a measure of his Machiavellian 
artistry that he cleverly sought to soften the impact of his 
blows by likening the Fijian "communal" system to "socialism 
and communism"; (for him socialism and communism were one 
and the same thing) .59 That was truly a master stroke, for 
it allowed him to exploit to great advantage the deep id~al~ 
ogical bias against ~ommunism which permeated Fijian society. 
His comparison therefore served, simultaneously, as a 
rationalisation for his attack upon indigenous society and 
also as a springboard from which to launch his case about 
the superiority of capitalism. His strategy with respect to 
the latter is interesting because it illustrates the man's 
grasp of the particularities of Fiji politics and also his 
dexterity at manipulating them for political gain. Political 
consciousness among the Indian labouring classes, he real-
ised, was on the increase, so he could not afford to appear 
too blatantly as a spokesman for white capital. His case 
for the superiority and desirability of capitalism, there-
fore, could not take the form of open praise. A cover was 
needed and the perfect one was provided by the church. He 
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therefore set about applauding the policy of the Wesleyan 
Mission in Fiji which, he said, had been "to promote individ-
ualism among the natives". 60 His. target audience, of course, 
was the Fijians and knowing full well that they were predom-
inantly Methodist, the message he sent out to them was that 
if the church was promoting individualism, then surely it 
must be a good thing. 
So having lambasted the Indians for their greed, 
ingratitude and political precociousness, criticised the 
Fijians for their personal deficiencies and backward form of 
social organisation, and castigated the colonial state for 
persisting with policies which obstructed the development of 
individualism among the Fijians, the stage was now set to 
present the European as the saviour. The pace of indigenous 
development had been hindered by the sorts of factors that 
he had just outlined and because Fijians were not yet able 
to stand on their own feet, the continued support and guid-
ance of the white man, Ragg intimated, was clearly essential. 
Moreover, that it was only the white man who could provide 
the necessary support, he had little doubt for Europeans, 
after all, had made the greatest contribution to the country 
over the last one hundred and fifty years. So here in the 
Council, credit for Fiji's development was being claimed for 
the white community, and to catalogue its "achievements" was 
one of its favourite sons: 
Theycolonised and transformed Fiji from a bar-
barous country into a civilised one: they 
instituted a stable government: they are res-
ponsible for the economic development of the 
Colony. They gave their best in the two wars: 
they have been the mainstay of Government during 
times of internal trouble ... 61 
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Ragg's strategy worked perfectly. with the enticement 
of Fijian support as his major objective, he juxtaposed 
Fijian deficiency and Indian evil with European benevolence 
and virtue. At root, he argued, the problem was an Indian 
one and Fijian salvation depended critically on European 
support. On other words, the fundamental contradiction 
confronting Fiji was a racial and not a class one. That, of 
course, was an accurate account of the real appearances of 
Fiji society; and that it was well received is demonstrated 
by the statements of support and were to come from various 
European members of the Council and, more importantly, from 
the Fijian representatives. To be sure, the argument which 
Ragg advanced had been prevalent in Fiji for a long time but 
what was significant about his delivery was the fact that he 
was able successfully to reinforce it at an important histor-
ical conjuncutre. 
The country was at something of a turning point: the 
balance of class forces had changed significantly, and mainly 
to local white capital's disadvantage. And as the ruling 
class set about making the transition to a peacetime economy, 
there was much discussion about the best way forward, and 
because self-government for the colonies had recently been 
proclaimed as policy by the newly-elected Labour Government 
in Britain, the country's constitutional status was now an 
item on the political agenda. The confluence of these 
events, set against an historical background of political 
agitation by the Indians and, more importantly, the struggles 
that had been waged against capital by the Indian labouring 
classes, had opened up a threat, however slight, to the 
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ruling class, but in particular local white capital's pos-
ition within it. As we shall see, local white capital's 
concern stemmed basically from its fear of being electorally 
swamped by the greater number of both Indian and part-
European voters. Ragg, we should recall, had stated that 
his motion was being put before the council "in view of the 
great increase in the non-Fijian inhabitants and its conseq-
uential political development". 62 (emphasis added) The 
adjective non-Fijian was clearly intended as a camouflage. 
Fortunately, however, in the ensuing debate, the smokescreen 
was penetrated and the underlying motives exposed. 
This, then, is the kind of background against which 
Ragg's adventure in the Legislative Council needs to be 
understood, for essentially it represented a marshalling of 
forces, an attempt to consolidate and further entrench the 
interests he represented. Various developments had occurred 
which threw some doubt on the continued hegemony of capital. 
More particularly, local white capital no longer appeared as 
secure as it had been in the past, so it was now necessary 
to rise up in its defence. And the obvious way to accomplish 
that objective was simply to exploit racial antagonisms. 
The costs of such an approach were likely to be minimal and 
given the existing balance of forces within the ruling class, 
it was probable that capital's ally, the chiefly class, 
would rally to the cause, and as we shall see, this is pre-
cisely what happened. 
Ragg's defence of capital was a shining example of 
ideological manipulation. By posing the issue in terms of 
racial domination he was able to capitalise on, and at the 
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same time reinforce the whole ideology of racialism, which 
equated things European, and to a lesser extent Fijian, with 
good and things Indian with evil .. Here was the politics of 
race at work and the only question that had yet to be settled 
was the tactical one about how the supposed Indian threat 
should be dealt with. Concrete measures had to be adopted to 
contain the Indian ogre but who was to lead the way in that 
highly sensitive task? And the way that Ragg tackled that 
question showed him up as the shrewd political calculator 
that he was. 
Ragg was of course concerned that Europeans avoid as 
much as possible situations where they might lay themselves 
open to charges of racism. For them to take the initiative, 
therefore, was politically risky, and so he sought to shift 
the burden onto other shoulders. The groundwork for this had 
already been laid: he had projected the image of the Euro-
pean as the guardian of native interests and therefore duty-
bound to raise the alarm about Indian domination. All that 
now remained was to plant the idea that responsibility for 
taking the initiative rested in other quarters. Once taken 
of course, the Europeans would follow. Fijian initiative was 
clearly what he was seeking, but if similar action was to be 
adopted by the colonial state, then so much the better. And 
so it was that he appealed to the Fijian leaders to "go out 
among their people and awaken them to the reality of the 
situation". 63 After that, he turned to the Governor and 
urged him to rise up against the common foe: 
Take up the cudgels for the Fijian people who 
have so loyally done their duty to the King and 
Empire and you will erect in the minds of a 
grateful and increasing Fijian people a monu-
ment more lasting than brass and, you, Sir, 
they will remember always as their saviour and 
their friend.6~ 
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stirring stuff indeed and, although his original motion was 
eventually amended so as not to appear quite so innocous, 
there can be do doubting that the spokesman for white capital 
had scored a major victory. 
To second his motion was the First Native Member, 
Ratu G. Tuisawau)and hot on his heels came the Third Native 
Member, Ratu T. Vuiyasawa, whose support is best expressed 
in his own words: 
This motion as it stands concerns the future 
well-being of my people, who are likely to be 
overwhelmed or swamped by this Colossus of 
Indian domination ~n this Colony. This problem 
.. , must be solved before it is too late, ... 
I support the motion. 65 
For his part, the Fourth Native Member, Ratu G. Tonganivalu, 
began his speech by saying that he would be failing in his 
duty if he did not support the motion. 66 Ratu E. Mataitini 
echoed the sentiments of his Fijian colleagues but, in 
addition, he also lavished Ragg with praise: 
I support this motion because to my knowledge 
it is the first time for many years that some-
one has had the courage to table and speak on 
a motion of this kind. 67 
With such solid backing from the Fijian members, together 
with the strong support provided by European members like 
W.G. Johnson and H.B. Gibson, victory could hardly have 
eluded Ragg. The following statement by W.G. Johnson, a 
European Nominated Member, for example, captured the essen-
tial thrust of the kind of argument which came from the 
representatives of local white capital: 
out. 
... the European people and the Fijian people 
see today fairly clearly that within the space 
of a few years it is inevitable that the Indian 
people will have a vast numerical superiority 
and that the time may corne when they will try 
to take power unto themselves in this Colony, 
and then we will be faced with the unhappy state 
of affairs that is occurring in Palestine today. 68 
Twenty-eight years on, history has yet to bear him 
But he went on: 
Their [the Europeans'] association with the 
Fijians in the past is one which has been almost 
completely acceptable to the Fijians and the 
Fijians have never regretted that association 
created in 1874 [sic]; and if they could turn 
back time and have the opportunity of re-con-
sidering their position they would not do other-
wise than follow in the same steps that their 
forefathers took them. 69 
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The real basis of the ideology of racialism, then, was 
the "ever-present fear" of "eventual Indian domination" that 
came with their rising numbers. During the debate, Ragg had 
put the Fijian and Indian populations at 119,000 and 130,000 
respectively - a difference of 14,000. But according to the 
latest estimates (see Table 5.2 below), which had in fact been 
tabled before the council only a week before the debate, the 
figures as at December 1945 were 115,724 and 117,256 respec-
tively - a difference of only 1,500. 
Despite the fact that Ragg had clearly exaggerated 
the difference in numbers, the fact remained that Indians 
had outstripped the Fijians. But what was even more threat-
ening was that not only was the Fijians' birth rate lower 
than that of the Indians, but also their death rate was 
higher. 70 Consequently, the population growth rate was much 
lower for the Fijians than the Indians. (See Table 5.3.) 
Table 5.2 Estimated Population as at 31 December 1945 
Fijians ll5,724 
Indians 117,256 
Part-Europeans 5,909 
Europeans 5,277 
Pacific Islanders 3,146 
Rotumans 3,432 
Chinese 2,490 
Others 1,442 
Total 254,676 
Source: Annual Report of the Registrar of Births, Deaths 
and Marriages, 1945, C.P. 6/46, p. 3. 
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Table 5.3 Population Growth Rates by Race, 1939 - 1945 (per 1000) 
Part- Total 
Year Fijians Indians Europeans Europeans Population 
1939 14.26 26.28 17.91 12.21 19.57 
1940 19.28 32.82 27.22 16.09 26.06 
1941 20.84 37.15 23.33 22.35 28.38 
1942 19.38 35.48 33.64 5.70 26.53 
1943 19.09 35.88 34.61 9.53 26.95 
1944 16.61 32.44 30.79 11.80 24.48 
1945 21.09 35.53 30.63 15.35 28.16 
Source: Annual Report of the Registrar of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages, 1952. C.P. 12/53, p. 7. 
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with those sorts of figures, Ragg was well-placed to 
mount his attack. So what was the nature of the counter-
offensive? The blatantly racist.character of the assault did 
provoke a defence of sorts from a few of the European members 
but it is significant those who spoke out were all expatriate 
European members and not local Europeans. Of the Indians, 
then, the Commissioner of Labour, for example, had this to 
say: 
[they] are a frugal, thrifty, industrious 
people who can be called the very sinews of our 
economy. The Fijians owe much of their advance-
ment and security to the material wealth that 
is derived from the efforts of other races of 
the colony. 71 
The Acting Secretary for Fijian Affairs concurred: 
... it is a self evident fact that the progress 
which the colony has made since Cession would 
not have been possible if the Indians had not 
been brought in to satisfy the cry of the plan-
tation owners for more and more labour, and if 
the present Indian population were suddenly to 
vanish ... our prosperity would burst like a 
pricked bubble and we should leave the Fijians 
in no better state than that in which we found 
them. 72 
And as for Ragg's basic argument that the major problem 
confronting the country was the increasing Indian population, 
the Acting Director of Medical Services thought this quite 
mistaken. For him the problem was not the racial aspect of 
the population increase but simply the increase in overall 
numbers: 
the major problem facing Fiji at the present 
time is not a different composition of one 
component in numbers as opposed to the other 
racial components of the population. It is 
not that at all. It is the absolute increase 
of population, whatever its racial composit-
ion ... 73 
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That this argument seems to have carried some weight is 
suggested by the fact that the original motion was eventually 
amended and, in particular, the offending reference to the 
political consequences of the increase in the non-Fijian 
population was deleted. In its amended form, the motion 
read: 
That in the opinion of this Council the time 
has arrived to emphasise the terms of the Deed 
of Cession to ensure that the interests of the 
Fijian race are safeguarded. 7~ 
But what of the response from the Indian members? 
K.B. Singh described Ragg's motion as "mischievious" and 
asked why the state did not care to take action against Ragg 
under the Sedition Ordinance for "setting one section of the 
community against another". 75 The Indians, he went on to 
say, had not in the past interfered with the rights of the 
Fijian people and he claimed that it was not the Indian but 
the European community who had "kept the Fijian down". 76 In 
support of this he referred to European monopoly of freehold 
land and white racism in the colonial civil service. 77 
Similar sorts of arguments were later made by the other 
Indian members - B.M. Gyneshwar, A.R. Sahu Khan, A.D. Patel, 
and Vishnu Deo. Without exception, they all employed racial 
categories: K.B. Singh, for example, spoke of European 
capital, Indian labour and Fijian land; 78 A.D. Patel made 
reference to Fijians spending their money in European or 
Chinese concerns; 79 and Vishnu Deo spoke of European vested 
interests. So here were representatives of a people who 
were being exploited first and foremost by capital and yet 
they persisted with racialist perceptions. A major reason 
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for that, as has been argued, is that they were themselves 
bourgeois and, therefore, could not jeopardise their own 
positions by adopting a class de~inition. 
For the Indian representatives, then, Ragg's attack 
was just another instance of racial prejudice but not much 
more. The pervasiveness of racialist thinking was here given 
its finest expression. Not once during the entire debate was 
reference made to the activities of the CSR, Burns Philp, 
Morris Hedstrom, Emperor Gold Mines or any other capitalist 
enterprise. The only reference to capital specifically was 
when K.B. Singh charged that Europeans were fearful of 
"Indians who have come to a state where they are competing 
with European merchants". 80 Now that statement is most 
telling. 
Of all the factions of capital to attack, white com-
mercial capital was the only one to be singled out. Why? 
Precisely because it was with commercial capital that the 
emerging Indian bourgeoisie was in greatest competition, and 
the connections between the latter and the Indian Council 
members were close. Patel was a lawyer with strong ties with 
the Gujerati corr~ercial community. Vishnu Deo was an accoun-
tant, K.B. Singh belonged to the Arya Samaj, and Sahu Khan 
was an Ahmadiyya. The Arya Samaj and the Ahmadiyya are the 
unorthodox sects of the Hindu and Muslim communities respec-
tively, and prominent in the leadership of each were people 
who were wealthy. 81 with those sorts of connections, there-
fore, it was never likely that the Indian members would 
pursue the matter of capitalist exploitation of Indian 
workers and farmers too far. To do so would have meant 
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running the risk of compromising the interests of Indian 
capitalists to whom they were connected. It was perfectly 
acceptable to point to the racial. character of inter-capit-
alist rivalry, but to expose the exploitative side of capit-
alists generally would be highly detrimental. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the whole thrust of the Indian 
counter-offensive was that Ragg's attack was basically an 
assault on Indians as a race. Ragg had adopted a racialist 
approach. They responded in like manner. It is now clearly 
evident that all the factions of capital, European and 
Indian, shared a common interest in maintaining a racial 
definition of politics. 
There is one final but crucial aspect of the Indian 
counter-offensive that needs to be considered. Vishnu Deo, 
who largely spearheaded the Indian response, argued that the 
real reason behind Ragg's motion was to settle the question 
of the electoral system. 82 Now there was an issue on which 
the Indian members could speak with some authority. They 
had, after all, fought a bitter battle over it two decades 
earlier. More importantly, however, it was an issue that did 
not pose a fundamental threat to bourgeois Indian interests. 
In 1943 Alport Barker proposed that municipal corpor-
ations be constituted through an elective system and in 
August of that year a select committee consisting of four 
Europeans (including Barker as Chairman) and Vishnu Deo was 
formed to investigate the proposal. The committee's report 
was submitted to the governor in the following October but 
was not tabled before the Council until the following year. 83 
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The major recommendation was that there should be a common 
electoral roll for municipal elections, and in May 1946 the 
European Electors' Association issued a memorandum which was 
headed "Common Roll Principle adopted in Municipal Bill". 
When, however, the governor opened the July 1946 session of 
the Council, he made this statement: 
In the light of COIT~ents received and after 
further careful consideration of the matter, 
it has been decided not to proceed with the 
Bill as published in draft, for it is not 
proposed to have a common roll, but instead, 
the communal roll system. 84 
For the Indian members, this smacked of collusion 
between the state and the white community. But why the 
change of heart? The immediate reason, as Deo pointed out, 
was that on the basis of the franchise qualifications set 
out in the Majority Report of the Select Committee,85 
Europeans would probably dominate the Suva Municipal Council 
but not the Lautoka one, and that they wished to avoid. That 
of course had a lot to do with the fact that Lautoka was in 
the major sugar region. But there was a larger and more 
important reason. 
The day before the debate, the Fiji Times and Herald 
carried a report on the colonial debate in the House of 
Commons at which the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Mr George Hall, outlined the newly-elected Labour Govern-
ment's colonial policy. It qupoted Mr Hall: 
it is our policy to develop the colonies 
and all their resources in such a way as to 
enable their people speedily and substantially 
to improve their economic and social conditions 
and as soon as may be practicable to attain 
responsible self-government. 86 
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So with self-government for the colonies now on the political 
agenda, the question of the electoral system took on renewed 
urgency. Pressure could now be applied from London to adopt 
the British electoral system, which was based on a corr~on 
, 
roll, and the prospect of such pressure being exerted was 
heightened by the fact that the Labour Government openly 
professed its socialist leanings. The governor's reaffirm-
ation of the system of communal rolls on 12 July was there-
fore very welcome, but there was still a degree of uncer-
tainty. Not surprisingly, Ragg called upon the Labour 
Government to make an "unequivocal statement" of its inten-
tions,87 and the urgency of his call is underlined by the 
fact that elections were to be held in the following year. 
The numerically superior Indians had to be kept at bay and 
support from London for the communal system of representation 
would have helped. But here came the crunch. According to 
Vishnu Deo, even with a communal electoral system, there was 
no guarantee of European electoral success and, what is more, 
the Europeans realised it. Why? Because they could no 
longer count on the unquestioning loyality of part-Europeans: 
... the European members ... fear the part-
Europeans. The part-Europeans are organising 
themselves ... They know what benefits or 
advantages they have received from the members 
they have so far been electing. They know also 
that the members so far elected ... seek to 
enfranchise civil servants. Why? Because they 
fear that the part-Europeans will not have that 
confidence in them and they will not be returned 
unless they counterbalance the half-caste votes 
with the European votes in the Civil Service. 88 
Deo's claim that the electoral salvation of the 
European community now depended on the enfranchisement of 
expatriate state functionaries was not in fact well-founded; 
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the population census on October of that year put the Euro-
pean and part-European populations at 4,594 and 6,129 respec-
tively.89 Figures aside, however, Deo I s essential point was' 
that even with the communal electoral system European polit-
ical power was now under serious threat. The whole purpose 
of Ragg's motion, therefore, was to whip up anti-Indian 
sentiment and to project the image of the European as the 
defender of both the Fijian and the national interest. In 
that way, continued part-European electoral support might be 
secured, for after all, part-Europeans had blood ties with 
the Fijians. 
The significance of the debate on this particular 
issue is that it showed how, despite the defeat of the 
common roll struggle in the early thirties, the represen-
tatives of capital were willing to test it out. When, how-
ever, it became evident that their interests would clearly 
suffer through such a system they retreated and, very impor-
tantly, sought immediately to justify and entrench its 
opposite, the system of communal rolls. That was a crucial 
intervention for it meant that any future attempts at resur-
recting the call for a common roll, and they did occur, 
would not have much chance of success. 
The debate of July 1946, then, was a cathartic res-
ponse by the ruling class to underlying capitalist contra-
dictions. Subterranean class tensions, greatly aggravated 
by demographic trends and the Second World War threatened to 
intensify even more with the changes in metropolitan colonial 
policy. Alarmed, the ruling class, particularly local white 
capital, searched for an appropriate method with which to 
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contain the welling pressure, and the legislative debate 
orchestrated by its leading representatives proved highly 
effective for the task at hand. lhe debate needs to be seen, 
therefore, as the cUlmination of mounting class tension, and 
its outcome was clearly a major victory for the ruling class. 
It reaffirmed the capitalist development path, reinforced the 
ideology and politics of racialism, and served to bolster 
local white capital's shaky position. 
6. SUMMARY 
This chapter has sought to explain how forms of bour-
geois organisation serve to contain class conflict. The 
argument has been advanced that the general function of the 
capitalist state is to provide a society-wide system of 
organisation which is capable of managing class contradic-
tions to a degree which allows capitalist production and 
accumulation to proceed relatively smoothly. So it is in 
that light that state institutions and practices, and in 
particular the electoral system, need to be understood. 
The main focus of the chapter has been the way in 
which the electoral system functioned as a form of bourgeois 
organisation, and the reason for that focus is that it was 
in the field of electoral politics that the underlying class 
struggle manifested itself most clearly. The central thrust 
of my argument is that because class conflict assumed a 
racial form, the most obvious and expeditious way for the 
ruling class to manage that conflict was to evolve an elec-
toral system along racial lines, which is precisely what it 
did. The effectiveness of that system, moreover, was greatly 
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the bourgeois electoral system. Yet they can hardly be 
expected to have done otherwise. By accepting the racialist 
rules of the electoral game, they of course played right 
into the hands of the ruling class. At the same time, how-
ever, they also effectively safeguarded their own class 
positions and those of other bourgeios Indians. 
In the end, the ultimate losers were, of course, the 
Indian labouring class. Severely compromised by an electoral 
system which identified them as Indians rather than as 
workers, and seriously disadvantaged by a bourgeois leader-
ship which was incapable and unwilling to represent them as 
a class, they were forced to evolve organisations of their 
own. The chapter which follows, then, continues, with class 
organisation as the major theme, and there the subject will 
be working class organisation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FORMS OF ORGANISATION II: WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION 
1. ORGANISED LABOUR: EARLY ORIGINS 
The history of the organised labour movement in Fiji 
dates back to the latter part of the last century and, as to 
be expected, worker unrest occurred most frequently in the 
sugar industry. Gillion, for example, described strike 
action on CSR estates at Navuso in February 1886, at Koronivia 
in May 1886 and February 1888, and at Labasa in April 1907. 1 
He also referred to a march by 130 Indian labourers from 
Nausori to Suva in April 1887 "to complain of being overworked 
and underpaid,,2 and described an earlier period (to 1903) 
when "Labasa was the worst centre ... [and] there was almost 
a state of civil war".3 Important though these episodes were, 
they were largely spontaneous reactions against the worst 
effects of a harsh plantation life, rather than instances of 
organised struggle. In Hince's words, they lacked "the 
notion of 'union' or 'unionism,,,.4 
The first real attempt at organising a trade union 
appears to have occurred in 1916 when a Fiji-born European, 
Edmund Sanday, with the assistance of a Fijian called 
Setareki Nasoki, tried to organise Fijian labourers employed 
by the CSR and the Union Steamship Company at the Lautoka 
wharf into the Fiji Wharf Labourers' Union. 5 As Hince's 
analysis clearly shows, however, the attempt was doomed to 
failure, for the fledgling organisation was no match for the 
combined might of capital and the colonial state. Sanday and 
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Nasoki were victimised, scab native labour was organised for 
labouring duties on the wharf, and police reinforcements were 
taken to Lautoka to "maintain law and order". Capital and 
the state clearly saw the whole incident as a totally new 
dimension in labour relations workers were trying to 
organise and they appeared to be doing that quite success-
fully. A strong response was therefore necessary and in the 
end the nascent organisation was suppressed through the use 
of the state's repressive forces. That the state did not 
expect a strong challenge from organised labour is suggested 
not only by the speed with which it called upon its repress-
ive forces (such action is usually taken as a last resort), 
but also by weaknesses in the existing legislative controls. 
Ordinance 1 of 1875 and the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 
1890 were two pieces of legislation that were considered but 
neither were deemed applicable. 6 Not suprisingly, then, the 
desirability of introducing new legislation "to deal with 
persons agitating the coloured labour and thereby causing 
strikes" was clearly recognised. 7 That point was agreed upon 
at a meeting between the Governor, the Attorney-General, J.M. 
Hedstrom and H.M. Scott in November 1916,8 but nothing 
actually materialised, and it was not until workers rebelled 
again - during the 1920 strike - that the colonial state was 
prompted into enacting new legislative controls. The Public 
Safety Ordinance was passed in February 1920 and was used to 
convict and imprison the "ringleaders".9 No doubt the 
violence of the 1920 strike prompted drastic action. 
Sanday's attempt at organising labour, then, is sig-
nificant in two respects. Firstly, it bore the marks of a 
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trade union - leadership, organisation, the payment of 
subscriptions, withdrawal of labour, submission of a log of 
claims and so on. Secondly, it alerted the colonial state to 
weaknesses in its system of social control which it would 
have to rectify if class pressure was to be contained in the 
future. Some twenty years would elapse between the demise of 
Sanday's organisation and the birth of the trade union move-
ment as we know it today, but in the interim state and capital 
would learn from the early lessons and prepare for the task 
of class containment that lay ahead. 
Various initiatives to form trade unions were made in 
the 1920s and early 1930s by leading Indians like Manilal, 
Mitter and Muni but, largely because of the defeats suffered 
by labour and tighter social control by the state, no lasting 
organisations emerged. 10 The only unions to emerge before 
the 1940s were an association of European teachers at 
Methodist Mission Schools and the Suva Teachers Association. 
The former was formed in 1924 while the latter followed four 
years later. In 1931 they amalgamated and formed the Fiji 
Teachers' Union but a few years later native Fijian teachers 
broke away and formed their own Fijian Teachers' Association. 
That break has persisted to the present and is the only 
instance of ethnic exclusivity that remains within the trade 
union movement today. Similar ethnic splits were subse-
quently to afflict the movement at various times, but they all 
proved temporary. Their impact on the evolution of the 
organised labour movement was significant, but that will be 
discussed later. 
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2. FARMER ORGANISATIONS 
The turning point in the early history of organised 
labour came in late 1937 when Ayodhya Prasad, a school-
teacher who arrived in the colony in 1926, founded the Kisan 
Sangh ('Farmers' Union'). Securing company recognition of 
the union, however, turned out to be a much more difficult 
task than Prasad had anticipated, and all the more so inspite 
of his misguided belief that the most effective way forward 
was to collaborate with the company. At first the CSR 
ignored the union, hoping that it would somehow go away. 
Soon, however, the company decided that it might be better to 
try to defeat the union while still in its infancy. From the 
company's point of view, such an approach made a great deal 
of sense - better to annihilate the fledgling enemy than to 
let it develop strength. As far as the colonial state was 
concerned, however, such a strategy was pregnant with disrup-
tive potential, and the lifeblood of the economy could not be 
allowed to be subjected to that kind of risk. The company, 
therefore, had to be prodded into adopting a more conciliat-
ory posture. 
Beyond its concern about the potentially serious 
consequences of company antagonism towards the union, the 
colonial state was also coming under mounting pressure from 
Britain to introduce "enlightened" labour legislation. For 
the previous ten years the company had successfully staved 
off such legislation but "informed opinion in Britain would 
no longer allow it do [so] for much longer".]] So, as 
membership of the Kisan Sangh grew and the demand for recog-
nition increased, so did state pressure on the company 
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intensify. Eventually, on 30 May 1941 the union was recog-
nised. 
Prasad's strategy of collaboration was based on his 
conviction that only by co-operating with the company would 
the farmer& secure concessions that would raise their real 
incomes. 12 After the battle for recognition had been won, 
therefore, co-operation increased, but so too did anxiety 
among certain farmers who remained distrustful of the CSR. 
Long-term reconciliation of grower and company interests, 
they felt, was impossible and the Kisan Sangh's collaborative 
approach was inherently contradictory, and in the end farmer 
interests would be compromised. In that kind of atmosphere 
of distrust and apprehension, the situation was ripe for the 
emergence of a rival canegrowers' organisation. 
Prominent among the Kisan Sangh's concerns was the 
matter of farmer indebtedness, and in an attempt to solve 
that problem it established a co-operative store through 
which members could purchase goods fairly cheaply. That 
development had important consequences for the two factions 
of capital that had the greatest and most direct impact on 
canefarmers and labourers - the CSR and the Indian merchant 
traders. For the former it meant that with the Kisan Sangh 
concentrating on providing cheap supplies as a means of 
alleviating indebtedness, its attention would be diverted 
from trying to increase the price of cane as a means of 
raising real incomes. By following such a strategy, the 
Kisan Sangh effectively relieved the CSR of a great deal of 
pressure and it is not surprising that the company saw fit to 
give both moral and financial support to the co-operative 
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venture. 13 For the Indian merchant traders, on the other 
hand, the co-operative represented a fundamental threat to 
their profits. Most of the traders' dealings were with cane-
farmers and labourers, and their high prices and interest 
rates were precisely the profit-extracting devices that the 
Kisan Sangh was concerned to attack. The traders' business 
practices were considered unscrupulous, and it was to rescue 
rural Indian workers from the clutches of the rapacious 
Indian traders that the Sangh set up the co-operative. 
A proper understanding of the effect of the Sangh's 
intervention as a stimulus to the growth of the organised 
labour movement is possible only against a background of 
changes that were taking place at the time in both the class 
structure and the circuit of capital. At the level of the 
immediate production process, the Indian labouring classes 
were being exploited by sugar capital, and past history had 
shown very clearly that the possibility of raising real 
incomes by struggling for a higher cane price was minimal. 
At the level of exchange, however, the source of their 
exploitation (high shop prices) had shifted increasingly from 
local white merchants to an emerging Indian bourgeoisie whose 
strength was still something of an unknown. Never before had 
Indian farmers and labourers waged a battle against the 
latter, and the Kisan Sangh's co-operative venture represen-
ted the first attempt. The changing class structure had thus 
apparently opened the way to an alternative means by which 
the lot of the Indian labouring classes could be improved. 
As the object of attack, the Indian merchants were a rather 
easier target than their local white counterparts had been. 
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Not only were their practices more intensely exploitative 
(higher prices and interest rates), but there was also the 
I 
added psychological advantage that came with the racial 
character of the enemy. It was somehow easier, psycholog-
ically, to deal with other Indians than with Europeans, and 
because there were intracommunal cleavages that could be 
exploited, the task of dealing with the Indian traders as 
capitalist exploiters was that much easier. But the nascent 
Indian bourgeoisie was intent on resisting. 
By this time a major cleavage had developed within the 
Indian community between those of North Indian and those of 
South Indian origin, and its real basis was differences in 
wealth. North Indians had been in the country longer than 
South Indians and therefore tended not only to be more 
prosperous but also to have a greater stake in the existing 
order. Their substantial support for the Kisan Sangh, and in 
particular the strategy of collaboration advocated by its 
leader, Ayodhya Prasad (himself a North Indian), is therefore 
easy to explain. As Moynagh put it: 
They had more to lose than South Indians from 
a strategy of confrontation that [in the past] 
failed, and yet they stood to gain from con-
cessions won through co-operation. 14 
South Indians, by wa~ of contrast, were generally less well-
off, and that disadvantage the Indian merchants sought to 
exploit as they set about defending themselves against the 
threat posed by the Kisan Sangh's co-operative. So in 
alliance with South Indians, and through the leadership of 
the Gujerati lawyer A.D. Patel, the Indian commercial bour-
geoisie set about undermining support for the Kisan Sangh, 
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and on 5 June 1941 a rival organisation, the Akhil Fiji 
Krishak Maha Sangh, was formed. 
was a South Indian. 
Its leader, Swami Rudranand~ 
In terms of class organisation, then, the farmers were 
now deeply divided, a division which has persisted to the 
present day. The dynamics of capitalist exploitation, 
coupled with the realities of bourgeois forms of organis-
ation,forced the farmers to evolve an organisation of their 
own. Having done so, they subsequently set about trying to 
improve th~ material conditions of their existence. That, 
however, fundamentally threatened the profits of Indian 
commercial capital, and it is there that the real basis of 
the split which followed lies. Exploiting intracommunal 
cleavages based ultimately on differences in wealth, Indian 
commercial capital led the way in the formation of a rival 
farmer organisation. 
Class and intracommunal differences thus found insti-
tutional expression in the rival organisations, and hence-
forth farmers would have to contend with class enemies on 
two broad fronts. To the awesome power of sugar capital to 
which the farmers had always been subjected, was now added 
the burden of having a leadership which was not only divided 
but also whose class interests were often antithetical to 
their own. Ahead, then, lay a history of struggle against 
even more formidable odds. 
It is not surprising that the immediate origins of 
the organised labour movement are to be found in the farmer 
organisations. Neither too is it surprising that the first 
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trade union was formed in the sugar industry, and It is to 
the growth of trade unions in Fiji that attention now turns. 
3. TRADE UNIONS: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 
At Lautoka on 3 April 1938, the Mazdur Sangh(\~orkers' 
Union}was formed, but it was first registered on 9 December 
1944, at which time its name was changed to the Chini Mazdur 
Sangh (Sugar Workers' Union). Lacking both the numbers and 
the influential leadership of the farmers' associations, the 
Chini Mazdur Sangh remained a minor force for a long time, IS 
but as the first organisation of industrial workers, it 
served as something of a model for the later unions. 
In terms of its growth, the early 1940s were a lean 
period for the newly-born trade union movement. In part that 
was due to the war but the major reason had to do with the 
antagonism between the movement, on the one hand, and 
Australian capital and the colonial state, on the other. 
Growing concern in Britain about the'~elfare"and 
'~spirations"of its colonial subjects led in 1930 to the 
appointment in London of a committee to consider the whole 
question of labour policy in the colonies. Despatches were 
sent out in that year by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies urging all colonies to introduce legislation that 
would give legal rights to trade unions. 16 In Fiji, that 
call bore no fruit for twelve years thereafter. By the mid-
1930s, Australian dominance in the colonial economy had 
extended beyond the sugar sector to take in the gold-mining 
industry also. With that kind of control, Australian capital 
was in a powerful position to resist the introduction of 
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"enlightened" labour laws. About that resistance, Gillion 
says that as late as 1940, Australian capital was still 
opposed in principle to "all labo.ur legislation". 17 Surely, 
has claim is exaggerated. Capital always welcomes legis-
lation which controls workers. In reality, therefore, what 
Australian capital feared was the introduction of leg~slation 
which might increase the strength of the workers. In any 
case, in the face of strong opposition from Australian 
capital and similar, though less visible, opposition from the 
colonial state, it is not surprising that by 1944 there were 
only three trade unions in the country. By 1949, however, 
the number had risen to fifteen. IS How is that to be 
explained? 
Pressure had been mounting in Britain for the enact-
ment of "enlightened" labour laws, and the passage of the 
Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1940 proved to be a 
major turning point. The Act, as we shall see in Chapter 
VIII, represented a major shift in metropolitan colonial 
policy and its impact on trade unionism in the colonies 
derived from the provision that support for development 
projects was conditional upon the existence of trade union 
legislation. By then the need for enlightened legislation 
was firmly impressed upon the colonial state, and something 
of a test of its position occurred during a dispute between 
the CSR and the Kisan Sangh in the same year, i.e. 1940. As 
usual, the company was uncompromising, and largely because of 
that the colonial state's newly-appointed industrial relat-
ions officer, stuart Reay, proposed the introduction of 
compulsory arbitration legislation. Soon afterwards, on 
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26 March, the Executive Council resolved to do just that. 
The severity of the state's proposal, i.e. to proceed direc-
tly to compulsory arbitration without instituting a system of 
free collective bargaining, did not, however, square with the 
pressure from London that industrial laws should be enlight-
ened. The state was therefore caught in a dilemma. So when 
the dispute was settled soon afterwards, on 6 April, it was 
let off the hook. The Kisan Sangh did not win recognition 
(another year would pass before it did) but as a result of 
the settlement the company was deemed to have "in effect ... 
recognised the principle of collective bargaining". 19 There-
upon the decision to introduce compulsory arbitration was 
revoked in favour of something on "less severe lines". The 
result was the Industrial Associations Ordinance and the 
Industrial Disputes (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance 
of 1942. 20 The way was now clear for more unions to emerge, 
and hence the five-fold increase in five years. 
Enactment of the ordinances did not mean, however, 
that the colonial state's underlying antagonism towards 
labour had changed fundamentally. Legislation had now been 
passed which had the appearance of being liberal but that did 
not guarantee that the general antagonism which the colonial 
state had previously displayed had changed radically. As 
Reddy put it, the colonial state "did not always share the 
Colonial Office policy of encouraging trade unionism". 21 So 
against the liberal appearance of the new legislation (a 
point we take up further a little later), new and less 
obvious forms of labour control had to be found. Reddy's 
account of these gives a fairly good idea of the new approach. 
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The state encouraged the formation of some unions merely "as 
a matter of administrative convenience", others it repressed 
by vicitmising unionists and refusing to recognise their 
legal status, and to others still it "displayed an attitude 
of indifference". 22 
Handicapped thus by the restricting effects of the 
state's new approach, it is not surprising that the growth of 
the trade union movement over the next few years was slow. 
But there were other problems confronting the nascent move-
ment - inadequate resources, organisational deficiencies, and 
a relative scarcity of effective and experienced leaders. 
Inevitably, therefore, many of the early unions were short-
lived. Yet in spite of all that, the unions which did survive 
were generally able to consolidate themselves sufficiently to 
provide the essential substructure for the establishment of a 
continuous link between workers and their organisations, and 
initially unions were strongest in the sugar-milling, mining, 
stevedoring, seafaring and public works sectors.23 And as 
numbers grew, the movement gained in strength. On the whole, 
however, it was still quite vulnerable. Mohammed Ramzan 
described the problems and fragility of the early years in 
this way; 
Joining unions meant inviting trouble, intim-
idation and victimisation ... Employers could 
not tolerate trade unions as they were construed 
as a challenge to their authority - something 
which was unbearable to them. In those early 
days leadership too was scarce and difficult to 
come by and unions had very little resources to 
work with. Those who accepted any positions of 
responsibility in unions were invariably ostra-
cised to the extent of dismissal. Their pros-
pect of future employment was doomed and their 
names were whispered around to employers for 
black listing ... Those were the early days of 
the struggle - a struggle for self respect and 
recognition. It was a struggle for workers' 
dignity .•. This battle for .•. survival was by 
no means an easy one and to make matters even 
more difficult even the Government of the day 
was against trade unionism.2~ 
In that kind of hostile environment the possibility of a 
national workers' organisation emerging increased. 25 And 
soon one did. 
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In 1951, the Minister of state for the Colonies, Mr 
Dugdale, visited Fiji, and an invitation was sent to union 
representatives to hold discussions with him. Led by Pandit 
Ami Chandra, delegates from five unions met Mr Dugdale on 
August 14 of that year. 
It is significant that the meeting was held in Lautoka. 
Of the five unions represented at the discussions, four were 
based predominantly in north-western Viti Levu - the Chini 
Mazdur Sangh, Fijian Mineworkers Union, Fiji Airport Employ-
ees Union, and the Fiji Public Works Department Employees 
Union. 26 The industrial working class was concentrated in 
/, 
that region and it is not coincidental that wor~e'r organis-
ation was most highly developed there. In Suva, for example, 
a union of employees of the Public Works Department was 
formed in 1946 but it was quite ineffectual, and was deregis-
tered in 1950. 27 In 1947, by way of contrast, the North-
Western Public Works Employees Union was formed in Lautoka 
and subsequently expanded throughout the country. with the 
deregistration of the Suva-based organisation, the Lautoka-
based one received official recognition and in June 1950 
became the Fiji Public Works Department Employees Union. It 
is to the early efforts of the workers in the west, therefore, 
that the trade union movement owes a great deal. That they 
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provided the early lead, however, is largely to be expected, 
for it was in that region that capitalist production was 
concentrated most heavily. The workers of the 'burning west' 
were, indeed, the most badly burnt, and out of their longer 
history of pain and struggle was born a determination to 
redress the balance, a determination which led to the form-
ation of a national organisation of worker~. 
After their meeting with Mr Dugdale, the representa-
tives of the five unions signed a document which included 
this statement: 
We, the representatives of various unions 
assembled here today agree to form a Federation 
of Unions with the object of promoting and 
safeguarding the interests of the working class 
generally. 28 
The document was subsequently ratified by the respective 
unions and on 29 September 1951 the Fiji Industrial Workers 
Congress, the movement's first umbrella organisation, came 
into being. A milestone in the history of the movement had 
been reached. Another union, the Fiji Timber Industrial 
Workers' Union, Nadarivatu, joined the original five and the 
affiliated membership of the national organisation represen-
ted about one third of the existing unions. Modelled on its 
British counterpart, the organisation changed its name in 
1954 to the Fiji Trades Union Congress. 
The decade or so up to the mid-50s, then, were the 
formative years of the trade union movement in Fiji. It was 
beginning to leave its imprint on the industrial scene but 
its effectiveness was still severely constrained by the 
limiting effects not only of its infancy but also of the 
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ruling class's deep-rooted antagonism against workers, and 
one which was demonstrated by the generally hostile posture 
which capital and the state adopted in their practical 
dealings with trade unions. Industrial legislation did not 
give clear expression to that antagonism; it had, after all, 
to appear liberal. There was, however, a very important but 
indirect way in which the bourgeois nature of the labour laws 
was evident - the absence of any legal requirement for the 
compulsory recognition of trade unions. A little later, the 
consequences of that serious omission will be discussed but 
first the system of industrial relations will be examined. 
In Reddy's work is to be found the only attempt so far at 
dealing with this issue but his analysis is fundamentally 
flawed. 
4. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 
What, then, was the system of industrial relations 
which the 1942 ordinances created? In principle, they estab-
lished a system of free collective bargaining and not, as 
Reddy suggested, a system of compulsory arbitration. This 
can be supported on several grounds. In the first place, 
employers and employees were free to settle their disputes by 
themselves. Secondly, state intervention in industrial dis-
putes was possible only where settlement was not reached and 
where both parties consented to referral of the dispute to a 
third party. Third, in the event of state intervention, the 
dispute was to be referred in the first instance to concil-
iation and only if settlement was not reached at that level 
could arbitration proceedings be commenced. Fourth, the 1942 
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Industrial Disputes Ordinance also provided for both a con-
ciliation and arbitration machinery. Finally, and very 
importantly, the relative freedom of employers and unions was 
further underlined by the absence of any legal requirement to 
provide advance notice of intention to declare a lockout or a 
strike. From all this, then, it is clear that the colonial 
state was responding mainly to pressure from the metropolitan 
state and enlightened opinion in Britain generally. Austra-
lian capital especially had for a long time resisted the 
introduction of labour legislation but if the colonial state 
was to benefit from assistance which the Colonial Welfare and 
Development Act o£ 1940 provided for, then enlightened labour 
legislation would have to be enacted. Seen from that pers-
pective, the only viable option open to it was to institute a 
system which at least would give the appearance of being 
liberal, so it was virtually inevitable that the new legis-
lative machinery would establish a system of free collective 
bargaining. 
Such, then, was the kind of system which the law 
allowed. Whether or not the actual practice of industrial 
relations conformed to it is another matter altogether, and 
here Reddy makes ·two valid points: that the actual develop-
ment of free collective bargaining in Fiji was slow,29 and 
that "an important requirement for collective bargaining is 
that employers must not only grant unions recognition but ... 
they must also be willing to bargain in good faith". 30 These 
points are closely related for the fact that free collective 
bargaining was not actually the predominant practice for such 
a long time is to be explained largely in terms of the 
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extended absence of any legal compulsion on the part of 
employers to recognise trade unions. Recognition of unions 
was not required by law until the. passage of the Trade Union 
(Recognition) Act of 1976. If, therefore, Reddy is arguing 
that in practice industrial relations in Fiji did not, on the 
whole, conform to the principles of free collective bargain-
ing, then his case is valid. And evidence that this is so 
will be provided later. But whether or not that is in fact 
his position is unclear. A system of compulsory arbitration, 
he claims, existed until 1954. 31 By itself, this is clearly 
incorrect. That the reality of industrial relations fell 
short of free collective bargaining can be demonstrated, and 
it is tempting to conclude from this that a system of compul-
sory arbitration was in effect operating. 
that Reddy has fallen to that temptation. 
And it appears 
The fact that 
conciliation was available as an intermediate step before 
arbitration and that the law provided for both a conciliation 
and an arbitration machinery clearly shows that industrial 
practice in Fiji did not rest solely on compulsory arbitra-
tion. Reddy seems to suggest that it did and he is clearly 
mistaken. 
What of his other argument, that compulsory arbitra-
tion gave way to collective bargaining in 1954? This too 
does not stand up to scrutiny. The only significant piece 
of industrial legislation enacted in that year did not affect 
the existing legislation. The Essential Services (Arbitra-
tion) Ordinance of 1954 provided for compulsory arbitration 
in disputes affecting essential services, and under section 
13(1), twenty-one days' notice had to be given of intention 
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to strike or to effect a lockout. Not until 1958 was there 
any significant departure from the provisions of the 1942 
ordinances. What is more, the effect of the 1958 changes was 
not, if Reddy is to be believed, to herald an era of free 
collective bargaining - something approaching such a system 
already existed. Nor was it even to strengthen the principle 
of free collective bargaining already enshrined in the 
existing laws. Quite the contrary, for as we shall see, the 
major legislative change in 1958 - the deletion of the 1942 
clause which provided for a state-instituted conciliation 
machinery - actually-had the effect of strengthening the hand 
of the colonial state in dealing with the task of containing 
working class struggles. By 1958 that task had become more 
urgent, so the need to seek out methods of dampening the 
increasing assertiveness and confidence of organised labour 
became more imperative. It is not the case, therefore, as 
Reddy contends, that the system of collective bargaining 
began in 1954. 
Industrial relations in Fiji, then, were based on the 
principle of free collective bargaining, even if actual 
practice did not always conform that that principle. The 
importance of the legislative changes of 1958 lies in the 
fact that they served to blunt, but not negate, that prin-
ciple. Why the colonial state resorted to such action can 
only be understood against the short history of industrial 
strife that preceded it, and to that I now turn. 
5. CLASS CONTRADICTIONS, ORGANISATION, STRUGGLE 
Taking strikes as an indicator, it is clear from the 
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table below that the level of open struggle by organised 
labour during the first decade after the war was generally 
low. But that can be explained relatively easily. The trade 
union movement was still very much in its infancy and had not 
yet developed the kind of confidence and strength that was 
necessary to overcome the difficulties that were borrt of its 
unequal relationship to capital. Also, the country was still 
recovering from the effects of war. 
Table 7.1 Strike Activity 1949 - 1960 
No. of Workers Workdays 
Year Strikes Involved Lost 
1949 1 55 110 
1950 3 544 1,651 
1951 1 275 425 
1952 2 797 1,825 
1953 3 262 594 
1954 2 55 100 
1955 7 1,488 10,457 
1956 2 542 142 
1957 3 4,922 20,825 
1958 1 294 388 
1959 6 1,738 5,529 
1960 15 4,692 12,017 
Source: J. Reddy, Labour and Trade Unions in 
Fiji, p. 111. 
Against that general trend described above, the years 
1955 and 1957 stand out as major exceptions. By then union 
strength had increased and the movement had become suffic-
iently assertive to stake a claim for a greater share of the 
economic cake. The major strikes by gold-miners at Vatakoula 
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in 1955 and by the Sugar Employees Union (the Chini Mazdur 
Sangh) in north-western Viti Levu in 1957 were so disruptive 
that capital and the state recognised the necessity for 
legislative changes. Never before had strike activity 
reached such major proportions and a reoccurrence in the 
future had to be prevented. It is against that background 
that the enactment of the 1958 Industrial Disputes (Arbitra-
tion and Inquiry) Ordinance needs to be understood. 
The Fiji Mineworkers Union had been in existence since 
1948 but had not won recognition from the company Emperor 
Gold Mines. A major complicating factor for the predomin-
antly-Fijian workforce was the existence of a provincial 
committee of traditional leaders who continued to exert their 
authority among the workers. Although it did not act as a 
bargaining agent, the committee did serve as a "tenuous link 
between management and workers", 32 and it was largely because 
of that "dual authority" among the workers that the company's 
position was always considerably greater than that of the 
union. The colonial state for its part had always supported 
the company because of what it perceived as the company's 
vulnerability to industrial disturbances, 33 and as late as 
1953 it still continued to shrug its shoulders in relation to 
the union. 3q A wage dispute in August 1952, however, resul-
ted in the setting up of a conciliation board and one of its 
major recommendations was that the union should be recognised 
as the sole representative of the workers. That proposal was 
not taken up by the company but when, during the strike of 
1955, the power of the union emerged very clearly, recognit-
ion was duly given. with respect to both the terms of the 
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settlement and recognition of the union, the workers had 
scored a significant victory But the magnitude of the loss 
resulting from the stoppage - som~ 10,000 workdays 35 - was 
more than sufficient to signal the need for more restraining 
legislation. This was the first time that mine production 
involved such a major loss, and that it occurred at a time 
when the price of gold had fallen 36 meant that the loss in 
revenue to both mining capital and the colonial state was 
magnified. The writing was on the wall - labour had to be 
restrained. 
Two years later the writing became clearer. Three 
strikes by sugar workers in the latter part of 1957 produced 
a total loss of some 21,000 workdays, 37 more than twice the 
loss resulting from the Vatukoula stoppage. State and cap-
ital had learned important lessons from the earlier strike 
and now that sugar production was at risk, appropriate meas-
ures would have to be instituted. Industrial legislation 
based on sugar's special position in the economy did not 
materialise until the enactment of the Sugar Ordinance of 
1961 (this will be discussed later) but in the meantime the 
1958 Industrial Disputes Ordinance would serve as the regul-
ator. 
The purpose of that ordinance was summarised as 
follows: 
to provide for the establishment of an arbitra-
tion tribunal and a board of inquiry in connec-
tion with industrial disputes, and to make 
provision for the settlement of such disputes, 
and for the purpose of inquiring into economic 
and industrial conditions in the ~olony.38 
This statement of intent captures the two major features of 
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the ordinance: the shorter route to compulsory arbitration, 
and the new restraining effect resulting from the provisions 
which made it possible to consider workers' demands in terms 
of their consequences for the broader "economic and indus-
trial conditions" of the country. 
Conspicuous by its absence 'from the 1958 Ordinance 
was any provision for a legally-required, state-instituted 
conciliation machinery. Such provision had been a hallmark 
of the 1942 Industrial Disputes Ordinance but now it did not 
exist. Under the new legislation, recourse could still be 
had to conciliation proceedings but only if such proceedings 
were provided for in a previously-concluded agreement 
between employer and employees. Given, however, that unions 
were seriously handicapped by the absence of any statutory 
requirement for the compulsory recognition of unions, the 
likelihood of there being any such agreement was usually 
quite small. And that only a few such agreements actually 
existed is suggested by this statement by the Department of 
Labour three years after the passage of the new ordinance: 
It is evident from the number of collective 
agreements signed over the years that there is 
a lack of provision for a full disputes pro-
cedure. Although employers and trade union 
officers in some industries have accepted the 
need to insert in agreements, provision for 
permanent arrangements dealing with disputes 
... in other industries the agreements do not 
specify full procedural methods ••• 39 
It does appear, then, that the inclusion of a dispute settle-
ment procedure in employer-union agreements was more the 
exception than the rule and the colonial state's explanation 
for that is interesting: 
... it could be presumed that there is a rel-
iance on the Industrial Disputes (Arbitration 
and Inquiry) Ordinance of 1958 as the only 
means of settling dispute differences, and to 
resort to the Ordinance b~fore full machinery 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes in 
industry is exhausted. 4o 
208 
Not only is this statement contradictory, it is also a clear 
example of ideological mystification. I have already demon-
strated how it was that recourse to the disputes ordinance 
was usually necessary precisely because more often than not a 
formal dispute settlement machinery between employers and 
unions did not exist. Moreover, that state of affairs 
was largely the result of the highly unequal relationship 
between bosses and workers - if one did not recognise the 
other, how could a mutually-acceptable arrangement be conclu-
oed? Very often the "full machinery" that was supposed to 
have been "exhausted" was illusory; it is in that sense that 
the above statement is contradictory. But it is more than 
that. It gives the impression that the whole intention of 
the 1958 ordinance was to shift the burden of conflict resol-
ution from the state to the employers and workers. At the 
latter level, however, the machinery necessary for such 
resolution either did not exist or was inadequate. It is 
quite clear, then, that the real import of the 1958 ordinance 
was rather different from what the colonial state would have 
us believe. Its real effect was to allow the state to inter-
vene in disputes more quickly, and the empowering provision 
was section 3(2). Conciliation, as an intermediate step in 
the settlement of disputes, was no longer available, and the 
governor was now able under section 3(2) to refer disputes to 
arbitration. Overall, then, the ordinance greatly reduced 
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the time between the emergence and the settlement of a 
dispute. Clearly, the lessons of 1955 and 1957 were not lost 
to capital and the colonial state.. The push was now on to 
minimise the effects of industrial action. Related to this, 
of course, was the other important feature of the new ordin-
ance - the provision for boards of inquiry to investigate the 
consequences for the wider economy of worker demands. 
That was a major intervention, for it now meant that 
worker demands could be considered not only on their own 
merits but also in terms of the wider 'national interest'. 
Unions would henceforth have to contend with arguments about 
what the economy was capable of withstanding and union 
'militancy' would begin to figure increasingly as an ogre 
that had to be contained. Deleterious in its demonstration 
effects, such militancy would increasingly be blamed for 
inflation, unemployment, loss of revenue and so forth. 
Couched, then, in terms of the 'national good', these sorts 
of arguments would be made to appear as if they were imbued 
with a certain moral force, a kind of unchallengeable moral-
ity which, if the arguments were to be believed, workers were 
either largely impervious to or were not prepared to abide 
by. Either way, workers would appear to be the villians. 
But in addition to that kind of ideological underpinning, 
these sorts of arguments also had the added advantage of 
being buttressed by legal sanction - the law, after all, 
insisted that the wider economic conditions of the country 
should not be put at risk. 
The legislative changes of 1958, then, were necess-
itated by the stress resulting from the organised attempt by 
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workers to improve their conditions. By the second half of 
the 1950s, the trade union movement had become better organ-
ised and more assertive, and the $trikes of 1955 and 1957 
bore that out. In response, the state passed restraining 
legislation in 1958, but just one year later it would become 
clear that, although significant, the state's action ~as not 
broad enough. A major strike in 1959 and another in 1960 
would jolt the ruling class with a force it had never before 
experienced. And only an invocation of the repressive Public 
Safety Ordinance of 1920 would end them. The very roots of 
colonial capitalism in Fiji were about to be violently shaken. 
The strikes of '59 and '60 were major events in Fiji's 
history and are therefore discussed in a separate chapter 
(see chapter IX), but for the moment, one further feature of 
the early years of the labour movement needs to be consider-
ed - the ubiquitous problem of racialism. 
6. RACIALISM AND ORGANISED LABOUR 
Racialism had for a long time militated against the 
unity and strength of the labour movement. The historical 
dialectic between race and class in the wider social form-
ation found expression within the movement and produced scars 
and divisions which did not begin to heal until the late 
sixties. Struggles within the movement during its infant 
stages mirrored and in turn accentuated the racial character 
of wider social tensions. 
The history of racial fragmentation within the trade 
union movement dates back to the formation of the Fijian 
Teachers Association in 1934. But racial splits only began 
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to afflict the nascent movement in a significant way in the 
immediate post-war years. Various reasons have been given as 
explanations for that development~ One factor was the exis-
tence of skill differences, and these took the visible form 
of race. The Seamen's Union, registered in 1946, contained a 
specific racial exclusivity clause which was designed to 
exclude Europeans and part-Europeans who typically held 
higher rankings than Fijians. Those excluded responded by 
forming their own Masters, Mates and Engineers' Union but it 
was shortlived. 41 Skill differences were also instrumental 
in the formation of the Fiji Sugar Skilled Workers' Union 
(later reorganised as the Fiji Sugar Tradesmen's Union) .42 
Part-Europeans especially were heavily represented in it and 
their continuing influence there is suggested by the fact 
that as late as 1981 they still commanded the three top 
positions - president, vice-president and general secretary.43 
A second explanation for the racial splits has to do 
with employment patterns. Since Indians were concentrated 
most heavily in the sugar sector, they would inevitably 
dominate both the membership and the leadership of unions 
such as the Chini Mazdur Sangha The same was also true of 
the North-Western Public Works Employees' Union (registered 
in 1947), the forefunner of the Fiji Public Works Department 
Employees' Union. Fijians, for their part, predominated in 
the Fiji Goldminers' Union and the Fiji Stevedores' Union. 44 
In view of this early pattern of racial concentration, ele-
ments of racial competitiveness and exclusiveness increas-
ingly crept into the movement in the 1950s and early '60s. 
This was the case with the Fijian Commercial Workers' Union 
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(formed in 1948), Public Works Fijian Workers' Union (1953), 
Fijian Domestic Restaurant and Allied Workers' Union (1960), 
Suva and Lautoka Municipal Council (Fijian) Workers' Union 
(1960), Fijian Engineering Workers' Union (1962), and the 
South Pacific Sugar Workers' Union (1962) .~5 As this list 
clearly shows, most of the racially exclusive unions were 
formed by Fijians. Many of the stronger and more established 
unions were dominated by Indians, a situation which "led in 
some cases to a certain disenchantment of the Fijian minority 
based in part on language barriers, accusations of favourit-
ism and a feeling of inability to achieve primary Fijian 
goals" . ~6 
Related to that sense of marginality was, according to 
Reddy, a third explanation of racial exclusivity, Fijians, 
he argues, were "unwilling to accept non-Fijian leadership 
that lacked the authority and respect of the traditional 
chief". ~7 His argument is a powerful one if the early exper-
ience of the Fiji Miners' Union is anything to go by. As 
Hince argued, traditional authority continued for a long time 
to play a decisive role in that union and the evidence 
suggests that management exploited that state of affairs in 
order to undercut the growth and the influence of the union.~B 
And it was not until after the 1955 strike that the union 
carne into its own. While Reddy's point is therefore not 
without substance, the more important factor was perhaps not 
so much the absence of Fijian chiefly authority and leadership 
as the absence simply of Fijian as opposed to non-Fijian 
leadership. , 
As a fourth and final explanation, Reddy indentified 
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the "considerable pressur~ from the Fijian chiefs, 
colonial administrators and politicians to organise along 
rac ial 1 ines" . 49 Chiefs feared a weakening of their author-
ity, administrators "saw weak unionism as the corollary of 
racial divisions", and with a racially fragmented trade union 
movement, strikes would be less common, more easily broken 
and politically less dangerous. 50 
Each of the explanations identified here has some 
validity, but there are two basic weaknesses in the way in 
which all of them have been presented by the various writ-
ers. 51 The first is that no attempt has been made to under-
stand them in the context of broader historical processes. 
Related to that is the absence of any systematic account of 
the kind of position which capital, in all its organisational 
forms, adopted with respect to the whole question of racial 
exclusiveness in the labour movement. 
Racial fragmentation during the early years of the 
labour movement needs to be understood first and foremost as 
a product of the particular form that capitalist penetration 
took. until the establishment of the sugar industry, the 
need for wage labour arose mainly in the copra and cotton 
plantations. There labour was predominantly Fijian but it 
was hired primarily on a casual or part-time basis. With the 
onset of sugar production the working class took on a racial 
character that subsequently served to keep it divided. The 
needs of capital - sugar, plantation and mining capital -
together with the changing pattern of labour availability at 
particular historical conjunctures, combined to produce 
occupational and geographical concentrations of labour on 
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broad racial lines. It is hardly surprising, therefore,that 
labour organisations followed similar lines and although 
racial exclusivity decreased greatly from about the mid-60s, 
the broad racial characteristics of the early period have 
persisted. As a result, organised labour is still afflicted 
with racial undercurrents. And what of capital's attitude? 
Typically, the analyses of racial fragmentation in the 
labour movement have treated this issue as if capital were 
not an element in the equation. Part of the reason for this, 
it appears, is that there was not much evidence of capital 
openly espousing a view or acting in ways from which clues 
about its position might be drawn. Further research is 
clearly necessary but at least the following general point 
can be made. It was simply not in capital's interest to take 
a position because it stood a lot to gain from a factionated 
labour movement. The process by which capital had come to 
insert itself into the colonial economy had produced a 
pattern of racial concentrations of labour that was highly 
advantageous to it. Moreover, it had the enormous advantage 
of not being legally required to recognise unions and if 
there were now other forces at work to prevent a unified 
movement, then so much the better. Internal fighting within 
the unions was their business, the possible erosion of 
traditional authority that might result from the growth of 
trade unions was primarily the concern of the Fijian chiefs, 
and if industrial strife threatened to cause political 
instability, that was a matter for the colonial state to deal 
with. Non-action by capital with regard to racial splits 
within the movement was therefore the most sensible strategy 
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to follow. It could afford to distance itself from the 
problem precisely because it had little to lose and a great 
deal to gain by doing so. When, therefore, the colonial 
state, guided largely by political considerations which had 
to do with guiding the colony to independecne, mounted a 
campaign against "racial unionism" in the early '60s, it 
might have appeared that capital had lost a major advantage, 
but by then it was much better organised anyway. In response 
to the major strikes of '59 and '60, capital marshalled its 
forces and formed the Fiji Employers' Consultative Assoc-
iation. Very significantly, however, and to anticipate the 
discussion in Chapter IX, in the immediate aftermath of the 
1959 strike, racial differences were exploited to undermine 
the unity of organised labour. And only several years later 
did the colonial state urge workers to avoid racial splits 
within the union movement. 
For a long period, then, racialism proved to be a 
major problem for the trade unions, and the profound way in 
which the latter were so afflicted indicates just how exten-
sively the racial form of class relations had permeated 
Fiji society. 
7. SUMMARY 
Continuing with the theme of class organisation, then, 
this chapter has sought to explain the development of worker 
organisations. Capitalist exploitation of the labouring 
classes, coupled with the latter's virtual exclusion from 
bourgeois forms of organisation, forced workers to evolve 
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organisations of their own. Indian cane farmers led the way 
by forming a cane-farmers' association, and soon afterwards 
they established a co-operative store. The latter move, 
however, threatened the profits of Indian commercial capital, 
who then responded by engineering the formation of a rival 
farmer organisation. Virtually from the beginning, then, 
cane-farmer organisation has been plagued by a deep split. 
The trade union movement too had its share of prob-
lems. In the formative years it had to contend with the 
consistently hostile posture adopted by capital and the 
state. Later, pressure from the metropolitan state forced 
them to be rather more conciliatory, but the appearance of 
accommodation which subsequently followed was actually 
belied by less obvious forms of control. Moreover, these 
structural disadvantages were compounded by organisational 
ones that typically characterise a young movement. By the 
latter half of the 1950s, however, organised labour had 
gained sufficient strength and confidence to wage open 
struggles, two of which in particular (in 1955 and 1957) 
were of such a scale that the ruling class responded by 
introducing restraining legislative measures. But it soon 
became clear that the provisions of the 1958 Industrial 
Disputes Ordinance were not sufficient to contain the 
working class. 
Better organised and more assertive, workers were 
more willing to struggle in defence of their interests. And 
in December 1959, they demonstrated that willingness very 
clearly. The strike of '59, therefore, needs to be under-
stood as the culmination of intensifying contradictions. 
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With capitalist exploitation increasing and labour becoming 
better organised, a major conflict was all but inevitable. 
But the 1959 strike is also indicative of another 
major development - a process of restructuring which by the 
late '50s was nearing completion, and which had two broad 
phases. The later phase dates to the immediate post-World 
War II years when local capital sought to restructure the 
colonial economy in a way which would allow the development 
of tourism. And it is significant that the 1959 strike 
involved oil workers; a tourist industry, after all, could 
hardly be viable if fuel supplies were threatened. The 
earlier phase of the restructuring was concerned with Fijian 
class relations and its culmination was the formation of the 
Fijian Administration in 1944. 
The strike of 1959, then, and the way in which it was 
resolved, was the product both of intensifying class contra-
dictions and the class organisations which they spawned, and 
at the same time, of an historical process of restructuring 
which at first focussed on class relations among the Fijians, 
and later was concerned largely with a structural reorien-
tation of the economy towards the tourist industry. 
That process of restructuring is the subject of the 
two chapters which follow. The earlier stage of that pro-
cess, the reordering of Fijian class relations, is examined 
in Chapter VII, and in Chapter VIII, the reorientation of 
the economy towards tourism will be considered. with that 
done, the stage will be set for a better understanding of 
the historic events of '59 and '60, and beyond that, for an 
analysis of neocolonialism in Fiji. 
CHAPTER VII 
RESTRUCTURING I: STATE POLICY AND FIJIAN 
CLASS RELATIONS 1875 - 1944 
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The formation of the Fijian Administration in 1944 
represented a significant victory for the Fijian chiefly 
class. Here was a state institution which, although ultim-
ately subject to the authority of the Governor, nevertheless 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Managed and dominated by 
the chiefly class, the Fijian Administration bore witness to 
the rise of the indigenous bureaucratic bourgeoisie. That, 
however, was achieved only after a long and sustained 
struggle between the chiefs and the colonial state. So, the 
view that the chiefs collaborated with the colonial masters, 
although not without a great deal of substance, is not wholly 
correct. 
The basis of their collaboration had to do with the 
vital question of social control. The main function of the 
colonial state was to create and maintain an environment 
conducive to capitalist production and accumulation. And 
central to that task was the need to ensure political stab-
ility. To the extent, therefore, that the chiefs could be 
useful in carrying out that task, the state would seek their 
support. Once, however, that support became less important, 
then the state could seek to dispense with the chiefs as 
much as possible - which is precisely what happened. But 
the chiefs fought back, and in the course of the ensuing 
struggle, the embryonic indigenous bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
asserted itself more and more, and with the formation of the 
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Fijian Administration, effectively constituted itself as an 
autonomous power. 
In large part, the chief's victory was due to the 
fact that, despite their reduced importance, they were not 
totally dispensable. And their continued importance was 
underlined when the colonial state had to contend with 
another major struggle - that waged by Fijian peasants 
through the Viti Kabani movement. That struggle was related 
to similar ones before it. Very importantly, it was also, 
in part, the product of an earlier attempt by the colonial 
state at restructuring Fijian class relations - im Thurn's 
(failed) attempt at proletarianising the Fijian peasantry. 
The Viti Kabani movement can be seen, therefore, as a major 
link between two separate attempts by the colonial state to 
restructure Fijian class relations - a product, in part, of 
the first; and a significant factor in the second. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain that broad 
process of restructuring, a process which ultimately had to 
do with social control. After having first described the 
system of control established by Gordon, therefore, the 
state's responses to the earliest instances of indigenous 
rebellion against colonial rule will be discussed. Those 
rebellions and im Thurn's intervention form the immediate 
background to the discussion of the viti Kabani. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the chiefs' struggle 
against the colonial state and the rise of the indigenous 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
1. CLASS RELATIONS AND SOCIAL CONTROL: THE REAL 
BASIS OF "INDIRECT RULE" 
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The immediate and most urgent task confronting Gordon 
upon his arrival in Fiji in 1875 was the need to establish 
an effective system of social control. The political chaos 
before Cession, the fact that the Maori-Pakeha wars in 
Aotearoa (New Zealand) were fresh in Gordon's mind, the 
absence of regular British troops in Fiji, and the fact that 
Fijians greatly outnumbered the white population forced upon 
Gordon the realisation that in order to govern effectively, 
indigenous support would be vital. His immediate problem, 
therefore, was to find a way to command the loyalty of the 
Fijians and also to control them. On the matter of loyalty, 
he was aided greatly by the apparent commitment of the 
colonial state to the paramountcy of Fijian interests. After 
all, the Deed of Cession, signed the year before, was seen 
to be based on the principle that Fijian interests would be 
safeguarded. How, then, did Gordon reconcile that principle 
with the need to control the Fijians? The short answer to 
that is that he instituted a system of "indirect rule", but 
before taking up the details, it is necessary, first to 
explain how he justified it. 
Much has been made of the influence of the major 
anthropological theories of the time on Gordon's approach to 
native affairs. That he subscribed to unilinear evolutionary 
theories of historical development, and that he also believed 
that Fiji was just emerging out of the state of savage bar-
barism, is generally agreed. 1 As a consequence of views such 
as these, Gordon's basic operating principle was that 
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traditional institutions would have to be preserved until 
such time as Fijians were capable of coping with the rigours 
of modern civilisation. As he himself put it: 
'the more the native policy is retained, native 
agency employed, and changes avoided until nat-
urally and spontaneously called for', the less 
likely is 'the Fijian to perish from off the 
face of the earth,.2 
Bourgeois historians have sought to explain Gordon's approach 
to native affairs in terms of this principle. Legge, for 
example, argued that it was: 
an expression of a developed view of native 
society and of the probably effects to too 
sharp a contact between a primitive and a more 
advanced culture. 3 
Lest too much emphasis be given to Gordon's concern for 
native welfare, however, it should be noted that his feelings 
for kith and kin were rather stronger. As he once remarked: 
"My sympathy for the coloured races is strong; but my sym-
pathy for my own race is stronger".4 
But that aside, to explain his native policies solely, 
or even primarily, in terms of his belief in the need to 
protect Fijians from the demands of modern society would be 
idealist. Such an explanation, moreover, is based on the 
fundamental error of identifying the agent (Gordon) with the 
position which he occupied (functionary of the colonial 
state). His beliefs, therefore, were simply examples of the 
wider ideology of which served to justify British imperialism. 
The aristocrat from Scotland was a seasoned and experienced 
practitioner of colonial rule (before coming to Fiji he had 
served in Trinidad and Mauritius), and he was clearly well-
imbued with imperialist ideology. And a major element of 
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that ideology was that colonised peoples were incapable of 
governing themselves, and therefore needed the benevolent 
and guiding hand of their imperialist masters. 5 The argument 
advanced here, therefore, is that the dominant anthropolog-
ical theories of the time were themselves part of the wider 
imperialist ideology. The solution to the question of social 
control, therefore, was already implicit in the ideology and 
all that theanthropoligicaltheories did was to underline it. 
Fijians were seen to be backward and incapable of withstand-
ing the rigours of modern life, and therefore had to be 
protected. And what better way to protect them than to let 
others manage their country's transition to 'modernity'. So 
excluded, they could be mor~ easily controlled. 
Gordon knew well what he was up against and it did 
not require much ingenuity to realise that in order to rule 
"most peaceably, cheaply and easily" it would be necessary 
to work through the chiefs: 
So long as the native population outnumbers the 
Europeans by an hundred to one, it is through 
these chiefs that the country will be most peace-
ably, cheaply and easily governed - and the 
Governor has already observed that in those dis-
tricts where ... the chiefs have lost their hold 
on the people, the administration of affairs is 
attended with a difficulty and confusion unknown 
elsewhere. If deprived of position and employ-
ment they [i.e. the chiefs] would, not improbably, 
from being docile and useful instruments, become 
a constant source of trouble if not even of 
danger. 6 
The system of rule would, of course, have to be modelled on 
the "traditional" social structure which had to be preserved. 
It was necessary therefore to establish just what that 
structure was. Anthropological theory had suggested its 
broad outlines by specifying the general characteristics 
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typically associated with societies which had progressed to 
Fiji's stage of development. Armed with those preconceptions, 
then, Gordon set about the task of reconstructing the 'trad-
itional' social structure. 
But here he was faced with a major difficulty. 
Neither he nor anyone else saw precapitalist Fiji in class 
terms, so the question of an underlying class structure did 
not arise. Because of that, he was confused by the apparent 
variety of social structures. But that variety, as has been 
argued in Chapter III, represented the particular forms 
which social organisation took in the various regions, and 
more importantly, social organisation was itself the form 
which the underlying class structure took. For Gordon, 
however, reality was what was visible, and out of the "chaos" 
of apparently disparate social structures (which he became 
increasingly exasperated about), he sought to derive the 
universal 'traditional' social structure. And the model 
which he came up with formed the basis of an orthodoxy which 
has persisted to this day. 
For Gordon's critics, this was an historic exercise 
in historic misrepresentation. The overwhelming evidence, 
they argued, clearly showed that 'precontact' Fijian socie-
ties were different in certain fundamental respects, and a 
'traditional' social structure of the type which Gordon 
sought to create simply did not exist. 7 But the critics were 
themselves concerned only with appearances. They too saw 
only the visible forms of the underlying structure, so in a 
very real way their criticism of Gordon amounted to very 
little. Neither they nor Gordon could resolve the question 
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of the underlying structure of precapitalist Fiji precisely 
because they all focussed their attention solely on the 
visible forms of that structure. 
All this aside, the central problem for Gordon was to 
set up a state machinery which could deal effectively with 
the question of social control. The observable variations 
in social organisation not only flew in the face of his 
expectations about Fiji's "imperial traditions", they also 
threatened to complicate seriously the task with which he 
was confronted. Upon the "chaos", therefore, "order" had to 
be imposed, and the model of the "traditional" social 
structure which he created formed the basis of his system of 
control. And thus was founded an orthodoxy and a colonial 
state apparatus the background to and the effect of which 
France accurately summarised in this way: 
It was, of course, necessary to introduce 
uniformity into the system of administration, 
and the indigenous 'institutions of government', 
such as they were, would have been too varied 
and despotic to have been incorporated into a 
colonial administration. The Fijian adminis-
tration very soon established itself as the 
new mode of social control which supplemented 
and, in some respects, incorporated, that of 
the chiefs. 8 
"Indirect rule" through a system of native adminis-
tration is usually associated with the name Lugard but, as 
Legge points out, Gordon was the pioneer: "before Lugard 
laid the foundation of his system in Nigeria, Gordon had 
established a native authority system in Fiji " 9 
Gordon's system of native administration, then, was a 
political response to conditions in Fiji generally, and to 
the question of control in particular. If capitalist 
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production was to proceed relatively smoothly, then the 
numerically superior Fijians would have to be controlled. In 
Gordon's design, that control would be mediated largely 
through a state institution in which Fijian chiefs would 
occupy subordinate but nonetheless critical positions. What, 
then, was the nature of the system of native administration? 
Detailed descriptions of the system can be found in 
other works, so only a brief outline will be presented here. IO 
with the enactment of the 1876 Native Affairs Regulations 
Ordinance, the system of native administration came into 
being. Covering virtually every aspect of Fijian life, it 
provided for a tiered structure of administrative units. At 
the bottom level were the villages (koro) which were headed 
by a village headman (turaga-ni-koro). Groupings of villages 
into districts (tikina) formed the next rung of the hierarchy 
and placed in charge of these were a buli to whom all the 
turaga-ni-koro in the district were responsible. Contiguous 
districts were grouped in turn into provinces. Often these 
corresponded to traditional divisions and initially most 
were headed by Roko Tuis who were responsible directly to 
the Governor. Notable among the exceptions were provinces 
in inland Viti Levu which fell under the authority of 
European state functionaries called commissioners. 
In addition to these administrative units, there were 
also District and Provincial Councils and the Council of 
Chiefs. District Councils (Bose ni Tikina) were concerned 
strictly with local matters of welfare and good order while 
the jurisdiction of the Provincial Council (Bose ni Yasana) 
was much wider. Presiding over the former were the bulis 
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and over the latter the Roko Tuis. The Council of Chiefs 
(Bose vaka Turaga), as the name suggests, was composed 
primarily of chiefs and these we~e drawn from all the pro-
vinces. The background to the formation of this "new 
creation" 11 offers useful insights into the way that the most 
senior functionary of the colonial state operated. Rokos had 
gathered in Bau for Gordon's formal installation as supreme 
chief of the territory. He used the occasion to consult the 
Rokos and thenceforth the council became an annual event, 
and the regulation which provided for its establishment 
stated: "The Governor is the originator of the Council and 
he alone can open its proceedings". 12 Subject to Gordon's 
authority, then, this subordinate apparatus of the colonial 
state acted purely in an advisory capacity. Largely through 
chiefly efforts, however, it soon carne to be regarded as the 
very embodiment of the Fijian body politic and was always 
consulted (and still is) by the state on matters affecting 
Fijian interests. This, of course, greatly facilitated the 
whole exercise of colonial rule but the Council of Chiefs, 
like the other councils, were alien institutions. As France 
argued: 
Although it had been a Fijian habit to discuss 
matters in council at a village level, or even 
at the level of a local group of villages in 
time of war, there is no evidence that the 
councils set up by Gordon were 'purely native 
and of spontaneous growth'. Assemblies of 
people had traditionally gathered for the inter-
change of gifts but social intercourse was 
limited on these occasions. The high chiefs 
rarely met in council until the imported insti-
tutions of government required them to do so.13 
And of the system generally: 
[w] hatever outward semblance of a traditional 
or indigenous system Gordon's native adminis-
tration possessed for European observers, 
Fijians clearly regarded it as an imported 
institution directly under the control of the 
Governor. 14 ' 
Such, then, was the nature of the system of native 
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administration. But it was not long before its effectiveness 
as a system of control was tested. There had always been 
some Fijian resentment of colonial rule, particularly among 
the people of the west. Annexation had been concluded 
largely with the eastern chiefs whose political control did 
not extend over the western region. And so it was that all 
but one of the high chiefs who signed the Deed of Cession 
were from the east. It was clear from the very beginning, 
therefore, that support for British colonisation was less 
than total l and it is not surprising that the roots of the 
, 
anticolonial struggles in Fiji are to be found in the western 
region. To those struggles we now turn. 
2. FIJIAN PEASANT STRUGGLES 
The hill tribes of the interior were renowned for 
their fierce independence and when local white capital, 
using Cakobau as a figurehead, sought in 1871 to create a 
central authority, they resisted. The armed forces of the 
"Cakobau Government" were able to subdue them only to a 
degree, and their spirit of independence lived on to resur-
face in 1876 when they resisted colonial rule. That time, 
however, and only after a costly military campaign, they 
were finally subjugated by the colonial state. 15 
Of all the early instances of rebellion against 
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colonial rule which have so far been documented, this was 
the bloodiest and most brutal. The viability of the colonial 
administration was clearly threatened by the hill tribes, 
and as Legge put it, "Severity in dealing with the leaders 
of the rebellion was considered essential for long-term 
peace".16 Very important about this exercise in state 
repression was the "deliberate effort" by the colonial state 
to prevent the campaign from appearing as "a punitive cam-
paign against natives by a 'white' Government". 17 Apart 
from its "general direction", therefore, the details of 
strategy and the execution of the assault "were left largely 
to natives". 18 By pitting Fijians against Fijians, the 
state was able to conquer the hill tribes, and in that way 
a section of the indigenous population was able to win for 
the state the "Little War in Fiji". Legge's summary of the 
whole affair is telling: 
[Gordon's] desire for native assistance in the 
war was to secure their support for the new 
Government's system of law and order, and at 
the same time to prevent the growth of a contin-
uing hostility on the part of the defeated 
tribes. So successful was he from that point 
of view that it was possible at the close of 
hostilities to leave a small force of merely 
150 native constables in the district. 19 
with the suppression of the hill tribes, the execution of 
their leading figures, and the pacification of the district, 
Fijian resistance to colonial rule subsided. The violence 
of this episode in Fiji's history issued warning to poten-
tial agitators that they would incur the wrath and repres-
sive might of the colonial state at their peril. And so 
it was that when indigenous resistance to colonial rule 
229 
surfaced again in a period that coincided with the depres-
sion of the late '80s/early '90s, the level of physical 
violence was far below that whicn was meted out to the brave 
of the interior. 
The next instances of anti-colonial struggle took the 
form of the Luve ni wai and the Tuka movements. 20 The few 
writings on these movements have emphasised their cuI tic or 
millenarian aspects, but it is quite clear that at root they 
were reactions against colonial authority. Behind all the 
ritual and religious paraphenalia lay the hallmarks of an 
anti-colonial struggle. 
A youth movement, the Luve ni wai (Children of the 
water) originated in the Colo area in inland Viti Levu. In 
one district, members resolved to emancipate themselves from 
British rule and even adopted an authority structure that 
mimicked the colonial one. But quite apart from this par-
ticular example of open challenge, the unmistakeable anti-
authority precepts of the wider movement caused the colonial 
state much concern. Many members were incarcerated for 
insubordination, and the piece of legislation that was 
invoked, Ordinance No.3 of 1887, was specially enacted to 
cope with the disturbances emanating not just from the Luve 
ni wai but also from a larger and potentially more threaten-
ing movement - the Tuka. 
Existing over the same period as the Luve ni wai, the 
Tuka movement originated in Ra but soon spread over a wider 
area. It was formed in 1885 by a Ra commoner and self-
styled prophet Dugumoi, who later took the name Navosavakudua. 
The name Tuka means "immortality" or "the promise of 
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inunortality" and with its inspiration drawn from Fijian 
legend, it is not surprising that many have seen it primarily 
as a revivalist religious movement. But even as the recog-
nised authority on the Tuka, the Rev. W. Sutherland, himself 
said in 1910 in his address to the Fijian society: "Appar-
ently harmless and simple at first ... it was of a distinctly 
political nature and hostile to the Government ... ".21 He 
went on: 
The advent of the missionaries, followed by 
settled Government, took away all that the 
native had to live and struggle and fight for 
in earlier times ... It was inevitable there-
fore - we of course see it more clearly now 
than then - that spasmodic efforts should be 
made to revive old customs and possibly regain 
power. 22 
The order of the world, Navosavakudua prophesied, would soon 
be overturned so that the whites would serve the natives and 
the chiefs would serve the conunoners. And to prepare for 
the "millenium" when commoners would reign supreme, he set 
up a quasi-military organisation consisting of soldiers, 
sergeants, rokos, bulis, scribes and, at the senior level, 
officials who were known as "destroying angels". The bib-
lical overtone no doubt reinforced the movement's religious 
character, but the adoption of offical titles used in the 
colonial administration, together with the overtly military 
nature of the organisation and the hint of a power struggle, 
all point very clearly to the anti-colonial and anti-chief 
nature of the movement. Here was a movement of Fijian 
peasants rebelling against those whom they saw as their 
oppressors - the white functionaries of the colonial state 
and their subordinate chiefly agents. The latter were doubly 
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oppressive because they not only continued to exact material 
tribute from their traditional subjects but they had also 
joined forces with the white rulers. 
Once the date of the millenium was fixed and prepar-
ations got underway in earnest for the overthrow of the white 
men and the collaborators, however, the movement was stopped 
by the colonial state with the assistance of a chief from 
Bau. 23 Navosavakadua's lieutenants were imprisoned while he 
was sentenced to hard labour, and later banished to the 
island of Rotuma three hundred miles away. He died in exile 24 
but after his death enthusiasm for the movement continued, 
and there was a resurgence of activity in 1892 which was 
suppressed by the burning of Navosavakadua's village, the 
banishment of the members of his tribe to the island of 
Kadavu for ten years, and the stationing at Nadarivatu of a 
force of armed constabulary which was, in Sutherland's words: 
sufficiently strong to impress the inhabitants 
that the forces of the gods of the Nakauvadra 
were less powerful than the authority of the 
King. 25 
Although there was another revival later, the decline of the 
movement was well in train and by the end of World War I it 
had died. The demise of the Tuka was followed, however, by 
a larger movement,and the activities of its leader, Apolosi 
Ranawai, himself a Tuka disciple, opened another chapter in 
the history of indigenous peasant struggle against colonial 
rule. Of all the early instances of early indigenous 
struggle, this was the most important in the sense that it 
was the first clear expression of organised struggle by the 
Fijian peasantry against not only colonial rule but also the 
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underlying system of exploitation which it served -
capitalism. 
A more complete understanding of Apolosi's movement is 
possible only against the background of the major changes 
brought by Governor Everard im Thurn. His predecessors had 
to contend with the Luve ni wai and the Tuka movements; he 
facilitated the emergence of the Viti Kabani. Of all the 
early governors, im Thurn stands out as the only one to have 
departed significantly from the pattern of colonial adminis-
tration that had been set by Gordon. His native policies, 
as will be shown, heightened the possibility of further 
indigenous reaction against colonial rule. 26 
3. A FAILED ATTEMPT AT PROLETARIANISING THE 
FIJIAN PEASANTRY 
The situation in Fiji at the time of his arrival, im 
Thurn recognised, was rather different from that which 
existed in the early years of Gordonian rule. With the 
Fijian population in a state of rapid decline, the threat of 
extinction of the race loomed large. Moreover, Gordon's 
protective and paternalistic administration seemed to im 
Thurn to have done little to prepare Fijians for the rigours 
of modern society. Above all else, it discouraged the 
development of individualism. Not Fijians in general was 
im Thurn concerned about, but rather, the commoners, whom he 
felt had to be rescued from chiefly oppression. As he said: 
the term 'Fijian' includes two distinct 
classes, whose interests are to a greater or 
lesser extent opposed, viz: the chiefs and the 
commoners - what is the gain to one is often 
the loss to the other. To me their interests 
seem to be as distinct as those of patrician 
and plebeian, or of noble and serf ... if 
[commoners] try to accumulate property, it is 
taken from them. 27 
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It appears that im Thurn may have been conversant with Marx. 
In chiefly lala (tribute) he recognised the source of the 
oppression of commoners by chiefs. Commoners, he said, were 
burdened by a "double series of demands". The first was the 
chief's personal lala (tribute exacted by virtue of tradit-
ional chiefly privilege) and official lala (tribute exacted 
by virtue of status as a state official). Official lala, he 
argued, should be retained because it was payment for 
services rendered by state functionaries. For personal lala, 
on the other hand, there was no longer any justification for 
it and the practice should therefore cease: 
I do not overlook the fact that the chiefs were 
probably the heads of the commune and therefore, 
as being then responsible for the administration 
of the affairs of the commune, entitled to pay-
ment or lala. But the British Government in 
instituting its 'Native System' substituted this 
for the system of rule by 'the chiefs', so that 
the administrative function of these 'chiefs' 
is, or ought to be, gone, and with it the chiefs' 
right to lala is, or ought to be, cancelled. 28 
A major implication of this position was that chiefs who were 
not employed by the colonial state would effectively lose all 
lala. But that was precisely what im Thurn was seeking to 
achieve. The effect of his attack on personal lala, as he 
himself anticipated, would be 
the creation in the ordinary Fijian of that 
individuality which would, I believe, be the 
only thing to save him and his race from ex-
tinction. 29 
Steps were therefore taken to repeal existing legislation, 
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especially Ordinance No.3 of 1877, so that refusal to pay 
personal lala would no longer be an offence. This was a 
significant development in chief-commoner relations for it 
represented a considerable attack on the (traditional) 
material basis of chiefly power. True, subsequent legis-
lation was not able fully to achieve im Thurn's goals, and 
in any case, not only had there always been differing inter-
pretations of the regulations but also the line between 
personal and official was never firm or clear. Possibilities 
therefore existed for chiefs to circumvent the law in order 
to exact tribute. On the other hand, there can be no ques-
tion that the material- basis of chiefly rule under the 
tributary system of social relations was under threat. 
But why was im Thurn able to mount this attack against 
the chiefs? It is reasonable to argue that a major reason 
had to do with the fact that in terms of social control, the 
need for chiefly support had become rather less important. 
Thirty years after annexation, the colonial state was well-
established, and some thirteen years had elapsed since the 
last peasant struggle. These factors, together with the 
decline in Fijian numbers, probably suggested to im Thurn 
that control was no longer such the major problem it had 
once been, and perhaps, therefore, the time was now opportune 
to draw the Fijians from their "sheltered existence" and 
prepare them for modern life. But in the modern way of life, 
people were individuals. Reward and gain were therefore the 
result of individual effort; they were not a birthright. 
For the Fijians, then, this meant that the traditional 
privileges of the chiefs had no place. Chiefs and commoners 
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therefore had to become "equals", and if differences subseq-
uently emerged among them, that would be the legitimate 
result of individual merit and hard work. But here comes 
the rub, for im Thurn was concerned not so much with hard 
work as such, but hard work of a particular kind - hard wage 
work. Under precapitalist social relations, he sympathised, 
Fijian commoners had laboured but had little to show for 
their efforts. Under capitalist social relations, however, 
he intimated, they would. So the push was on to proletar-
ianise the Fijians, and the strategy which im Thurn employed 
consisted essentially in propogating the whole bourgeois 
ideology of individualism. How did he go about doing that? 
Enactment of the new legislation which im Thurn had 
proposed was delayed because of the lengthy time involved in 
re-drafting the regulations, and rather than wait he pushed 
ahead with his campaign by confronting the chiefs directly. 
In his opening address to the Bose Vakaturaga on 10 April 
1905, he prefaced his remarks with statements about patri-
otism and then proceeded to castigate the chiefs in this way: 
I know also that some of you think only, 
or chiefly, of yourselves, of your lala, and 
your sevu, your [kerekere] and your other 
exactions from your people. These of you are 
unpatriotic, and it is these of you who are 
killing your people ... 30 
Now that the concepts of patriotism and selflessness were 
introduced the governor developed his main theme - individ-
ualism. 
The subsequent response from both chiefs and commoners 
to im Thurn's attack seems by and large to have been positive 
to the degree that he was able to sketch the outline of a 
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wholly new approach to native affairs. As he did so, how-
ever, the implications for Fijian labour and land became 
more evident. Individualism reqQired freedom of choice and 
action, and so he stated his intention to make legislative 
changes which would allow greater freedom of movement for 
Fijians who wished to take up paid employrnent. 31 But it was 
on the question of land that im Thurn's major change in 
direction had the greatest impact. Fijian advancement could 
never be secured if Fijians were hamstrung by a system of 
land tenure that was not based on individual ownership. 
Four ordinances were therefore enacted to correct the sit-
uation. With the benefit of historical hindsight it is 
possible now to judge that white capital rather than the 
Fijians benefitted most from those ordinances, for between 
1905 and 1909 "some 20,000 acres of Fijian land was sold 
to white settlers, in addition to a larger area leased".32 
The principle of the alienability of native lands which 
formed the basis of Gordon's land policy was given a major 
jolt. Gordon had by this time become Lord Stanmore, and 
from London he launched a stinging attack on im Thurn's 
major detour. Fijian retention of their land was central to 
the appearance of benevolence that surrounded the system of 
native administration. That appearance had to be maintained, 
and now im Thurn threatened it. And in the end, Gordon 
won the day. In 1909 the Ordinance which permitted the 
sale of Fijian land was repealed, and with that the system 
of native administration swung back to 'its former Gordonian 
pattern. 
Assessments of im Thurn's experiment differ but there 
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are basically two opposing schools of thought. At one 
extreme is the view that the experiment was largely a res-
ponse to the "plaudits of the European community" and that 
its real function was to advance the total demise of the 
Fijians. At the other extreme is the view that it was 
concerned both to avert the threat of extinction which faced 
the Fijians and also to advance their economic development. 33 
There is not the space here to probe these respective 
positions in any detail save to make the following point. 
Whatever light they may throw, they are essentially idealist 
explanations because they are couched in terms of im Thurn's 
supposed beliefs about the best way forward for the Fijians. 
The crucial point which they miss is that im Thurn's inter-
vention would not have been possible if the balance of class 
forces did not allow it. His experiment took the form of an 
attack against the chiefly class, but that attack in turn 
was possible only because the wider (and crucial) task of 
social control no longer depended critically on the support 
of the chiefs. And in that kind of situation, the way was 
open for class relations to be restructured in a way which 
would make more wage labour available to capital. 1m Thurn's 
prop~gation of the ideology of individualism was simply a 
means by which to achieve the restructuring. And by follow-
ing that strategy, the appearance was created that his 
beliefs lay at the root of his experiment. The reality, 
however, was that the balance of class forces allowed the 
state to try to proletarianise the Fijians, which is precis-
ely what it did. And it was only when wider imperialist 
forces, in an attempt to keep up the appearance of imperial 
benevolence, asserted themselves that the experiment was 
ended. 
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Despite its failure, im Thurn's experiment did have 
important consequences. His attack on the chiefs,and his 
apparent pro-commoner sympathies in particular could not 
but heighten the possibility of another open struggle by the 
Fijian peasantry. Apolosi Ranawai, whose association with 
the Tuka movement had strengthened his opposition to colonial 
rule, must have been encouraged by what im Thurn had said and 
apparently sought to do. But Apolosi was not a peasant, he 
was a worker. So it is not altogether surprising that when 
he organised the Viti Kabani movement, his aim was to free 
his predominantly peasant followers not only from colonial 
rule but also from capitalist exploitation. 
4. CHALLENGING COLONIAL CAPITALISM: THE VITI 
KABANI MOVEMENT 
In 1913, with the collaboration of some European 
businessmen in Suva, Apolosi Ranawai, a thirty-six year old 
carpenter, formed the viti Kabani (Fiji Company) .34 Like its 
predecessors, Apolosi's movement also had a religious char-
acter and the promise was made of a New Era "when the burdens 
of taxation, enforced communal labour, and dominance by 
chiefs and whites would be eliminated". 35 It is clear that 
Apolosi's foremost concerns were the political oppression of 
the Fijian labouring class, their economic underdevelopment 
and, relatedly, the alienation of Fijian land (the last major 
spurt of land alienation having been halted a mere four 
years earlier). 
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A major vehicle for the liberation of the oppressed 
Fijians was to be the company, which was to be of and for 
Fijians only. The basic idea, then, was to buy and sell 
Fijian agricultural produce so that control of Fijian econ-
omic activity would remain in the hands of the producers. 
As a memorandum from the company stated: 
The cause [or the beginning] of this thing is 
through the Europeans here in Fiji swindling 
us, the price of all our things are different 
Their swindling us will never cease ... 36 
By 1914 the movement had spread west to the Yasawa 
Islands and in the opposite direction to eastern viti Levu 
and beyond to Lau and Vanua Levu. In Rewa the movement was 
particularly strong and at a meeting in Draubuta village in 
January 1915 between 3,000 and 4,000 people attended. Res-
olutions were passed which give an idea of the movement's 
ambitions. Fijians were to enter into contracts with the 
company "with the idea of keeping our lands in our own hands 
and all the produce therefrom". Company stores would be 
built in every locality and for those stores there would be 
no dealings with Europeans. And, further, there was to be a 
native shipbuilding yard in each province and the company 
would have its own police and church. 37 
Although there is a general agreement that the move-
I 
ment was not a commercial success, it did pose a serious 
threat to the established order. Europeans (and the few 
Chinese) who acted as middlemen in the marketing of Fijian 
agricultural produce were threatened with a big drop in 
business. The authority of the colonial state was increas-
ingly undermined as Apolosi's followers were ordered not to 
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comply with any of the dictates of the system of native 
administration. The movement had its own village officials 
and it was they rather than the rokos and bulis whom the 
faithful were urged to obey. And as for the chiefly class, 
this movement of "young upstarts" was considered an affront 
to their authority and status. That feeling, however, was 
significantly greater in the east than in the west, for 
although the movrnent spread to most parts of the group, it 
was in west Viti Levu that support was strongest. It is 
significant also that the colonial state recognised ~ marked 
tendency among the people there to develop to an increasing 
degree along "individualistic lines". 38 
was showing through. 
1m Thurn's influence 
The regional character of the movement underlines the 
way in which capitalism exacerbated uneven development in 
Fiji, and in the broad regional cleavage, the west lay at 
the bottom end. 39 More importantly, the movement was 
essentially a peasant one, although some chiefs were involved, 
especially in areas where it established strong roots. 40 
And it was the peasant origins of the movement which provided 
useful ammunition for the colonial state's response to it. 
The regional cleavage which divided the Fijians expressed 
itself in the way that Fijian opposition to the movement was 
strongest among the eastern Fijian chiefly class. And not 
surprisingly, that opposition was to playa critical part in 
the wider task of suppressing the movement. So it was that 
a central figure in that wider exercise was Ratu Sukuna, the 
Oxford-educated high chief who was later to become the most 
senior Fijian state functionary and "the statesman of Fiji". 
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It was he who articulated Fijian opposition to the viti 
Kabini most clearly. 
The anti-chief character qf the movement was not lost 
to Sukuna and it is only to be expected that his assessment 
of Apolosi's followers should reflect his chiefly background 
and his belief the commoners were little more than imbeciles, 
quite incapable of deciding what was in their best interests: 
"speaking generally, the more backward the people the more 
pronounced is the hold of the viti Company " 41 And of 
the activities of the movement's leader ("the man of Ra"), he 
wrote to the Secretary of Native Affairs on 12 March 1917, 
they 
confront the Government with facts and tenden-
cies alarming in regard both to native life and 
Native Administration and create grave respon-
sibilities which must be faced. In character 
those activities are undoubtedly corrupt and 
degrading, assuming a political character for 
the purposes of low gain. 42 
Elaborating, he charged that Apolosi was "belittling and 
interfering with consistuted authority", "trafficking with 
racial reelings for position of gain", and perpetrating "a 
crime of the worst kind". His "sordid and unpatriotic 
doings", he went on, "deserve the last punishment ... [and] 
the remedy is at hand by striking at the root of the evil, 
that is, by deporting Apolosi under Ordinance 111 of 1887".43 
And he was duly exiled to Rotuma. The colonial state 
could hardly have done otherwise, as strong pressure was 
being exerted not only by the eastern chiefly class but also 
by capital. The anti-white theme of Apolosi's propoganda 
had intensified, and Europeans were rebuking the governor 
for not taking action against him. 44 
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On his return from exile in 1924, Apolosi again took 
up the cause, and the wider his influence grew the more 
concerned capital, the chiefly class and the colonial state 
became. And the method of suppression took similar forms to 
those which had been adopted earlier: restriction of native 
gatherings, imprisonment and deportation. In 1940 Apolosi 
returned from a second exile in Rotuma but was sent back 
again. After consultations between the Governor and the 
east-dominated Council of Chiefs (90% of the council were 
I ,~ 
eastern chiefs4s), however, he was subsequently banis~d to 
I 
New Zealand "lest security to be endangered in the event of 
a Japanese invasion. 46 with the absence of its leader, the 
movement went into decline, but even after his death in 1946, 
veneration of him continued for a long time. 
Couper offers the following broad explanation of the 
Viti Kabani: 
the movement was, historically, part of a 
general reaction by villagers to those largely 
unforeseen and external forces of the market 
which ... controlled their day to day activities. 47 
Although largely correct, this explanation is not totally 
adequate. In the first place, the "general reaction" was n~ 
one of villagers as such but of Fijian peasant producers. 
Secondly, important though external forces were, at least 
equal importance needs to be attached to the critical inter-
nal class relations through which the impact of those forces 
was mediated. Those class relations had an importance and a 
specificity of their own, and the danger of supposing that 
they were merely epiphenomena of external market forces 
should be avoided. True, export prices bore directly on 
their level of material well-being, but as exploited 
producers, the immediate enemy was the class of middlemen 
to whom they sold their produce. 
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The importance of the Viti Kabani movement, then, is 
that it was a peasant struggle not only against colonial 
rule but also capitalist exploitation. The colonial state 
had sought, during im Thurn's governorship, to proletarian-
ise the Fijians, but it failed. But that attempt at restruc-
turing Fijian class relations also had the contradictory 
effect of hastening the onset of Fiji's most significant 
peasant struggle. Furthermore, the whole exercise of sup-
pressing that struggle was itself intimately tied to another 
attempt by the colonial state at restructuring Fijian class 
relations. That too failed, and the task now is to see why. 
5. THE INDIGENOUS BUREAUCRATIC BOURGEOISIE AND 
ITS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
As has been argued, the importance of the chiefs in 
the total capitalist production process lay in their role as 
agents of social control. Having taken up subordinate 
positions within the colonial state, they were able to 
benefit from both traditional tribute and official salaries. 
with im Thurn's attack on personal lal~, however, they 
became increasingly dependent on salaries as their major 
source of income. As state officials, then, the chiefs were 
part of the bourgeois class, and the more dependent they 
became on the state for their material well-being, the more 
they were entrenched as members of the bourgeoisie. It is 
in that sense that chiefly state functionaries are here un-
derstood as the indigenous bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The 
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term is used, therefore, primarily to denote the particular 
historical function of the chiefly class and the way in 
which, as a result of that, it came to constitute itself as a 
relatively autonomous faction of the ruling class. Having 
done that, it would gradually consolidate its position and 
eventually assume state power - after independence. The 
road to state power, however, was not an easy one. 
The colonial state's first attempt at restructuring 
Fijian class relations, as has been argued, was an exercise 
in extending capitalist relations in Fiji, and it was 
possible only because the conditions of the class struggle at 
that historical conjuncture allowed it to do so. In partic-
ular, the function of social control was no longer critically 
dependent on chiefly support. By 1913 that still appeared 
to be the case. So when, because of wider imperialist 
pressures, the colonial state decided upon decentralising 
authority within the system of native administration, the 
chiefly class again came under attack. A second attempt at 
restructuring Fijian class relations was underway. But 
whereas the first attempt was aimed ultimately at all 
Fijians, the second was focussed specifically on the chiefly 
class. Increased dispensability of chiefs as agents of 
social control, pressure from London to cut administrative 
costs, and arguments about the need to make a cumbersome 
native administration more efficient cleared the way for 
changes which the embryonic indigenous bureaucratic bour-
geoisie correctly saw as a threat. And they would not let 
those changes pass without a fight. Their very survival, 
after all, was at stake. Samy's blanket statement that the 
245 
chief s were the· "main class of collaborators" 48 needs, there-
fore, to be qualified because it suggests that their rela-
tionship with the colonial state was always a "parasitic" 
and collaborative one. That was patently not the case, for 
in the three decades or so between 1914 and the mid-1940s, 
they waged a battle against the colonial state the intensity 
of which grew with each successive year and the culmination 
of which was victory in 1944 when they assumed control of 
the newly-formed Fijian Administration. And so we turn to 
the details of the struggle. 
The system of native administration which Gordon had 
instituted remained largely unchanged during the governer-
ship of his immediate successors v-Jilliam des Voeu)t, Charles 
Mitchell and John Thurston. The economic recession which 
coincided with Thurston's term of office (1888 - 1897), 
howeve~caused the British imperialist state to urge the 
colonies to cut costs. But that was not the only reason. 
By the time of Thurston's death in 1897, native policy in 
Fiji had come under considerable criticism from the Colonial 
Office. As Gillion noted, "there was a feeling that the 
communal system had outlived its usefulness". 49 The system 
of native administration, it was obviously felt, could be 
dismantled, or at the very least pruned back. Gordon's 
system, as has been shown, came under severe attack from 
im Thurn, and although from England Gordon (now Lord 
stanmore) was able to mount a successful counter-attack, it 
is clear that doubts about the system of native administra-
tion persisted. And so it was that in September 1913 the 
Secretary of Slate for the Colonies questioned the necessity 
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for,and even the desirability of,continuing the Native 
Department. He therefore asked that consideration be given 
to its abolition or reduction and that its responsibilities 
be devolved to state functionaries in the field. The commit-
tee that was appointed to consider the matter concurred with 
the view that there should be decentralisation of authority, 
but it recommended that the department be allowed to continue 
for a while. Despite that recommendation, however, the 
pressure for abolition was strong. Local white opinion had 
always figured prominently in Fiji bourg~is politics and on 
this particular occasion its views were reflected in a state-
ment by one of its leading members, H. Scott, a prominent 
lawyer and whose son would later rise to become Speaker of 
the Legislative Council. Following the line from London, 
he had this to say: 
The continued separate existence of the Native 
Office is no longer necessary nor desirable .. _ 
[it] has had a fair trial and I do not think 
that even the adherents to the system of that 
department can suggest its administration has 
been a success. To my mind efficiency and 
control is sadly wanting - more effective local 
administration in the provinces is what is req-
uired. It would lead to expedition of work 
ins.tead of as at present the constant reference 
to the Native Department in Suva of minute det-
ail. To perpetuate the present Native Depart-
ment and its method of administration would in 
my opinion be a grave mistake. 50 (emphasis added) 
For the chiefly class, then, especially those employed as 
state officials, the writing was on the wall, and couching 
their argument in terms of the interests of Fijians generally, 
the Roko Tuis of Tailevu, Cakaudrove and Bau (Eastern prov-
inces all) communicated their concern to the governor: 
We Fijians are the most numerous class in the 
country and own the greater part of the land ... 
We do not think it at all reasonable that we 
should be considered as of no account or that 
our department should be belittled ... We feel 
sure that were the Department to be abolished 
we should not receive the same consideration as 
we now do ... We beg that our Department be 
maintained. 51 
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To no avail, however. That year the process of decentralis-
ation began and a resolution was passed in the Legislative 
Council which agreed 
Native Department. 52 
in principle to the abolition of the 
',1/\ ''\'i) 
Two year~(later it was abolished. 
Fijian ill-feeling increased and the picture painted by the 
racist W.A. Chapple in 1921 is clearly wide of the mark: 
these people '" are more than contented. They 
are happy. [sic] ... over and around these 
simple-minded and grown-up children are the 
sheltering wings of Britain administration and 
British justice ... The fragrance of British 
management pervades the village life. 53 
And thanks to Whitehall: 
[i] t is a matter for general surprise that a 
savage so recently cannibalistic, treacherous, 
and non-moral, should be today, after little 
more than a generation, so docile, and courteous, 
and manageable. 54 
, 
The commoners may have been "manageable" but naLso the\ 
chiefs who became increasingly agitated by the ever-increas-
ing dilution of their power. Further reorganisation of the 
system of native administration was conducted in 1923, 1925 
and 1937 and with that power shifted progressively from 
Fijian to European officials. Sahu Khan described the sit-
uation in 1938 well: 
the Fijian leaders were not at all happy .. . 
There was a feeling of unrest and anxiety .. . 
Fijian chiefs, as Rokos, were [previously] 
treated as senior officers of the Government 
However ... [now] the same Rokos became 
junior officers of the Government. They were 
controlled by District Commissioners and Dis-
trict Officers. The District Officers were 
invariably young and inexperienced with little 
knowledge of local customs and conditions. 55 
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Dissatisfaction with the system mounted, but attempts by the 
chiefs at regaining their former power were continually frus-
trated by the state. The more they were displaced, the more 
they couched their case in terms of the deterioration in 
native welfare which resulted from the neglect of European 
officers under whose "care" Fijians were put. 56 To the 
chiefs, that neglect did violence to the colonial state's 
duty to protect the Fijians. What they seemed not to have 
realised, however, was that the whole process of transferring 
power to European officials was tied not only to the need 
for economy but also to the reduced need for a chiefly role 
in the exercise of social control. The original letter of 
instruction from London in September 1913 which set the 
whole process in motion was clearly motivated, in part, by 
the hope that it would effect savings. 57 Moreover, the 
initial years of reorganisation coincided with the first 
imperialist world war - both developments having occurred 
between 1914 and 1917. Once reorganisation was under way, 
it would be difficult to undo, especially with the onset of 
the Great Depression of the early 1930s. 
On the other hand, however, the dispensability of the 
chiefs was not total. The period over which the chiefs 
fought their battle against the colonial state coincided 
with the state's battle against the Viti Kabani movement. 
True, the state's repressive apparatuses were well-developed 
but it is equally true that had the colonial state 
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attempted to suppress the movement without the support of 
the chiefs, then the whole myth of imperial benevolence 
might well have exploded. Such a risk it could not afford to 
take. The support of the eastern chiefs, therefore, clearly 
underlined the fact that despite its reduced importance, 
chiefly support was still necessary for the exercise of 
social control. But another major development was occurring 
among the Fijians which had consequences for that task: 
during the 1920s and 1930s and the Second World 
War many Fijians had been dislodged from their 
homes and introduced to the individualistic 
live style, and paid employment they soon reg-
arded as being more worthwhile and dignified 
than cUltivating the soil and building a commun-
ity in the villages. 58 
That being the case, surely it was preferable to have chiefs 
whose authority would help control Fijians living outside 
the villages. 
Had the chiefs been totally unnecessary, then, the 
colonial state would simply have dispensed with them. But 
clearly they were not, and they intensified their struggle 
against the colonial state. Victory finally carne when the 
Fijian Affairs Ordinance was enacted, and the Fijian Adrninis-
tration created, in 1944. Changes in the administration 
were sUQsequently made in 1949 and 1966 but they were 
"changes in scope rather than the nature of the organisa-
tion I S functions". 59 So the second attempt by the colonial 
state at restructuring Fijian class relations also failed. 
The chiefs refused to be shunted out of the bourgeois class 
even though their status in it was very much a junior one. 
And in Ratu Sukuna they had a high-ranking chief, an able 
and articulate leader, a product of the most elitist 
250 
bourgeois education that the metropolitan state could offer, 
a soldier with a distinguished military record, and a man 
whose image as a statesman was growing rapidly. So with him 
leading the chiefs' fight, the colonial state was faced with 
a formidable opponent. The point here is not that individ-
uals make history but simply that Sukuna played a major role 
in the failure of the colonial state's second attempt at 
restructuring Fijian class relations. Beyond that, he would 
also take centre stage in the affairs of the indigenous 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
6. THE RISE OF THE INDIGENOUS BUREAUCRATIC BOURGEOISIE 
with the formation of the Fijian Administration and 
the domination of it by chiefs, the indigenous bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie came into its own. At the apex of the adminis-
tration was the Council of Chiefs but its operating arm was 
the Fijian Affairs Board. The conservatism of the board 
"reflected its domination by a political elite of chiefs 
linked as a multiplex group by kin or affinal ties, and by 
associations in the Council of Chiefs and Legislative 
Council" . 6 0 Fijian members of the Legislative Council served 
as senior bureaucrats in the Fijian Administration and often 
also held office in other state apparatuses. 61 Furthermore, 
they "gained other positions of authority as Economic Devel-
opment Officers or as directors of the Fijian Development 
Fund Board". 6 2 
The Development Fund Board was the brain-child of 
Ra tu Sukuna. 63 Lagging Fijian economic development concerned 
him greatly, and the co-operative principles of the nascent 
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co-operative movement (which began in 1942 64 ) inspired him 
to set up a fund to which Fijians would contribute and which 
would be used in various ways to improve the Fijian economic 
condition. Established finally in 1951, the Fund was built 
up by deductions from the proceeds of Fijian-produced copra, 
and to administer it the Development Fund Board was created 
as an integral part of the Fijian Affairs Board. Further 
attempts at accelerating Fijian economic development would 
follow later and in each case the role of the Fijian Affairs 
Board would be central - the Fijian Banana Venture, the 
Lomaivuna Resettlement Scheme and the Vunamoli Association 
are a few examples. 
As the lynchpin of Fijian economic development, the 
Fijian Administration was by most accounts decidely unsuc-
cessful, and that chiefly dominance had much to do with its 
lack of success is clearly borne out by the report of the 
man who was commissioned to investigate the economic problems 
and prospects of the Fijians. The message of the Spate 
Report was clear: 
[a]ny system which bases itself prirnarly on 
the maintenance of the traditional structure 
must ... reconcile itself to seeing much of 
its economic effort stranded on the reefs of 
hierarchy and particularism ... 6s 
And of the architect of the Fijian Administration, Ratu 
Sukuna, he added: 
By far the ablest defence of the old order, in 
deeds as well as in words, was of course Ratu 
Sir Lala Sukuna ... but .. , his authority must 
be checked against the lessons of history and 
the observed facts of change in Fijian life. 
Not indeed that Ratu Sukuna was unobservant of 
change ... but his interpretation and his sol-
ution were biased by his half-conscious vested 
interest in a society in which chiefs were 
chiefs and common men obeyed without question 
The core of [his] position ... was a firm 
belief in hereditary authority and a corres-
ponding distrust in the capacity of ordinary 
men to run their own affairs. 66 (emphasis added) 
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The following year, the Burns Report was much more forthright 
in its condemnation: 
the Fijian Administration is ... an unecessary 
expense which Fiji cannot afford. In a colony 
of this size a double administration is waste-
ful of man-power and money ... We '" are 
definitely of the opinion that the Fijian 
Administration should not continue for longer 
than is absolutely necessary ... 67 
The first public attempt at explaining in some detail 
the failure of the Administration as an agent of Fijian 
economic development was made by Cyril Belshaw in his book 
Under the Ivi Tree. And with the benefit of having had 
access to officials and documents of the administration, his 
analysis and conclusions have come to be respected. His 
general conclusion was this: 
the effects of the Fijian Administration of the 
economic growth of the Fijian people have been 
little short of disastrous, and the source of 
much of the difficulty lies within the structure 
and philosophy of the Administration as a polit-
ical unit. 68 (emphasis added) 
Of the three particular factors which he isolated, two had 
to do specifically with chiefly domination of the organis-
ation. The first of these was that in appointing its 
officers, the Administration "leaned heavily on the side of 
family position and benign paternal, even aristocratic, 
authority". 69 The second was the tendency "to lean on auto-
cratic authority and to exercise it arbitrarily and sometimes 
capriciously". 70 Without wishing to underrate the doubtless 
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importance of such factors as the relative lack of funds, 
organisational weaknesses and so forth, the strong suggest-
ion which comes through from Belshaw's assessment is that 
the failure of the administration as an agent of Fijian 
economic development had to do essentially with the domin-
ation of organisation by an indigenous bureaucratic bour-
geoisie. The clear implication, therefore, is that it was 
the interests of that class rather than Fijians as a whole 
which benefitted most. 
The very open attack by the Burns Commission on the 
Fijian Administration provoked a prompt and defensive res-
ponse from those who wielded ultimate control over it, the 
Council of Chiefs. As the report on its August 1960 meeting 
put it: 
Council was opposed to the abolition of the 
Fijian Administration on the grounds that, 
whatever the future might be, there would 
still be a need for a department to look after 
specifically Fijian interests. 71 
with the chiefly class now a much more potent force 
than it had been in the first four decades of the century, 
the continuation of the Fijian Administration was all but 
assured. In the years ahead the indigenous bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie would consolidate its position and would be 
joined increasingly by educated commoners. And a strong 
bid for state power in the 1960s resulted in its dominance 
in the post-colonial state. Its near monopoly of state 
power from 1970 onwards was to serve as the major means by 
which to advance Fijian economic development, a task which 
was all the more difficult because in the interim capital 
and the colonial state had effected a restructuring of the 
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economy in a way which effectively reinforced Fijian economic 
disadvantage. Another process of restructuring was initiated 
in the years immediately after World War II and it laid the 
foundations of a neocolonial economy, the hallmark of which 
was a large tourist industry dominated by whites and foreign 
capital. That restructuring is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
7. SUMMARY 
The maintenance of social control is vital for the 
success of capitalist production and accumulation, and the 
role of the colonial state needs to be seen in that light. 
This chapter has argued that when the system of social 
control in colonial Fiji became rather less dependent on 
chiefly support, a situation was created which allowed the 
colonial state to try to restructure class relations in a 
way which would extend capitalist relations in the country. 
Two such attempts were made and they both had to do with 
Fijian class relations. The first was aimed at proletarian-
ising the Fijians, the second at dispensing with Fijian 
chiefs as agents of social control. Both failed and each 
had contradictory effects. The first hastened the onset of 
Fiji's most significant peasant struggle, the second ended 
with the rise of the indigenous bureaucratic bourgeoisie to 
a position within the ruling class where it was no longer 
quite the subordinate partner it previously was. 
The upshot of these developments was that by the end 
of the Second World War, the balance of class forces was 
such that local white capital was no longer quite as strong 
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as it had been. In the next chapter I show how it sought to 
shore up its shaky position by working through the newly-
emergent practice of state planning in order to restructure 
the colonial economy to suit its purposes. In tourism it 
saw its salvation, but because the existing tourist industry 
was so small, the colonial economy had to be restructured to 
make way for a much bigger one. The economic reorganisation 
which was about to take place would lay the foundations of 
the neocolonial economy. 
CHAPTER VIII 
RESTRUCTURING II: STATE PLANNING, CAPITALIST 
CONSOLIDATION AND THE TOURIST INDUSTRY 
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By the end of the Second World War, the class struggle 
in Fiji had produced a new balance of class forces. Sugar 
capital's continuing dominance of the colonial economy was 
underlined by its victory in the 1943 cane-farmers' strike, 
but the relative positions of the other classes had changed. 
Despite the split which divided them, the cane farmers were 
at least organised and were no longer quite as powerless as 
they had been. Wage workers too were in a somewhat stronger 
position. They too had organised themselves and the trade 
union movement was some five years old. The Fijian peasantry 
remained weak and unorganised, but the chiefs now enjoyed a 
rather stronger position within the ruling class. But what 
of local white capital? It alone was in a worse situation 
than it had been in previously. At the very least, its 
position had become uncertain. Although still engaged in a 
range of activities - commerce, farming, hotelling, profess-
ional services, and so on - it had not expanded greatly. The 
scope for expansion was limited, and the war made things 
worse. 
Faced with that situation, something had to be done to 
shore up its increasingly uncertain position. One dimension 
of its strategy was to engineer the historic debate of July 
1946. The other major dimension consisted of exploiting the 
newly-emergent practice of state planning. Tourism, it 
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figured, was the area in which it had the greatest potential 
for growth. Two things, however, were necessary: the 
country's infrastructure had to be upgraded; and appropriate 
fiscal incentives had to be secured from the colonial state. 
These it set out to achieve, and in doing so, the colonial 
economy was restructured. The aim of this chapter is to 
explain that process of restructuring, a process which 
marked the transition to the neocolonial economy. 
1. STATE PLANNING AND THE CAPITALIST FUTURE 
In February 1940 the British colonial state published 
its Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare l 
in which it announced that thenceforth it would assume a 
more direct responsibility for colonial development, and to 
give substance to this major shift in policy the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was passed. This was 
the first departure from the imperialist principle that 
colonies should be financially self-sufficient: 
For the first time the British Government 
officially acknowledged that the colonies could 
not be expected to develop unaided and that, 
accordingly, imperial funds would be made 
available on a much more extensive scale than 
hitherto, to facilitate development projects. 2 
In order to qualify for assistance under the act, however, 
colonies were required to submit development plans. That 
requirement set the scene for the emergence of state planning 
in Fiji. 
In May 1944 the governor appointed the Postwar Plan-
ning and Development Committee whose task it was to make 
recommendations about the future direction of the colony. 
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In addition to four expatriate state functionaries, it 
included the Secretary for Fijian Affairs, Ratu Sukuna, 
Vishnu Deo, two local European members of the Legislative 
Council, H.H. Ragg and W.G. Johnson, both of whom had commer-
cial interests,and A. Barker, chairman of the Suva Town 
Board and a director of the national newspaper, the Fiji 
Times. The committee's report was submitted to the governor 
in August 1945 and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in the following October. 3 Two basic objections were raised 
by the Secretary of State and they had to do with, firstly, 
the questionable ability of the country to finance the pro-
posed £4~ million budget, especially with a war debt of about 
£3 million hanging over its head; and secondly, what was seen 
to be an excessive emphasis on social services - 59% of the 
planned budget having been set aside for them. 
The report was fully debated in the Legislative Coun-
cil and even after it was subjected to further critical 
analysis, it was rejected by London in February 1948. An 
order was then issued that a new plan be submitted and that 
it should be based on the following considerations: 
(a) That greater emphasis be placed on pro-
jects of "definite economic value"; 
(b) that it would be unwise to anticipate 
raising a large development loan in the 
London money market in view of the 
"difficult conditions" there; and 
(c) that the country's war debt be taken 
into account. It 
It is clear from this direction· that the concern of 
the metropolitan state stemmed basically from what appeared 
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to it to be an overly ambitious plan, particularly in view 
of the difficult post-war circumstances. Because of auster-
ity in the United Kingdom at this time, the metropolitan 
state was clearly anxious to keep to a minimum the amount of 
assistance that would inevitably be sought under the Colon-
ial Development and Welfare Act. Furthermore, the budgeted 
allocation of 59% for social services appeared to Whitehall 
to be wildly excessive, and a luxury which the colony could 
ill-afford, even in spite of the justification for it which 
was made by the governor. 5 Rejection of the country's first 
development plan, therefore, was largely the result of the 
difficult economic conditions prevailing at that time. 
As a result of the direction from London, the Develop-
ment Revision Committee was formed. Compared with its pre-
decessor, its composition was significantly different in 
several respects. Firstly, it was bigger. Membership was 
increased from nine to sixteen, and it seems that the inten-
tion was to tap a wider range of opinion. Secondly, the 
number of expatriate state officials increased from four to 
seven and, significantly, both the governor and the Finan-
cial Secretary were now included. With an expanded official 
representation which included the two most senior function-
aries of the colonial state, it was more likely that the 
guidelines which had been laid down by London would be 
adhered to. Thirdly, while the number of both the Fijian 
and Indian representatives increased from one to two, local 
European representation increased from three to five. 6 In 
terms of what local white capital was seeking to achieve, 
this increased European participation, as we shall see, was 
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to prove important. 
The Development Revision Committee's report was sub-
mitted in November 1949, and as the table below shows, it 
conformed closely to the guidelines. Much greater emphasis 
was placed on "productive projects" (their allocation having 
increased three-fold from 12% to 36%) and less on social 
services which took a cut from 59% to 25%. Also, only about 
a quarter of the reduced budget of £4~ million was to be 
raised externally, and finally, by the time the report was 
submitted, the matter of the country's war debt had been 
settled, with Britain having written off the £2 million owing 
to it and a "satisfactory solution" having been reached with 
New Zealand for the remainder. 
Table 8~1 Development Plan Percentage Allocations: 
1945 and 1949 
Production and Development of Natural 
Resources (economic schemes) 
Social Services 
Communications and General 
Reserve 
Total 
1945 1949 
12% 
59 
29 
100% 
36.05% 
25.35 
34.25 
4.35 
100.00% 
Sources: Report of the Development Revision Committee 1949, 
p. 5; Report of the Economic Review Committee 
1953, p. 2. 
On the productive projects, the authors of the report 
reiterated the point that Fiji's wealth lay in agriculture. 
By their own admission, however, little attention was paid 
in the plan to the country's two major export crops, sugar 
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and copra, 9 the justification being that both were doing well 
and therefore did not require any assistance. At that time, 
of course, sugar and copra prices were high, but those who 
benefitted most from those high prices were the CSR and the 
few Europeans who owned large coconut plantations. The 
plight of the Indian cane farmers and the Fijian producers 
clearly mattered little to the committee. So rather than 
setting funds aside to improve the lot of those who actually 
produced the wealth of the country, the committee chose 
instead to divert state resources to other schemes. What 
were they? 
An examination of the projects which came under the 
category 'Production and Development of Natural Resources' 
reveals that the two largest allocations were for the pro-
posed Navua hydro-electric scheme (£566,000) and feeder roads 
(£455,000). These are clearly infrastructural expenditures 
and should properly be included with other. similar expendit-
ures classified under 'Communications and General'. If, 
therefore, those two items are reclassified,the allocations 
shown in Table 8.1 above would like quite different. A 
comparison of the two sets of figures is presented in the 
table below. 
What emerges very clearly from the reclassification is 
that the committee's statements about the primary importance 
of the agricultural sector amounted to little more than lip-
service to an idea which, although strictly speaking was 
correct, had little meaning in terms of improving the mater-
ial circumstances of the vast majority of the population. 
No, the real thinking which lay behind the report had to do 
Table 8.2 Comparison of the Original and the Reclassified 
1949 Planned Allocations 
~62 
Original Realassified 
£ % £ % 
Production and 
Development of 1,531,942 36.05 510,942 12.02 
Natural Resources 
Communications 
1,455,490 34.25 
and General 
2,476,490 58.28 
Social Services 1,077,507 25.35 1,077 , 507 25.35 
Reserve 185,061 4.35 185,061 4.35 
Total £4,250,000 100.00% £4,250,000 100.00% 
with something quite different and the clue to it is provided 
by the following statement: "many private enterprises in 
the colony had ambitious plans for expansion".10 
with that pronouncement, both the influence of the 
representatives of local capital - H.E. Snell, W. Gatward, 
A.A. Ragg and P. Costello - and the bourgeois character of 
the colonial state began to surface. Without an adequate 
infrastructure, local capital's "ambitious plans" would be 
frustrated, a prospect which the architects of the plan were 
not prepared to entertain. Little wonder, therefore, that 
fully 58% of the planned allocations were set aside for infra-
structural projects which included a hydro-electric scheme, 
an internation~airport, roading, port facilities and the up-
grading pf the country's main telephone exchange. What essen-
tially was happening here was that capital was pushing to 
secure the infrastructural requirements for the future 
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expansion it was planning to undertake and, as will become 
apparent in the section which follows, the intended area of 
investment was tourism. 
The significance of this whole development, then, has 
to do with, first, the nature of capital's intervention and, 
second, the way in which the class character of the state 
was exposed. Development planning was here to stay and, 
sensing this local capital made sure that it would have a 
major part in it. In so doing, it was able to influence the 
allocation of state resources in ways which were consistent 
with its material interests. But its intervention was also 
concerned with ideological ends. Increased state involvement, 
although necessary and desirable, should not be at the ex-
pense of private capital, and it was important that the 
message be made loud and clear. The state was there to 
assist capital, not compete with it: "it is not desirable 
that Government should compete on a large scale with private 
enterprise".11 More specifically, the state should refrain 
from drawing business from the private sector in times of 
economic buoyancy, and its role should be limited to "taking 
up the slack caused by a recession in private activity". 12 
And to tie this whole philosophy to the particular projects 
which were being planned, the authors of the 1949 report had 
this to say: 
[they] are essential prerequisites to that 
expansion of private activity which we desire 
to see and upon which we believe the future 
development of this Colony must largely dep-
end. 13 (emphasis added) 
So that was where the future of the country lay. To 
ensure that the point would not be missed, A.A. Ragg, during 
the debate on the report, had this to say: 
[the report] is based on sound commonsense and 
experience, and it will be as well for those 
who control the scheme to adjust the works that 
we have in mind to those envisaged by private 
enterprise. 14 
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Capital's interventions in the planning process were 
a major success. The 1949 report of the Development Revision 
Committee was implemented, and it is instructive that the 
governor's only substantiv~ comments on it had to do with the 
relative absence of racial dissension in its formulation: 
the fact which I wish to emphasise stands clear 
and unassailable; when the leaders of the three 
racial elements in the Colony get together ..• 
to produce a master plan for directing the 
Colony's developmental activities during the 
next ten years, they find it possible to forget 
that they are Europeans, Indians or Fijians 
and they see eye to eye, in the interests of 
the Colony as a whole on all essential points. IS 
This statement is illustrative of the way in which the co1-
onia1 state, like the other factions of the ruling class, 
saw conflict predominantly in racial terms. The absence of 
racial dissension is not at all surprising. All the "leaders 
of the three racial elements" who sat on the committee had 
strong connections with the bourgeois class, even if they 
were not all capitalists themselves. It was a bourgeois 
plan, conceived and formulated by representatives of bour-
geois interests, particularly those of local white capital. 
The governor's comments served essentially to buttress those 
interests. 
In October 1952 the Economic Review Committee was 
formed to review the progress of the 1949 ten-year deve1op-
ment plan and to consider ways in which the latter might be 
modified "in order to increase economic productivity in 
F · . '" 16 1J 1 • The Committee's report was submitted in 1953. 
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About one half of it was taken up with fairly detailed analy-
ses of agricultural projects. That so much attention was 
paid to agriculture is to be expected, given that a central 
plank of the dominant ideology was that agriculture was the 
very lifeblood of the economy and therefore had to be suppor-
ted as much as possible. The authors of the report, not 
surprisingly, took that view and argued that "the quickest 
and surest way of increasing the national income [was] to be 
found through the development of agriculture". 17 For all 
their words, however, very little in the way of financial 
resources was actually allocated to productive agricultural 
activities. The committee bemoaned the fact that by October 
1952 expenditure on various schemes which were planned in 
1949 was out of line with the original allocations. In par-
ticular, expenditure on social services had "crept up" to 
38.7% of the total while expenditure on 'Production and 
Development of Natural Resources' fell to 13%.18 To correct 
the imbalance and, very importantly of course, to give 
priority to agriculture, the committee recommended that only 
some of the original projects under the latter category 
should be continued, that others be dropped, and that new 
ones be introduced. Those to be dropped would effect a 
saving of £54,883, which represented a mere 1.1% of the total 
budget, and the projects to be introduced would require an 
additional expenditure of £269,300, an increase of only 5.6% 
over the existing total. 19 Not only is it difficult to see 
how such a small proportionate increase would make a great 
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deal of difference to the agricultural secotr but also, at 
most, only 42.6% of that increase was to be spent directly 
on productive agricultural projects. The remaining 57.4% 
was set aside for various surveys and investigations and for 
increased agricultural staff costs. So much, then, for 
"expanding" and "diversifying ll the non-sugar agricultural 
sector. The sugar industry, for its part, did not require 
any assistance: 
we feel that the industry is in capable hands 
from the managerial and technical standpoints. 
Indeed the organisation of the sugar industry 
in Fiji has frequently been quoted overseas as 
an example of efficiency[!] The abandonment 
of plantation farming in the nineteen twenties 
and the institution of the tenant farming sys-
tem has gone far to secure contentment. 20 
Whose contentment precisely, the authors do not specify. 
Since the formulation of the 1949 plan, the Navua 
hydro-electric scheme was judged "impracticable"; it was 
therefore dropped. The Economic Review Committee1s reaction 
to that is telling: 
it meant that the likelihood of obtaining 
abundant and cheap power had faded and the 
chances of establishing secondary industries 
in and around Suva and the south-eastern cor-
ner of viti Levu had been much reduced. 21 
The significance of this statement lies in its implication 
that state resources should be applied to developing primar-
ily those regions with the best prospects for industrialis-
ation. South-eastern Viti Levu was in many respects the 
most suitable region for industrial expansion, and that the 
authors of the report should consider the allocation of 
state resources in that light is understandable. The other 
side of that kind of thinking, however, and which of course 
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passed unmentioned, is that it would only exaggerate the 
already-established pattern of uneven development. Rather 
than proposing schemes which might spread the benefits of 
development more evenly throughout the country, attention 
was concentrated on regions where capital was most likely to 
maximise profits. 
It is significant that the authors of the report were 
"not in a position to make specific recommendations for the 
establishment of secondary industries" outside of the few 
which already existed. New industries, they argued, would 
"naturally follow the production in sufficient volume of any 
new or existing crop". 22 The thinking here was clearly that 
industrial expansion in Fiji was generally a function of 
agricultural growth. But agricultural development in Fiji' 
was still at a stage where there were little or no opportun-
ities for further profitable expansion. When, however, that 
stage was reached, the report emphasised, "it is to be expec-
ted that private enterprise would take advantage of the 
circumstances". 23 But why private enterprise? Because 
"Government, by the nature of its organisation, is not fitted 
to take direct part in industrial undertakings".21.f Industry, 
in other words, was the domain of capital. On the other 
hand, the report smartly pointed out, "private capital cannot 
be driven" into industry, "it can only be attracted". Then 
came this statement: 
[ a ] s we see it therefore our duty is to advise 
how the conditions can be created which will 
attract private capital. 25 
At this point the report launches into its detailed 
analyses of "new schemes and measures for increasing 
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productivity". All of those, with one notable exception, 
were concerned with the agricultural sector and the import of 
the recommendations have already been considered. The excep-
tion, not surprisingly, was tourism. The report had already 
admitted to being unable to make recommendations for further 
industrial expansion but now special mention was made of 
tourism: 
The tourist industry is one which can be of 
considerable economic value to the Colony ... 
The Fiji Visitors Bureau has been established 
to develop this industry which we consider needs 
greater encouragement than it has received in 
the past. We understand that the Visitors 
Bureau has been asked to place before Government 
specific proposals for increasing this industry, 
and we consider that Government should consider 
Wq¥S and means of assisting the industry (with-
out necessarily taking part) particularly in 
questions of finance. 26 (emphasis added) 
The future of the country, it was now being argued, 
rested to a large extent on the development of a tourist 
industry which should be controlled by capital. The signif-
icance of the above statement is that it shows how, as a 
mode of class representation in the colonial state, through 
its membership in state committees and its involvement in 
the state planning process, local capital sought to influence 
state policy towards the development of private enterprise 
and in particular the development of tourism. The class 
character of the state is demonstrated by the way it accom-
modated that pressure. 
By 1953, then, the push by local tourist capital was 
beginning to gather momentum and in the years ahead it would 
intensify greatly so that by the start of the sixties, the 
way would be clear for the dramatic growth in tourism. To 
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understand that development better, it is necessary, first 
to trace, very briefly, the historical development of tour-
ism in Fiji. 
2. TOURISM: IN THE BEGINNING 
By the early 1920s, various white residents had moved 
into the hotel business and activity centred around Suva 
hotels like the Pier, Club, Melbourne, and McDonald's, and in 
May 1914 the country's largest hotel, the Grand Pacific 
Hotel, was opened. Built as a "staging point for New Zealand 
and Canadian shipping services in the [Pacific] region",27 
the Grand Pacific was widely regarded as one of the finest 
hotels in the South Pacific. with the relatively small but 
steady growth in tourist traffic came the belief among local 
Europeans that there was a need to inject a degree of co-or-
dination and planning into the nascent tourist industry. So 
in May 1923, the White Settlement League, an organisation 
dominated by Suva businessmen, formed the Suva Tourist 
Board. 28 That was the first organised attempt at constitu-
ting a tourist industry in Fiji and, although foreign cap-
ital had a significant interest in it, the burden of ensuring 
its early survival fell largely on local tourist capital. 
Not long after its creation, the Suva Tourist Board 
realised that the continued viability of the infant industry 
would depend very largely on state financial support. 
Approaches for assistance were therefore made to the colon-
ial state and in February 1924, the governor appointed a 
committee to investigate ways of developing the industry. 
As it turned out, however, the state's response to the 
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committee's report was at best lukewarm and its grant to the 
Tourism Board was a mere £170. 29 Despite its failure to 
elicit a more favourable response from the state, the report 
was significant in that it showed very clearly the kind of 
vision which local capital had for the future development of 
tourism. Among the requirements it outlined was the need for 
a major publicity campaign overseas, organised tours and 
entertainment, a system of rest-houses and, very signif-
icantly, circuminsular and intersecting roads in the main 
islands. 30 The last of these especially would in the years 
ahead be urged persistently on the state. 
In 1925, the Suva Tourist Board changed its name to 
Fiji Publicity Board and Tourist Bureau, and was headed by 
the colonial state's representative, Mr W. Wise. Secretary 
to the board was Mr J. Herrick, a leading spokesman for local 
tourist capital who previously served as manager of the Suva 
Tourist Bureau. Ably supporting him were Mr G.F. Grahame, a 
leading lawyer and mayor of Suva, and Mr T. Horne, the 
Chamber of Commerce's represenatative. With the formation of 
the board 
the stage was set for a battle which was to 
last for nearly forty years between the advoc-
ates of increased activity to attract tourists 
to Fiji and the Colonial Government. 31 
In -the prolonged struggle which ensued, the state 
continually resisted the pleas by local capital for increased 
assistance and by the end of 1941 the tussle came to a 
"dismal stalemate" which lasted the duration of the Second 
World War. With the cessation of hostilities, the stalemate 
also ended and the representatives of local tourist capital 
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immediately resumed their battle with the colonial state. 
Added thrust was given to their crusade by the likes of Henry 
Marks, a man with well-established commercial interests, but 
despite the renewed pressure, state financial assistance 
remained at a low level. 32 Resentment of the state's attit-
ude, not surprisingly, took an upturn. 
The unwillingness, indeed inability, of the colonial 
state up until the immediate post-war years to provide the 
kind of direct financial assistance which tourist capital 
sought can be explained largely in terms of three factors. 
First, the size of the state's resources, quite simply, had 
always been limited, and in the face of more "deserving" 
projects or more urgent expenditures, tourism was simply 
accorded a low priority. Second, until the 1940s the central 
principle of colonial management was that colonies should be 
financially self-sufficient. Tourism simply did not contrib-
ute substantially to the treasury's coffers and it never 
appeared to have the potential to do so. And thirdly, 
throughout the duration of the Second World War, all sectors 
of the economy suffered, and in the period of reconstruction 
greater importance was attached to the non-tourist projects. 
Largely for these reasons, then, state financial assistance 
to the tourist industry did not reach the levels which local 
tourist capital sought. 
Tourist capital's fortunes were soon to change for the 
better, however, as the colonial state's former unsympath-
etic attitude turned into a rather warmer disposition. The 
turning point Game with the change In metropolitan colonial 
policy in 1940. Self-sufficiency was no longer the central 
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principle of colonial financial management, and there was now 
the prospect of increased financial assistance from London. 
Whitehall's new policy effectively opened the way for 
a more sympathetic response on the part of the colonial state 
to the needs of the tourist sector. Although direct state 
assistance was not increased significantly in the short-term, 
a climate more conducive to the demands of local tourist 
capital had been created. It was now possible U9 press even 
harder the argument about the economic potential of tourism 
and also to expect greater state investment in the kinds of 
projects Which were vital for the tourist industry. Sub-
stantially increased financial aid to the Publicity Board 
might not be forthcoming, but the state could at least be 
expected now to provide the requisite infrastructure. Such 
an expectation, capital felt was not unreasonable, and it was 
common knowledge in business circles that the Colonial Wel-
fare and Development Act 1940, was intended "primarily to 
provide assistance towards capital schemes". 33 So the task 
now facing tourist capital was to ensure that a substantial 
portion of state resouces would be invested in projects 
which would contribute to the development of tourism. 
3. THE PUSH BY TOURIST CAPITAL 
Development planning in Fiji, as has been noted, was 
in large part a consequence of the Colonial Welfare and 
Development Act. To qualify for grants and loans under the 
Act, colonies were required to submit acceptable development 
plans. Obviously, then, tourist capital's objectives had a 
greater chance of being realised if appropriate interventions 
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could be made in the newly-emergent system of state economic 
planning. That is, it would be highly advanta~eioUs for 
tourist capital if its interests were to be incorporated into 
the country's development plans. Outside this formal mach-
inery pressure could still be exerted of course, but to 
orient that machinery towards the needs of tourist capital 
was clearly desirable. 
As already mentioned, the country's first development 
plan, the 1945 Report of the Post-War Planning and Develop-
ment Committee, was rejected by London. The second, however, 
submitted in 1949, was accepted and in it 58% of the alloc-
ations were set aside for precisely ,those sorts of projects 
on which the tourist industry would depend for its success -
an international airport, roading, port facilities, energy 
and telephone systems. And it is not coincidental that 
included in the committee which drew up the 1949 plan were 
two members who were involved with the hotel industry - Mr P. 
Costello and Mr A.A. Ragg. Although there was no specific 
mention in the plan about the future of tourism, there can 
be no doubting that tourist capital had scored a significant 
victory. The plan, as has been shown, was biased towards 
the development of private enterprise and it is not a coinci-
dence that its major emphasis was on infra structural pro-
jects which were essential prerequisites for the development 
of that industry which had the most promise for expansion by 
local capital - tourism. The task now was to build on that 
major breakthrough. 
A.A. Ragg, as has been stated, defended the report 
when it was debated in the Legislative Council on 6 December 
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1949. Five days later, during the debate on the Appropri-
ation Bill, H.M. Scott, the prominent Suva lawyer, urged the 
colonial state to increase its financial assistance to the 
Tourist Board, arguing that the time was ripe to attract 
more tourists to the country "especially those from the 
dollar area". 34 This was a useful start and the push from 
tourist capital would henceforth intensify. In the following 
year state financial aid to the Tourist Bureau was increased 
but clearly not by as much as tourist capital would have 
liked. During the Appropriation Bill debate in December 
1950, Alport Baker, who by that time was a member of the 
Fiji Publicity Bureau and Tourist Board, thanked the state 
for the increased funding but added that the grant was a 
mer e II drop in the ocean II • 35 Fiji, he announced, had natural 
attractions far ahead of anything in Hawaii but in order to 
draw tourists here an extensive pUblicity campaign would 
have to be mounted, and that could be done only if more 
funds were made available - from the state of course. The 
plea for "sympathetic consideration" duly followed. 
Persistent pressure from tourist capital finally 
began to yield dividends. State support for the tourist 
industry was officially pronounced in the 1953 Report of the 
Economic Review Committee. The relevant passage from that 
report has already been quoted. 36 Belief in the "great 
future II of tourism in Fiji was growing, but the industry 
suffered a major set-back as a result of extensive:damage to 
tourist establishments caused by a hurricane in 1952 and an 
earthquake in 1953. The need for hotel expansion had long 
been a concern of tourist capital; the natural disasters 
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created a new urgency. The need for more accommodation 
facilities was stressed by A. Barker when the 1953 report was 
debated in May 1953. Finance, however, was the major problem. 
The state's public statements of support for the tourist 
industry were greatly appreciated, but whether it would put 
money where its mouth was was another matter. That it would 
not was Barker's major concern: 
Is the Government to provide the money or 
private enterprise? I cannot see it coming 
from private enterprise and personally have 
faint hopes of going to the Government for the 
£200,000 or £300,000 for the purpose of build-
ing hotels, but the money will have to be 
furnished sooner or later. 37 
Barker's fears were well-founded. Three years on the quest-
ion of hotel accommodation was still not resolved to cap-
ital's satisfaction. So the issue was taken up again in the 
,1/'\ Iq~1p ) 
Legislative Councill this time by W.G. Johnson, the chairman 
of the Fiji Visitors Bureau (which was the new name given to 
the Fiji Publicity Bureau and Tourist Board as from 1 January 
1953) . 
Over the last few years, the state had shown itself to 
be rather inflexible on the question of finance for hotel 
expansion, and to make matters worse, the infusion of for-
eign private capital which had been hoped for, had not in 
fact occurred. Alternative sources, therefore, had to be 
found, and Johnson used the Legislative Council to convey the 
message to the colonial state. It had come to his knowledge, 
he informed the chamber, that a high official of the Colonial 
Development Corporation might be visiting the country to look 
into the possibilities for hotel development, but because he 
had not recently heard any more about it, he was concerned 
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that the whole matter might have been "overlooked". 38 Two 
days later his fears were allayed by Mr H.W. Davidson, the 
Financial Secretary, who assured Johnson that he would 
personally take up the issue on his forthcoming trip to 
London in January 1957. 39 By the end of 1957, however, the 
financial assistance sought from the corporation had not 
materialised. Worse still, concerted attempts by the Fiji 
Visitors Bureau during 1957 to attract foreign investment 
had come to nothing. It was now clear to both tourist 
capital and the colonial state that conditions in Fiji were 
simply not sufficiently attractive to draw the much-needed 
capital into the tourist sector. In relation to that state 
of affairs, the Governor made this statement to the 
Legislative Council in November 1957: 
Government is satisfied - after full consider-
ation - that there is a need for some positive 
stimUlus to investment ... It is proposed, 
therefore, ... to put forward proposals which 
should render such investment more attractive 
than they seem to be at present. ltO 
Heartened by this, the Fiji Visitors Bureau made submissions 
to the state about the.kinds of incentives it preferred lt1 and 
in December 1958 the Legislative Council debated the Hotels 
Aid Bill. 
The major concessions provided for in the bill had to 
do with accelerated depreciation allowances and capital 
grants. For local tourist capital, however, the bill was 
unacceptable because the minimum levels of expenditure which 
were set in order to qualify for the concession were too 
high. Why were they set so high? The Financial Secretary 
provided the answer: 
What we need urgently is something really big, 
a major step forward in hotel accommodation 
and we believe that the figures we have 
put into the Bill will be required. 42 
277 
The state seemed intent upon a scale of expansion which only 
foreign capital was capable of undertaking. Why? Local 
funds, were in short supply so foreign capital was necessary. 
But more importantly, if a profitable tourist industry was to 
emerge, then surely British capital should have a share of it. 
Furthermore, British capital was more likely to be enticed if 
competition from local capital was kept to a minimum. And an 
obvious way to do that was to structure the qualifying con-
ditions for state concessions in favour of foreign capital. 
Resistance from local capital, however, was instant. 
The bill clearly discriminated against local entre-
preneurs, and caution was issued about the danger of the 
tourist industry being monopolised "by just a few". 43 Pres-
sure from local representatives, especially H.B. Gibson, led 
to reductions in the proposed minimum expenditure levels, 
although not by as much as Gibson would have liked. The 
battle to reduce the levels even further, therefore, did not 
end with the enactment of the amended bill as the Hotels Aid 
Ordinance of 1958. Subsequent attempts to lower the levels 
even further were made, but it was not until September 1960 
that they were so lowered. The year before that the Burns 
Commission arrived in the country, and in February 1960, it 
submitted its report. Local tourist capital ensured that its 
views were represented to the Commission, and the strong 
support which it gave to the development of tourism is there-
fore highly significant. 
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Concerned as it was with the whole question of Fiji's 
economic future, great importance was attached to the Burns 
Report, and it served as a blueprint for the country's next 
development plan. How was it occasioned? 
A major problem besetting the state's planning mech-
anism was the dearth of information about the economy, and 
as early as 1948 the need to rectify the problem was recog-
nised. The Financial Secretary was asked to carry out an 
economic survey of the colony, but by November 1948 his 
findings had not yet been published. A.D. Patel raised the 
matter in the Legislative Council during the debate on the 
Appropriation Bil144 and A.A. Ragg took it further: 
[ the] problem that we have today [is that] we 
do not know where we stand. It_is all pure 
guesswork, and until we do get a true economic 
survey of this Colony based on proper statis-
tical records then we are not going to get much 
further than we are today ... 45 
By 1952 the situation was not much better and the Council 
resolved to appoint a Commission of Enquiry to investigate 
and advise as to how the development of the colony and its 
resources should proceed. 46 The result was the Burns Report 
of 1960. The first set of national economic statistics was, 
however, produced in 1956 by C. O'Loughlin "in response to a 
suggestion that the Australian National University should 
second a research worker to make a national income survey".47 
The Burns Report was extensive in its coverage and 
far-reaching in its recommendations. Its recommendation 
with respect to the other sectors of the economy will be 
taken up later. For the present, we confine ourselves to 
its views on tourism. Its position on that question was 
clear: 
Tourism ... is one of the few industries in 
which Fiji can really compete effectively with 
other areas, and we consider that every effort 
should be made to develop it as quickly as 
possible. 1+8 
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But, it went on, "there are certain problems regarding the 
Government's role in tourist development which require 
looking into". 1+9 What were those problems and what were the 
commission's recommendations with respect to resolving them? 
The first had to do with the minimum expenditure 
levels which had to be met in order to qualify for state 
concessions under the Hotels Aid Ordinance of 1958: 
it has been represented to us that while the 
Hotels Aid Ordinance ... is a big step forward, 
it does not go far enough. In the first place, 
it only benefits the large hotels ... In the 
second place, it only benefits those companies 
in a position to finance themselves or are able 
to find a loan finance without difficulty. 50 
Those criticisms of the ordinance, the report said, had 
"some justification". There was no reason, it argued, why 
the ordinance should be biased towards large hotels, for 
surely it was "for the business interests concerned to 
decide what size of hotel will pay".51 It therefore recom-
mended that the minimum capital expenditure levels be red-
uced, and very soon afterwards they were. 
State concessions applied to three categories of 
hotel expansion: new hotels in the Suva and Lautoka areas, 
new hotels outside those areas, and additions to existing 
hotels. Under the 1958 Hotels Aid Ordinance, the minimum 
capital expenditure levels for each of these were set at 
£75,000, £60,000 and £20,000 respectively. In September 1960, 
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just seven months after the Burns Report was submitted, the 
Hotels Aid Ordinance, 1958 (Amendment) Bill was debated in 
the Legislative Council. The bill proposed that the levels 
be reduced to £50,000, £30,000 and £10,000 respectively, but 
those reductions, the local representatives decided, were not 
enough. Significantly, it was a local Indian building con-
tractor, S. Narain, who made the counter-proposal that the 
figures should be reduced even further to £40,000, £20,000 
and £5,000 respectively - roughly a 50% drop from the 1958 
levels. 52 
The ensuing debate is significant for its shortness 
and also for the relative ease with which Narain's proposed 
amendment was accepted. H.B. Gibson, who in 1958 had argued 
very strongly that the original levels had been set too high, 
of course supported Narain, and it is instructive that he 
was able to congratulate himself in this way: 
It is wonderful the number of suggestions I 
made to the Burns Commission which ... were 
finally accepted ..• and they did accept this 
one. 53 
Apart from Gibson, all the local representatives who spoke on 
the bill - and they all supported Narain's amendments - were 
either Fijian or Indian. They were Vijay R. Singh, A.I. 
Deoki and Ratu Mara. Throughout the British Empire at this 
time, the colonial ruling class was being forced to heed the 
voice of the colonised peoples and, on this particular 
occasion, the colonial state in Fiji could hardly afford to 
reject the views of the local non-European members, espec-
ially as they were strong ones. And so it was that the 
Hotels Aid (Amendment) Ordinance of 1960 was passed and the 
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minimum expenditure levels reduced to the figures Narain had 
suggested. 
The intervention of the Burns Commission, then, quite 
clearly was an important factor in the struggle by local 
tourist capital to change state policy to its advantage. 
Beyond the question of the minimum expenditure levels, the 
Commission also made other important recommendations. On 
the matter of finance for hotel expansion, it did not see 
that a case for preferential treatment for local capital 
could be made. On the other hand, it said: 
We see no reason why applications could not be 
made to the Agricultural and Industrial Loan 
Board which would judge the merits of any indi-
vidual proposal for loan finance for hotels 
against proposals from other industries. 54 
Later it will be shown that in the sixties and early seven-
ties, a great deal of the board's funds were in fact diverted 
to tourist projects and, very significantly, they were given 
to a very few people. 
The commission's recommendations on other facets of 
the tourist industry were also important, and they formed 
the basis of subsequent state policy. These had to do with 
upgrading and tar-sealing the Suva-Nadi road, liberalising 
licensing laws, declaring Nadi and Suva as duty-free ports, 
improving passenger facilities in and around Nadi airport and 
the Suva wharf, and raising state subsidy to the Fiji Visit-
ors Bureau. 55 On the last of these, the report recommended 
raising the state's grant from the existing £9,000 to 
£25,000. 56 
Although local tourist capital welcomed both the 1960 
ordinance and the recommendations of the Burns Commission, 
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those developments did not guarantee its dominance in the 
tourist sector. International tourism was already on the 
increase and the attractiveness of the Fiji tourist industry 
had already come to the attention of international capital. 
The Fiji Visitors Bureau had been a member of the 
Pacific Area Travel Association (PATA) since 1951.and in 
1958, in conjunction with the united States Department of 
Commerce, PATA commissioned the services of an American firm, 
Checchi and Company, to undertake a survey of the tourism 
potential in the Pacific and Far East regions. Concluding 
that tourism in those regions was far below its potential, 
the Checchi Report S7 called for a quadrupling of tourism 
between 1958 and 1968. For international capital, that was 
a vital signal and, pertinently, the report painted a glowing 
picture of Fiji's tourist potential and specifically recom-
mended that "money [be] pumped into the Fijian economy from 
outside" . 58 The report's prognosis about tourism in Fiji 
was correct but it could have been more accurate - the 
industry's subsequent performance was to exceed by far the 
expectations of the report. What is more, as will be shown 
in Chapter X, the tourist industry which local capital had 
striven so hard to develop, and hopefully dominate, would 
soon come under the control of foreign capital. 
4 • S UJVlMARY 
Local capital's attempt to develop the tourist 
industry was a direct response to the need to bolster its 
position which, in the post-war balance of class forces, had 
become increasingly uncertain. The relative absence of 
283 
profitable investment opportunities had limited its scope 
for expansion, and only tourism apparently held out some 
potential for growth. The tourist industry, however, was not 
growing. It sought, therefore, to reorient state policy 
towards the development of the tourist industry. Exploiting 
the state's planning process it succeeded in diverting state 
resources towards the kinds of infrastructural development 
necessary for the growth of tourism, and in doing so effec-
tively restructured the colonial economy. By the early 
1960s, that process of restructuring was complete, thus 
concluding the transition to neocolonialism. 
Over the fifteen or so years during which the restruct-
uring took place, other major developments had also occurred. 
Of particular importance was the increasing strength and 
assertiveness of organised labour. Two major strikes in 
1955 and 1957 demonstrated labour's growing willingness to 
defend its position through organised struggle, but they 
also alerted capital and the state to the need for greater 
control. If, in particular, foreign capital was to be 
enticed into the tourist industry, then labour would have to 
be contained. When, therefore, the 1959 oil-workers' strike 
shook the capitalist-dominated colonial economy to its roots, 
the task of class containment took on a new urgency. 
The 1959 strike, then, was a turning point in Fiji's 
history. Coming at the end of a restructuring process which 
laid the foundations of the neocolonial economy, it repres-
ented a fundamental threat. The trajectory of neocolonialism 
had just been mapped out and was not to be jeopardised by 
labour. The struggle of 1959, and that which followed it in 
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1960 (the cane-farmers' strike), are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER IX 
STRUGGLE AND CONTAINMENT 
The process of restructuring which local capital 
orchestrated paved the way for a neocolonial economy in which 
tourism would increasingly challenge sugar production as the 
country's major industry. And therein lies the historic 
importance of the 1959 oil-workers' strike. Because the 
strike occurred at such a critical time, the strong response 
from the colonial state is only to be expected. What began, 
therefore, as a legitimate wage demand soon flared into open 
confrontation, the nature and scale of which was largely the 
result of state provocation. A whole array of repressive 
state apparatuses was mobilised, and the experience gained 
from that exercise was to be useful when the cane farmers 
struck in 1960. Because that strike came so soon after the 
1959 confrontation, it added fuel to the deep anxiety which 
ran through the ruling class. So the cane farmers too were 
victims of state provocation and violence. 
Similar struggles by organised labour in the future 
would put the neocolonial design at risk, and what better way 
to minimise that risk than to mete out a solid dosage of what 
can be expected if that were to happen. In view of their 
central place in the history of' the class struggle in Fiji, 
therefore, the strikes of 1959 and 1960 are examined in 
detail in this chapter. 
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1. TURBULENCE AT THE TURNING POINT: THE STRIKE OF '59 
Despite percentage increases in the cost of living 
between 1955 and 1959, oil workers .in Fiji had not received 
any wage increase over the entire four-year period. In 
August 1959, the General Secretary of the Wholesale and 
Retail Workers' Union wrote to the oil companies - the Shell 
Oil Company and the Vacuum Oil Company - in an attempt to 
commence wage negotiations. l Delaying tactics were employed 
by the latter, and on 10 October the union submitted a log 
of claims which sought, in addition to improvements in other 
conditions of work, an increase in the minimum wage for oil 
workers from £3.0.6 to £6 per week. As a counter-offer, the 
companies proposed an increase to only £3.10.0 per week and 
that further negotiations be deferred until February of the 
following year. 2 Both of these proposals were immediately 
rejected by the union and when further efforts by the latter 
to keep negotiations going were met with further company 
intransigence, worker frustration and resentment intensified. 
By the beginning of December it had become clear to the 
union that no headway would be made with the oil companies, 
and on 5 December it gave notice that a nation-wide strike 
would take effect two days later. 
The strike lasted from 7 - 12 December and the capital, 
Suva, became the main theatre for the drama that was about 
to unfold. Early on the first day of the strike, an angry 
crowd of between 100 and 150 people tried to prevent the 
delivery of oil to the Electricity Power House, but because 
union leaders were under the misapprehension that such action 
would contravene the Essential Services (Arbitration) 
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Ordinance of 1954,3 they allowed the delivery to proceed. 
Considerable tension, however, had been created by the 
incident, and by the end of the day the proclamation of 
emergency regulations under the Public Safety Ordinance of 
1920 was considered a possible step.4 
Two major developments occurred on the following day. 
At 9a.m. a meeting of a number of senior state personnel was 
convened: the Governor, Acting Attorney-General, Commander 
of the Fiji Military Forces, Commissioners of Police and 
Labour, Assistant Colonial Secretary and the Public Relations 
Officer. That an offical statement on the strike was both 
desirable and necessary the meeting appeared to be in agree-
ment. Whether, however, the purpose of such a statement 
should be "to put the people in the picture" or "to give sane 
lead to the people" was not altogether clear. Disagreement 
over that in the end, did not make a great deal of difference. 
The state felt that it had a duty to "the public" to do 
something about the strike; some kind of lead was therefore 
deemed necessary.s The official statement was broadcast by 
the state-controlled radio station, the Fiji Broadcasting 
Commission, in the afternoon of the same day, by which time 
tension had increased even further 6 largely as a result of 
a confrontation at the Shell Company depot several hours 
earlier between picketers and a police riot squad. 7 The 
state was already provoking the strikers, but more was yet 
to come. 
The official statement was clearly hostile towards 
the strikers. Totally ignoring the fact that the unions had 
for so long unsuccessfully sought to bring about 
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negotiations,S it accused the union secretary, James Anthony, 
of flouting "recognised industrial practices" and claimed 
that the union was behaving irresponsibly. 9 It counted for 
little that union leaders had gone to great lengths to abide 
by the law and to ensure that the supply of fuel to essential 
services was not disrupted. 10 The state simply turned 
immediately to its ultimate fall-back position, its respon-
sibility to protect "the life of the whole people". 11 The 
strike was only into its second day but already the state 
was prepared to act in the strongest possible way. A certain 
amount of inconvenience had been caused and it was inevitable 
that it would, but to suggest, especially at such an early 
stage of the strike, that the life of the people was at risk 
was rash and provocative. Up to that point no inquiry had 
been made into the grievances of the workers, and yet the 
state was prepared to embark on hasty and drastic action. As 
the union's response to the official statement put it: 
The general public (with the exception of a 
privileged minority) have suffered for much too 
long in this country_ A little more suffering, 
a little longer, will we are certain, hurt only 
a little. 12 
It then went on to assure the state that: 
We shall continue to see that essential services 
are served as provided for under the Essential 
Services (Arbitration) Ordinance ... 13 
That the official statement expressed the state's 
antagonism towards the strikers is further underlined by its 
conclusion: 
Finally the Government of this Colony wishes 
to give a clear and unequivocal statement of 
its views of the strike:-
1. The strike should not have taken place. 
2. Workers should resume work and enter into 
negotiations immediately afterwards. 
3. If the negotiations are not successful 
the assistance of the Labour Department 
should be sought. 14 . 
A.G. Lowe, the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry 
which investigated the "disturbances in Suva", correctly 
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argued that this statement of opinion served only to aggra-
vate the whole situation. "The government", he said, "was, 
very properly, concerned to do nothing which gave any 
indication that it was attempting to break the strike". 15 
Proper that concern may have been but whether it was genuine 
is another matter. The Acting Colonial Secretary, J.A.C. 
Hill, maintained that the official statement was a sound one. 
After all, he was an advocate of the view that the statement 
should show that the government was "giving a lead". 16 He 
was also one of those who approved the issue of the state-
mente Those who felt that the government's role at the time 
should have been limited to "putting the people in the 
\( 
picture", therefore lost out to the more hawl~sk faction 
which won the day. Even the Commissioner of Inquiry quest-
ioned the soundness of the official statement. The weight 
of the evidence clearly suggests therefore that the state 
was taking sides and it was precisely in that way that the 
union interpreted its intervention: 
There remains no doubt in the union's mind that 
Government has deliberately decided to side 
with the employers ... The Government has no 
right whatsoever to say whether the strike 
should or should not have taken place without 
making a thorough, impartial and objective 
investigation. 17 
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The day after the official statement was broadcast, a state-
ment of protest from the union was taken to the Fiji Broad-
casting Commission and permission was sought to have it 
broadcast also. That was refused on the grounds that "some 
portions of the statement were not factual and that others, 
if broadcast, would be likely to increase tension rather 
than reduce it". 18 
Not surprisingly, on December 9, the strike became 
violent. A meeting at 9a.m. between the Acting Colonial 
Secretary, oil company representatives and the Commissioner 
of Police decided upon alternative arrangements for the 
supply of fuel. The companies were to be responsible for 
distribution while the duty of government was to afford the 
necessary protection. 19 That morning too, attempts by the 
Labour Office and the union's legal adviser, A.I. Deoki, to 
establish a basis for settlement of the dispute failed. 
When, therefore, the companies commenced fuel distribution, 
the already-heightened tension got progressively worse. A 
confrontation at Niranjan's petrol station in Walu Bay at 
10a.m. was followed by more serious ones at Burns Philp's 
and Morris Hedstrom's stations. By then the crowd had 
swelled to about 400 and with police reinforcements arriving, 
the crowd had become "sullen and hostile".2o From lp.m. to 
2p.m., as buses queued for petrol, unrest became more evident 
and by now expressions of anti-European feeling were becoming 
more frequent. Bus drivers were being urged by the crowd to 
go on strike and at the central bus station placards emerged 
in support of the strikers. Mounting tension and growing 
numbers greatly increased the likelihood of violence. 
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"Sometime in the afternoon", the union secretary sent 
a telegram to the oil companies complaining of unfair tactics 
"to crush the workers' right to strike".21 The companies, 
he felt, were using scab labour and were supplying petrol 
for general use rather than just for essential services. 
By 3p.m. the crowd at the bus station became agitated; the 
position of the bus drivers with respect to the strike was 
unclear, and it appears that the lack of transport was a 
factor in the increasing hostility. Around this time two 
events occurred: a section of the crowd crossed Rodwell Road 
and invaded Burns Philp's store, and at the opposite end of 
the bus station, on Harris Street, ~~ Patton of British 
Petroleum (South west) Pacific Limited, was stopped, abused 
in anti-European language, seized by the collar and compelled 
to get out of his car.22 Attention then turned to bus pas-
sengers and when a police party arrived, Mr Patton was able 
to get away and the crowd dispersed. 
By then events had acquired a momentum which would be 
difficult to stop. By 4p.m. the bus transport system had 
broken down completely, James Anthony had been refused per-
mission to address a public meeting, European and police 
vehicles were being stoned, the Fiji Broadcasting Commission 
had refused to broadcast the union's statement of protest, 
and instructions had been issued for the preparation of 
public safety regulations. A crowd of between 3,000 and 
4,000 people had gathered in an area opposite the Phoenix 
Theatre which was known as the "hard standing", expecting to 
hear James Anthony speak. The arrival of a police riot 
squad added to the tension and in response to a police call 
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to disperse, the crowd chanted "we want a meeting". Tear 
smoke grenades were then thrown into the crowd; thereupon 
people scattered "in all directions" and retaliated with 
stones. A baton charge proved of little value because by 
then most of the crowd had moved down Rodwell Road. The 
city was now gripped by a two-day period of destruction of 
property on a scale that had no parallel in its previous 
history. Leave for all regular members of the Fiji Military 
Forces was cancelled, the reservists in the Second Territor-
ial Force Battalion were called to active duty, and a curfew 
was imposed. 
Day four of the strike, 10 December, saw more des-
truction of property, including damage to a store owned by 
the mayor of Suva, Charles Stinson. At noon the governor 
issued emergency regulations under the Public Safety Ordin-
ance. That did not prevent the strike leaders from calling 
a meeting of about 3,000 people "consisting almost entirely 
of Fijians and Indians"23 at Albert Park two hours later. 
Two aspects of that meeting are significant: first, that it 
had the approval of the Commissioner of Police, and second, 
that it was addressed by two of Fiji's leading chiefs - Ratu 
Edward Cakobau and Ratu George Cakobau. That chiefly inter-
vention was described in this way: 
The Fijian Chiefs spoke first to the people 
making it clear that they had no intention of 
endeavouring to stop the strike but appealed 
for calm and sensibility.24 (emphasis added) 
The significance of this intervention, the disclaimer not-
withstanding, lies in the way in which a degree of reliance 
was placed on the use of traditional authority to influence 
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the course of events. 
A similar meeting the following day, again at Albert 
Park, saw further calls for calm from James Anthongy, 
Mohammed Tora, B.D. Lakshrnan and A. Deoki. More importantly, 
the strikers were asked to return to work and await the 
result of attempts which by then were being made to resume 
negotiations. Anthony had written to the Fiji Industrial 
Workers' Congress asking it to mediate in the dispute. At 
lp.m. on the following day, he learned not only that the 
congress had agreed to mediate but also that terms had 
already been worked out for a return to work. Physical 
exhaustion had compelled him to rest, so he was not present 
at the negotiations. The "successful" mediation of the dis-
pute was brought about largely through the efforts of Ratu 
Mara and Ratu Meli Gonewai, the president of the union. 25 
This collaboration between two traditional chiefs is signif-
icant and should be borne in mind for the later discussion 
of the Fijian-led breakaway unions which followed in the 
wake of the strike. 
The terms of the interim agreement between the union, 
the Fiji Industrial Workers' Congress and Ratu Mara were 
strongly rejected by Anthony, but because they had the unan-
imous support of the union executive, he was eventually 
forced to accept them. 26 The dispute was subsequently 
referred to arbitration. Said Hassan appeared for the union, 
D.M.N. MacFarlane for the oil companies and Ratu Mara acted 
as umpire. James Anthony made representations on behalf of 
the union while Maurice Scott and John Falvey presented the 
case for the Shell Company and the Vacuum Oil Company 
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respectively. In terms of the outcome of the arbitration, 
Scott's representations are of particular significance in 
that he clearly invoked the sentiment of the 1958 Industrial 
Disputes Ordinance about the need to consider the implica-
tions of wage demands for the wider economy. 
Due regard, he informed the arbitration tribunal, 
must be given to the overall economy. The oil companies, he 
said, had not pleaded inability to pay but they had to be 
careful to keep in line with economic progress and the abil-
ity of the other commercial enterprises in Fiji to pay.27 
The effect of the union's wage demand, he argued, would be 
as follows: 
it would mean the complete collapse of industry 
in Fiji, and therefore the ruination of the 
country and its people. 28 
Being more specific, he went on to claim that companies 
would either go out of business, cut down staff or resort to 
mechanisation and thus reduce employment. No more veiled 
could a threat be, and it is hardly surprising that the union 
demand was not met. It had asked for a minimum wage of £6 
per week, the companies were prepared to pay £3.10.0 and the 
umpire awarded £4.11.6. 29 The fact that the award fell 
roughly halfway between the two positions made it appear 
fair, but that fairness was more apparent than real. The 
companies, after all, had implicitly conceded that ~t could 
actually pay more. 
The strike of 1959, then, clearly marked a watershed 
in Fiji's history. The early years of the trade union 
movement had been plagued by a whole set of difficulties, 
which ranged from a pervasive bourgeois antagonism towards 
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labour, racial splits within the movement (which I discuss 
later) and power struggles which centred around personalties. 
The clash between Nand Kishore and B.D. Lakshrnan for control 
of the Chini Mazdur Sangh, for example, almost led to the 
destruction of that union. 30 By the mid-50s, however, 
expecially after the formation of the Fiji Trade Union 
Congress, the fledgling movement had gained in strength and 
cohesion, and the strikes by gold-miners in 1955 and sugar 
workers in 1957 gave expression to that new found strength 
and cohesion. Although extensive in terms of workdays lost, 
those stoppages were, however, of a different order from the 
strike of '59 in several crucial respects. All three had 
been caused by grievances about low wages and inadequate 
working conditions but whereas each of the first two involved, 
predominantly, workers of a particular racial group - Fijians 
in the case of the 1955 strike and Indians in the 1957 one -
the oil-workers' strike did not have that racial character. 
For the first time in the country's history, Fijian. and 
Indian workers carne together to fight a cornmon cause. The 
leaders of the union acknowledged that there were differences 
separating Fijian from Indian workers, but decided that 
because their members shared cornmon "economic interests" 
their differences should be "put into cold storage". 31 
Working class solidarity had for the first time transcended 
racial boundaries~ and the ruling class was unable to play 
upon racial sentiment in order to deal with the strike. 
Moreover, that solidarity also expressed a fairly high degree 
of class consciousness for it was clear that capital was the 
main enemy. As the union's newsletter which announced the 
strike said: 
Our claim is for a living wage - you all know 
how impossible it is to feed, clothe and house 
a family on the miserable wages that we are 
getting at the present time.. These Companies 
are making big profits - we feel that the time 
has now come when we must get a fair share of 
the wealth that we are making. In fact we are 
entitled to a fair share ••• 32 
The newsletter concluded: 
The workers must stand together. Today you 
must show the people of Fiji and the world that 
we, the workers, stand together - that we are 
one! 33 
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United they clearly were and when the colonial state 
sought to "protect the life of the whole people", the tactics 
which it adopted confirmed in the minds of the strikers that 
it too, and not just capital, was the enemy. On the pretext 
of defending the "whole people" it mobilised its ideological 
and repressive machinery to break the strike - the Fiji 
Broadcasting Commission was used, repressive legislation was 
passed, the army and police were called to duty and tradit-
ional chiefly authority was exploited. 
The strike was branded as "anti-European": 
Furthermore: 
There was a very pronounced anti-European 
feeling throughout the disturbances ... This 
manifested itself by anti-European abuse hurled 
at Europeans and by the stoning of Europe~V'\ 
driven cars •.. Both Fijians and Indians were 
responsible ... When rioting broke out the 
damage which was caused to premises was con-
fined entirely to European premises and to 
offices such as the Labour Office and the Dis-
trict Government Offices, both of which were 
then in [the] charge of Europeans. 34 
The fact that the Police were Europeans also 
had an influence on the minds of those who were 
responsible for the show of anti-European 
feeling and it is important to remember that 
the Oil Companies are European-owned and were 
... deliberately chosen for strike action. 35 
Giving evidence. before the Commission of Inquiry, Suva's 
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mayor, Charles Stinson, whose store was also damaged, gave 
this assessement: 
I looked closely ... at the pattern of destruc-
tion because I was naturally interested 
It did not take long to form a definite opin-
ion ... To my mind it was centred near all 
European businesses. 36 
He then went on to mention the names of various European 
establishments - Carpenters, Burns Philp, Mouat's Pharmacy, 
Corbetts' Butchery, Boots the Chemist, Steeles, the British 
Council, Fiji Trading Company and Morris Hedstrom. Total 
damage caused by the strike was estimated at £14,304, 86% 
of which was inflicted on European-owned property. 37 
The Commission of Inquiry concurred with Stinson's 
assessment of the pattern of destruction and offerred the 
following explanation: 
The evidence suggests that the anti-European 
feeling was probably engendered by the fact 
that the Europeans own the largest shops and 
have, at least, an appearance of wealth and 
that the lower paid workers felt that such 
large shops were indicative of considerable 
profits whereas many workers' wages were low. 38 
(emphasis added) 
The tentative and qualified nature of this explanation is 
understandable - the commissioner, after all, could not be 
expected to make a definitive statement to the effect that 
capitalist exploitation lay at the root of the strike. He 
was, however, prepared to concede that the damage wrought on 
European property had something to do with the workers' 
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anger about disparities in wealth. Although, therefore, the 
commission was not prepared to say so directly, it is clear 
that European property was the major object of destruction 
simply because it was the very embo~iment of unequal wealth -
the product of capitalist exploitation. The real target, in 
other words, was not Europeans as such but capital, and 
capital, because of the origins of imperialism, was predomin-
antly European. Indian and Chinese business property, after 
all, were also objects of attack. 39 
Important too is the fact that various establishments 
of the colonial state also suffered physical damage. The 
strikers were not fools; it was apparent to them just whose 
side the colonial state was on, so it is not surprising that 
it too was subjected to the wrath and anger which the workers 
unleashed. The activities of certain "splinter groups" and 
"criminal elements" notwithstanding, it is clear that the 
workers had identified their main enemy and its allies very 
clearly. 
In sum, then, the strike of 1959 sparked off a major 
convulsion in the colony. Never before had workers ignored 
their racial differences and come together on such a scale to 
shake the capitalist system to its very roots. Here was 
organised working class pressure in its most developed form, 
and the nature of the ruling class's response amounted essen-
tially to an acknowledgement of that fact. More importantly, 
it demonstrated a willingness on the part of the colonial 
state to defend - violently, if necessary - the newly-laid 
foundations of the neocolonial economy. Success for the 
strikers might encourage similar struggles in the future 
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and that would seriously undermine the development of that 
industry which was to be the hallmark of the neocolonial 
economy - tourism. The state's antagonism towards the 
stxikers, therefore, is not surprising. But that antagonism 
provoked the strikers into a more militant posture, and that 
in turn enabled the state to resort to violence. 
Having suppressed the strike, the ruling class's next 
task was to ensure that a similar upheaval would not occur. 
Before examining how it set about doing that, however, it is 
necessary first to consider the next episode in labour 
turmoil - the sugar-cane farmers' strike of 1960. 
2. CRISIS IN THE CANE FIELDS: THE 1960 FARMERS' STRIKE 
Throughout the 1950s the sugar industry expanded 
greatly. In the decade up to 1956, for example, the area 
under sugar cultivation increa~ed by 27.3% from 90,816 acres 
to 115,654 acres and between 1950 and 1959 the number of 
cane growers almost doubled, increasing from 7,742 to 14,200~o 
Exceptionally good weather in 1958 produced a bumper crop of 
283,000 tons which exceeded the country's export quotas by 
some 14,000 tons. 41 By the time the new ten-year cane agree-
ment came up for negotiation, therefore, the CSR was con-
cerned about over-production and sought to restrict output. 
Two possibilities were suggested: either a tonnage quota 
could be imposed on each farm (this had the advantage of 
shifting total responsibility to the farmer who would have 
to ensure that production did not exceed the agreed amount) 
or quotas could be introduced on an acreage basis whereby 
the company would buy cane that was grown only on a specified 
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area. Both of these were of course firmly rejected by the 
farmers who argued that the CSR had a moral obligation to 
buy all the cane harvested in 1960 "since in 1957 and 1958 
it had urged farmers to increase the area planted". 42 In 
addition to limiting output, the CSR also advanced cost-
cutting proposals: higher penalties for burnt or inferior 
cane and the deduction of certain expenses, e.g. storage 
costs, from sugar proceeds before calculating the cane price 
to be paid to the farmers. Furthermore, it also suggested 
that the growers' share of proceeds be reduced when the sugar 
price was high. 43 These proposals too, needless to say, were 
rejected by the farmers. By March 1960, after protracted 
negotiations, no progress had been achieved and at that point 
the state and capital collaborated to end the dispute. wit-
ness, for example, this remark from the company's head office: 
It is gratifying that our views on the situation 
and method of handling it seem to be finding 
acceptance by Government. 44 
For their part, the farmers remained resolute and 
united in their opposition to the company's proposals. Well 
before negotiations got under way they had taken steps to 
present a united front. Since the early forties deep rifts 
had afflicted the Indian cane-farming community and an 
attempt at forging a unity was made way back in January 1949 
when the Kisan Sangh, Maha Sangh, Vishal Krishak Sangh (a 
predominantly Punjabi union), Rewa Planters' Association, 
and the Farmers' Union of the Southern Districts formed them-
selves into a loose federation. 45 Shortly thereafter, how-
ever, the Kisan Sangh withdrew and the organisation effect-
ively went into decline. Ten years later, again when the 
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cane contract was up for renegotiation, the need for unity 
resurfaced and in March 1959 the organisation was revived 
under the name Federation of Canegrowers. Prominent in it 
were the leading figures of the two largest associations -
A.D. Patel, S.M. Koya and J. Madhavan for the Maha Sangh and 
A. Prasad, J.P. Bayly and V.R. Singh for the Kisan Sangh. 
But the unity displayed in the federation was fragile and 
proved to be short-lived. Old rivalries stretching back to 
the early years of the farmer associations persisted as 
undercurrents and only a major act of political will and 
class suicide on the part of the leaders could transcend it. 
But that was not to be. Always more moderate than its major 
rival, the Kisan Sangh was more amenable to compromise than 
the Maha Sangh. A repetition during the 1960 strike of the 
Kisan Sangh's earlier break was therefore all but inevitable, 
and the farmer unity that many were so keen to achieve again 
proved elusive. The catalyst for the break occurred in May 
1960. 
In that month the Governor, Sir Kenneth Maddocks, 
proposed an economic investigation into the sugar industry, 
but the proposal was rejected by the farmers. Such a commis-
sion, they feared, would not be able "to get at the facts".lt6 
A crucial set of "facts" of course were those relating to 
the company's performance and the farmers fears were vindic-
ated when the CSR was subsequently criticised by the Commis-
sion of Inquiry (led by Malcolm Eve) for failing to produce 
financial accounts at any stage of the dispute. lt7 Up to May 
the Federation of Canegrowers was still united in its oppos-
ition to the company's original proposals and it remained 
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firm on the following demands: that the company take all of 
the 1960 cane harvest; that a new pricing formula be derived 
which would split the net proceeds from the sale of sugar 
between the farmers and the company on a 70%-30% basis; and 
that the pricing formula be included in a renegotiated, long-
term contract. The federation refused to countenance any 
interim agreement which fell short of these demands, espec-
ially if such an agreement was disadvantageous to the 
farmers. Ita 
When, therefore, the governor proposed a commission 
of inquiry, Patel had grave misgivings. Such a move would 
only delay matters and would in all likelihood weaken the 
farmers' bargaining position. Precisely the same sort of 
situation had arisen during the 1943 strike, and one of the 
major effects of which was to fuel disunity among the far-
mers. Patel was concerned to avoid a repetition of that 
si tua tion. 49 Not unexpectedly, therefore, suspicions grew 
about the impartiality of the governor's intervention. The 
colonial state, it now seemed, was biased against the far-
mers. Then on 27 June, three local members of the Executive 
Council, Ratu Mara, A. Deoki and J.N. Falvey, all of whom 
were influential political figures, had a meeting with the 
governor who advised them to encourage the growers' repres-
entatives to accept a Commission of Inquiry.50 To Patel, 
this smacked of political meddling rather than industrial 
mediation, for it threatened to turn local opinion against 
the federation and its case. A Commission of Inquiry would 
be presented to the public as a reasonable course of action 
and if the farmers rejected it, they would be seen to be 
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unreasonable. 51 A month after the June meeting, the Kisan 
Sangh broke away from the federation and together with the 
three Fijian cane-growers' associations - the Nadroga Fijian 
Canegrowers' Association, Ra Fijian Canegrowers' Association 
and the Ba Fijian Canegrowers' Association - accepted an 
interim agreement with the CSR. Significantly, J.N. Falvey 
had acted as adviser to the Fijian associations. 
The interim contract required the company to take 
199,000 tons of the 1960 crop and stipulated that crushing 
would stop once that figure had been reached. A deduction 
of 18 pence per ton of burnt cane was also provided for with 
the intention that the funds be used to reimburse farmers 
worst affected by the strike action to date. 52 For those 
remaining in the federation, the interim agreement repres-
ented a complete betrayal. They would have no part of it 
and thenceforth would fight alone. The ensuing strike action 
lasted until late September but it was clearly doomed to 
failure. Yet again, the farmers were deeply divided and 
quite apart from the supportive hand which the colonial state 
held out to the CSR, the latter was in a strong position 
anyway. By the end of the 1959 season it had accumulated 
stocks of 89,000 (52,000 tons more than permitted under the 
International Sugar Agreement) and was therefore well-placed 
to withstand the stoppage. 53 
Sir Malcolm Trustam Eve was appointed to head the 
Commission of Inquiry and he was to be assisted by J.S. 
Wheatley from the Colonial Office and J.M. Bennett, an 
accountant. Eve, Moynagh wrote, belonged to "the English 
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'establishment''',5lf and as for Bennet, the firm of account-
ants for which he worked was known to have connections with 
the CSR. However impartial they might therefore have tried 
to be, their "natural inclination ... would be to favour the 
CSR", and that they did. 55 
The Eve Report was a major victory for capital. It 
established a method of production control which was accep-
table to the CSR; it provided for the establishment of an 
administrative machinery to oversee the industry - the Indep-
endent Chairman, the Sugar Board and the Sugar Advisory 
Council - and it decided upon a sugar proceeds-sharing 
formula which "gave CSR some protection against rising costs 
[but] provided no such protection for the growers". 56 All in 
all, the inquiry was an astute political exercise: "Under 
the guise of impartiality, a report which was distinctly 
favourable to the CSR was produced". 57 Such was the power 
of the company. 
The single most important difference between the 
farmers' strike and that of the oil workers the year before 
was that the former occurred in the country's most important 
industry. The very life-blood of the economy was at risk 
and fears about its consequences were serious. As the Fiji 
Times put it: 
It is just not possible to take £8,000,000 
worth of production out of Fiji's economy 
without the direst results. 58 
Evidence that the effect of the strike was felt very quickly 
surfaced at the end of June when shop sales began to take a 
downturn. A survey of Suva merchants showed that some 
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stores were already "going through a lean period". 59 But it 
was in the cane fields that the fullest effects of the 
stoppage were concentrated. The turning point in the strike, 
of course, was when the Kisan Sangh and the three Fijian 
cane-growers' associations signed the interim agreement with 
the CSR on July 24. Farmer unity was split, and the milit-
ancyof the Canegrowers' Federation became the object of 
attack from not only the rival farmer associations rut also 
the CSR, the colonial state and the Fiji Times. 
By early August the lines of battle had been clearly 
marked out. On 4 August four cane farms in Ba were burned,6o 
and with rumours of intimidation gaining currency, the rep-
ressive forces of the state were mobilised. 61 The Public 
Safety Regulations which were passed during the 1959 strike 
were still in operation and on 9 August a proclamation call-
ing out the whole of the Territorial Force was signed by the 
Governor. Police reinforcements were sent to the sugar 
growing areas, including Labasa where cane crushing was due 
to commence on August 11. By that time too the strike was 
exacting a heavier economic toll. Business in Lautoka was 
"suffer ing heavily" and in Labasa where "trade slumped", a 
growing incidence of petty theft of food and other items was 
reported. 62 
By the last week of August reports of cane burning 
and threats of violence had increased considerably. Through 
the pages of the Fiji Times the state was urged by the rep-
resentatives of the ruling class to take stronger action 
against the "disruptive forces" to end the strike. 63 Soon 
afterwards an official statement was released in which the 
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gravity of the situation and the deterioration in race relat-
ions were noted. An expansion of the Special Constabulary 
was also announced.6~ All that, however, was not enough, 
according to the national newspaper. 65 What was needed was 
firm and decisive action and when the Fijian ex-servicemen 
announced their readiness to prove their loyalty to help 
preserve law and order, the Fiji Times loudly hailed their 
stand. 66 
On 4 September some 900 farmers gathered in Ba and 
were addressed by, among others, A.D. Patel, S.M. Koya, 
Mohammed Tora and James Anthony. A resolution was passed 
giving the governor three days in which to review two propo-
sals for the havesting of cane which had previously been 
submitted to him. The two proposals were as follows: first, 
that the cane farmers who had not agreed to the July 24 
agreement would sell their cane to the government, and 
second, that the governor should decide on the percentage of 
cane to be harvested by these farmers on an area basis. The 
second proposal also carried the proviso that the allocation 
for each farm should be determined on an equitable basis 
between farmers but bearing in mind also that no farmer's 
allotted area of cane should be left unharvested. 67 Both of 
these proposals had already been rejected by the colonial 
state, the first for "legal and other reasons" and the 
second simply because it was unacceptable. 68 
The "ultimatum", as the Fiji Times put it,69 given to 
the governor by the Ba meeting, also carried the rider that 
if the governor did not respond to the request the farmers 
would burn their cane. 70 The governor's first reaction to 
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this was to amend the Public Safety Regulations, giving the 
Commissioner of Police extended powers in relation to public 
meetings and processions. 71 He also drew the public's atten-
tion to the law relating to setting fire to land - the 
Prevention of Fires Ordinance and section 348 of the Penal 
Code 72 - and on the national radio network he appealed to 
farmers to stop burning cane. At about this time, it was 
later reported, the governor had "apparently" signalled the 
British Far East Army Headquarters in Singapore saying that 
he would probably need troops to deal with the strike. 73 
The official response to that claim was as follows: 
There has never been any question of seeking 
outside assistance until all local resources 
were fully utilised, but as a precautionary 
measure it had to be considered whether any 
additional assistance could conceivably become 
necessary. 74 
It would seem that the Fiji Times's claim was not without 
foundation. 
By the end of the first week of September some 21,733 
tons of cane had been burnt, a little more than one half 
being on CSR estates. 75 A week later another 1,631 tons 
were burned. 76 Tension was by then increasing rapidly and 
parallels were being drawn between this strike and the one 
in 1943 which had been described as a "stab in the back". 77 
When, therefore, B.D. Lakshman moved in the Legislative 
Council that a sugar board be established to control the 
sale and purchase of cane and also that there be an inquiry 
into the sugar industry, the representatives of the coalit-
ion that stood opposed to the strike gave vent to their 
feelings, and A.D. Patel was singled out as the prime target 
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for their attack. J.N. Falvey, who had acted as adviser to 
the Fijian cane farmers, praised them for their patience and 
castigated Patel: 
He went on: 
Fundamentally, the problem Mr A.D. Patel has 
brought to the Colony comes from his outrag-
eous personal vanity.78 
I believe it would be totally wrong to deny 
that a very serious rift between the Fijian 
and Indian communities has arisen from this 
sugar crisis. 79 
The significance of these statements is that they were an 
attempt to personalise the whole dispute and at the same 
time make it appear as essentially a racial conflict. The 
pattern of the past was repeating itself and to reinforce 
the wholy myth other members of the Council also condemned 
the strike's racial character. Vijay Singh, a representative 
of the moderate Kisan Sangh, announced that the Indian 
community was now "bitterly divided as never before" and 
that the author of that division was A.D. Patel. He went on: 
Mr Patel has ... successfully undone a lot of 
hard, painstaking work in bringing Indians, 
Fijians and Europeans together ... they were 
beginning to understand and trust one another. 80 
As for Fijian opinion, Ratu Penaia Ganilau (the present 
Governor-General) made this statement on the basis of his 
knowledge of events and also of resolutions passed at Provin-
cial Council meetings in July and the Council of Chiefs in 
August: 
At the three provincial councils I attended it 
was quite clear that members were very concerned 
about the effect of the dispute on the economy 
of the Colony. As a result they passed resol-
utions offering their services to the Government. 
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Fijians have since come out in hundreds. About 
1,000 are now harvesting cane in the western 
District. Members of the RSSA, [Returned Ser-
vicemen's Association] in response to a call to 
attend a normal reunion, came out in thousands. 
When I was in the western District this week I 
was told that one of the non-cane-cutting lead-
ers had said that for every thousand the RSSA 
put up he could put up 5,000 cane farmers. That, 
I thought, was fighting talk. 8l 
Here was a marshalling of forces which Patel's group was 
unable to deal with, and given the CSR's position of strength, 
it was virtually inevitable that the strikers would succumb. 
The turning point as far as ending the strike was 
concerned came with the arrival of the Secretary of state 
for the Colonies, Julian Amery, who visited Fiji as part of 
a world tour. On 14 October, Patel and his associates 
presented Mr Amery with a memorandum and at a meeting the 
following morning he told the delegation that a Commission of 
Inquiry was to be appointed and that their case should be 
presented to the commission. He also urged, "for the good 
of the Colony", that harvesting be resumed. 82 Later that 
day, a meeting of between 3,000 and 4,000 farmers agreed to 
accede to Amery's request. 
It had been alleged that Patel's attitude to the 
strike derived from his eagerness, as a Gujerati, to prolong 
the dispute so as to increase farmers' indebtedness to Guj-
erati shopkeepers. It was also suggested that by adopting a 
militant posture he expected to increase his popular support 
and thereby aid his political career. Both of these sugges-
tions, Moynagh argues, lack credibility, 83 and he may well 
be right. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that 
pressures from the Indian bourgeoisie (of which he was a 
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member), coupled with his unquestionable political ambition, 
never at any stage informed his calculations. Be that as it 
may, it does appear that the determining factor behind the 
decision to accept Amery's request was probably the realis-
ation that the balance of forces were simply stacked against 
him and his followers. It is clear from developments which 
transpired that to have prolonged the strike even more would 
probably have meant more hardship for the striking farmers 
whose chances of success were minimal. In that sense the 
decision to resume harvesting was a sensible one. But there 
was a second reason. It is clear that the farmers themselves 
had by then suffered enough to want a settlement of the dis-
pute. In Amery they saw the possibility of a breakthrough, 
so it is likely that they were disposed to accepting his 
views. Evidence for this provided by the prominent display 
at the meeting of 15 October of signs, in both English and 
Hindi, which said "Welcome Amery", "Save Us Mr Amery", and 
"Do Not Forsake Us". 81t It was clear to the farmers that 
they were compelled by a force mightier than they to return 
to work. Six months of struggle against awesome odds was 
more than they could cope with, so when their leaders urged 
them to harvest, they responded. The Fiji Times, true to 
form, could only describe their leaders' decision as little 
more than a "face-saving measure". 85 
Such, then, in broad outline were the events surround-
ing the strikes of 1959 and 1960. Turning now to the res-
ponses by the ruling class in the aftermath of those upheav-
als, those relating to the cane-farmers' strike will be 
considered first. 
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3. CONTAINING THE FARMERS 
As has been argued, the report of the Eve Commission 
was a major setback for the cane farmers, but when it was 
released the Fiji Times praised its "dispassionate impartial-
ity" and pointed to "its value as an important contribution 
to the wellbeing of the Colony". 86 Later it applauded the 
state's intention to implement the recommendations of the 
report. This was the "time for action", the editorial 
stressed, for the country had too long been held to ransom 
by a handful of individuals: 
Personal ambition, private enmity, undue secrecy 
and suspicion, ill-will and violence have been 
allowed too long to destroy the peace of mind 
and prosperity of those engaged in the industry, 
and to endanger the economic future of Fiji. 87 
Here in a single statement was both an attack on certain 
"disruptive elements" and also a veiled but nontheless 
eloquent defence of sugar capital. The strike, the editorial 
said, had caused an estimated £l~ million (an insignificant 
amount compared with the vast pro'fi ts which the company made) 
and "those who caused the trouble" had much to answer for. 
with great anticipation, therefore, the national daily 
announced: 
The sugar industry, and the whole Colony, is 
waiting for the Government to create the 
machinery of administration and control which 
the Commission has recommended as a basis for 
peace and progress ... A repetition of the 
selfish, irresponsible, destructive antics 
shown in the past will bring disaster. 88 
(emphasis added) 
In November 1961 the CSR announced that it was pre-
pared to accept the recommendations of the Eve Report. The 
Fiji Times offered praise,89 but it also urged the colonial 
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state to introduce sugar legislation as early as possible in 
the forthcoming December session of the Legislative Council, 
which is precisely what happened. 
The Development Commissioner, E.R. Bevington, told 
the Legislative Council that the Sugar Industry Bill was 
virtually a codification of the Eve Report, 90 and after much 
heated debate, it was passed as the Sugar Industry Ordinance 
of 1961. The Ordinance provided for a Sugar Board comprised 
of an "Independent" Chairman, "Independent" Vice-Chairman 
and an "Independent" Accountant. All three were also members 
of the Sugar Advisory Council together with representatives 
of government, the millers and the growers. At the apex of 
this machinery of control was the Independent Chairman whose 
powers were clearly set out in the ordinance. Under section 
12(1), for example, a dispute would not officially exist 
until he deemed it so. It was his responsibility to try to 
bring about a settlement, but if he should fail the machinery 
of the colonial state was to be activated. Upon informing 
the Chief Justice of the dispute, and after consulting with 
the Governor, further steps would then be taken to effect a 
settlement. 91 Whether a settlement was to be achieved under 
the "ordinary machinery available in the Colony" or through 
the particular procedures set out in the ordinance was a 
matter for the Governor to decide at his own discretion. 92 
Quite clearly, then, the growers were now seriously hamstrung 
as far as dispute settlements were concerned. The Indepen-
dent Chairman alone decided if a dispute existed, and he had 
first responsibility for settling it. If he could not effect 
a settlement, then the dispute was to be referred to 
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compulsory arbitration. But there were other forms of con-
trol. No time limit was placed on the Independent Chairman 
for the settlement of a dispute, and when B.D. Lakshrnan 
sought to introduce such a limit, the Legislative Council 
refused. 93 Then there was the thorny question of the growers' 
representatives. The ordinance provided for a system of 
elections by panels of sirdars. J. Madhavan objected to that 
system in the following way: 
Sirdars were elected for a specific purpose -
to organise and supervise cane harvesting. 
They knew nothing about cane contracts or sugar 
agreements and some did not know how to read 
and write. The overseers had a great influence 
over the sirdars and never in the history of 
the industry had the sirdars gone against the 
wishes of their masters - the section overseers. 94 
Both A.R. Sahu Khan and B.D. Lakshman spoke in support of 
Madhavan's position, but again the Legislative Council 
refused to change the system of election. 95 In Chapter IV 
the point was made that sugar capital had delegated some of 
its functions of surveillance and control to the sirdars. 
To the extent that they performed those functions, they 
acted in the interests of capital and thus, in part at least, 
stood against the farmers. For that reason, and the Indian 
members of the Legislative Council realised it, they could 
not be fully trusted to represent farmers. 
If the spokesmen of the ruling class were adamant 
about the system of electing the farmers' representatives, 
they were equally firm about excluding those deemed to have 
been responsible for the 1960 strike. The Sugar Ordinance 
placed a ban on lawyers and politicians from the Advisory 
Council, and that immediately precluded leading figures like 
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A.D. Patel and S.M. Koya. Indeed the ordinance went even 
further for even a professed candidate for the Legislative 
Council was also barred. The test case here involved 
Mohammed Tora who, after being elected to the Advisory Coun-
cLl, was subsequently called upon by the Colonial Secretary 
to resign as he had made known his intention to contest the 
1963 Legislative Council elections. 96 
These, then, were the major forms of control which 
emerged out of the Eve Report and which were subsequently 
embodied in the law. But who might be liable for prosecution 
under the provisions of the ordinance, and on what grounds? 
If a repetition of the 1960 strike was to be avoided, then 
it was imperative that the legislative net be case as wide as 
possible so that the range of potential offences and offen-
ders could be maximised. The result was section 13(1) of the 
ordinance: 
any person who, before the Independent Chairman 
has given notice of the issue of a Certificate 
regarding a dispute, does any act or makes an 
ommission the doing or ommission of which hinders 
or is calculated to hinder orderly planting or 
growing or harvesting of cane, transport of cane 
to a mill, crushing the cane, making sugar at a 
mill, or transport or storing of sugar, shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be liable to 
"  d' 97 lIDprlsonment or a term not excee lng two years. 
The outstanding feature of this provision is its scope. 
Highly e la s tic the range of people and acts or. omissions 
which might fall within its purview is clearly enormous. 
Its effectiveness is suggested by the fact that it was not 
seriously tested until 1977 when it was invoked in a court 
case against Mohammed (then Apisai) Tora. 98 
Another measure of the ordinance's success is that 
throughout the 1960s the sugar industry managed to escape 
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even those strikes which approached the scale of the one at 
the beginning of the decade. The machinery of control which 
was established certainly -lived up to expectations, and not 
until about the mid-seventies did grumblings begin to be 
heard about the need for a reorganisation of the industry. A 
restructuring was proposed and investigations into an alter-
native administrative arrangement were commenced. The sig-
nificance of this development lies in its timing. Indepen-
dence came to the country in 1970 and three years later 
control of the industry passed to the Fijian-dominated post-
colonial state. Having thus assumed the mantle previously 
occupied by Australian sugar capital, the state now had 
direct access to the surplus created in the sugar sector. 
Control over the industry had always been a vital issue, but 
it was now rather more problematic. True, state power 
rested mainly with Fijians and the repressive apparatuses of 
the state were largely under their control. It is also true 
that the Fijian seizure of state power occurred relatively 
peacefully. But there can be no doubting that there was 
also a fair degree of latent racial hostility in the course 
of events leading up to the state's takeover of the industry, 
and also beyond. If, therefore, that tension was not to 
explode into open violence, and thereby bring the legitimacy 
of the state into question, then excessive control over 
those who produced the greater part of the country's wealth 
had to be avoided - and the majority of those were Indians. 
The legitimacy of the state hinged very critically on "multi-
racial harmony", and electoral considerations were also 
important. Largely for these reason, then, the post-colonial 
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state proved rather more responsive to the cane farmers than 
its predecessor had been. But all this is the subject for 
separate discussion later. For the moment, the central point 
is that throughout the 1960s the cane farmers would continue 
to be exploited by sugar capital, the major difference being 
that they were now further hamstrung by legislation and a 
machinery of control which did not exist previously. Such 
was the effect of the state's subsequent response to the 
strike of 1960. What, then, of the 1959 strike? How did the 
ruling class supsequently respond to that event? 
4. IN THE AFTERMATH OF '59: LABOUR UNITY UNDERMINED 
The early months of 1960 saw a series of developments 
that served to reinforce the ruling class's resolve to find 
ways of countering the increasing militancy of organised 
labour. The oil-workers' strike had shown what workers were 
capable of and the continued dominance of the ruling class 
called for appropriate responses. A marshalling of forces 
was about to occur. 
In February 1960 the Burns Commission submitted its 
report on the economy. The full significance of that report 
will be discussed later but for the purposes of the present 
discussion some of its pro#nouncements are directly pertinent. 
Although it accepted that there was a need for the condition 
of wage-earners to be "substantially improved", the report 
claimed to have found no evidence that that could be achieved 
through a redistribution of income!99 It also stated that 
there was "little evidence that deliberate exploitation by 
employers [was] the order of the day". 100 For the workers, 
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then, the way forward lay in the development of "responsible" 
trade unionism. 101 But then came this caution: 
unions might do better for their membership if 
they developed their bargaining skill with due 
regard to the economic conditions of Fiji rather 
than those in Australia. 102 
This caveat is significant because it echoed the broad senti-
ment of the 1958 Industrial Disputes Ordinance, i.e., that 
worker demands should be considered in the light of their 
possible effect on the wider economy. Alternatively put, 
trade unions would "do better" not to demand Australasian 
wages because the domestic economy could not withstand them. 
The other important feature of the Burns Commission's 
recommendations on labour relations is, quite simply, that 
they came from a document which was to serve as the blueprint 
for the country's next development plan. This point will be 
developed more fully later, but coming as it did so soon 
after. the 1959 strike meant that the report served the very 
useful purpose of conferring upon the colonial state a 
certain legitimacy as far as its task of containing an 
increasingly assertive working class was concerned. And more 
in the way of this kind of external intervention was yet to 
come. 
In May 1960, the Deputy Labour Advisor to the Secret-
ary of State for the Colonies visited the country and gave 
his blessing to the recommendations of the Burns Commission.103 
He also recommended that an Industrial Relations Adviser be 
appointed, and in the following November one duly took 
office. 104 Well before then, however, other major develop-
ments had transpired in the industrial arena. 
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From the available evidence it appears that soon after 
the 1959 strike forces were at work to undermine worker 
unity. The first public sign of this occurred on 16 March 
when the Fiji Times reported that about a week earlier some 
members of the Fiji Municipal Workers' Union had broken away 
and formed the Municipal Native Workers' Union under the 
presidency of George Suguturaga. IOS Membership of the break-
away union was to be confined to Fijians, part-Fijians and 
Pacific Islanders. The president explained the whole devel-
opment thus: 
The reason for the breakaway ... is that after 
the disturbances at Suva last December, Fijian 
employees of the Suva City Council decided to 
form a union of their own, managed and control-
led solely by Fijians. I06 
It is significant that in the course of preparing for the 
breakaway, the organisers of the new union made represen-
tations to the Fijian Affairs Board, Ravuama Vunivalu, the 
District Officer, Suva, the Labour Department and the Regis-
trar of Industrial Associations. lo7 From this it is clear 
that both the colonial state and the chiefly class were at 
least aware of the whole affair and while there is no evi-
dence that they sanctioned the breakaway, they certainly did 
not condemn it, at least not in public. It was only much 
later, when pressure from the trade union movement began to 
intensify, that the colonial state began to re-think its 
position. lOS 
Barely a month after the public announcement of the 
breakaway union, the Building Workers' Union struck against 
the construction firm of Christiani-Neilsen & Gammon Limited 
at Lautoka when the company refused to recognise a union 
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official as a legitimate representative. It claimed that 
the representative already held an executive position in 
another union. That strike "gave birth to another breakaway 
union, the Fijian Docks Construction Union".I09 George 
Suguturagi, president of the earlier breakaway union, was 
involved in that development and, ironically, he was also 
president of the second breakaway union. IIO 
Furthermore, by March the most significant union 
split had occurred. Ratu Meli Gonewai, former president of 
the Wholesale and Retail Workers' Union and the man who had 
co-operated with Ratu Mara in concluding the interim agree-
ment during the oil-workers' strike, broke away and, with 
himself as president, formed the Fiji Oil Workers' Union. 
By this time concern within the trade union movement about 
the growing breakaway movement was mounting but the mavericks 
were quite willing to defend their actions and in the corres-
pondence column of the Fiji Times a war of words was waged. lll 
Positions hardened even more after the north-west branch of 
the Wholesale and Retail Workers' General Union seceded in 
the following April and joined Ratu Meli's union. 112 
By March 1960, then, secessionist tendencies had 
begun to undermine not only the trade union movement gener-
ally but also, and very significantly, the Wholesale and 
Retail Workers' General Union in particular. Three other 
developments of significance occurred in the following April. 
Early in that month the first local Commissioner of Labour 
was appointed, one John Arnputch, a Fiji-born, Catholic, 
Indian. His background is interesting. Beginning his career 
as an apprentice with the CSR in 1927, he subsequently joined 
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Morris Hedstrom Limited. Working his way up the firm, he 
acted as Vacuum Oil Company's representative in north-west 
Viti Levu and later became Morris Hedstrom's branch manager 
for Nadi and Tavua. He became a state functionary in 1944 
when he joined the Labour Department as a Labour Officer. In 
1952 he was seconded to the Labour Department in Trinidad for 
six months and in the following year he went to England to 
undertake the Colonial Office training course for labour 
officers. In the period up to his appointment as Commis-
sioner, he twice acted in that capacity. 113 with that kind 
of official grooming, on top of his managerial background in 
a large company, it could hardly be expected that his pos-
ition with respect to the workers would be very much more 
than a moderate one. The main elements of his position 
found clear expression in his first Annual Report l14 but 
clues about it were available well before then. 115 But we 
defer fuller discussion of this until later. 
The second major development during April was a 
meeting of about 300 people at Albert Park where B.D. Laks-
man, president of the Fiji Sugar Workers' Union, James 
Anthony and Mohammed Tora, assailed the formation of break-
away unions. Employers were accused of having "fostered and 
encouraged" the breakaways and workers were urged to refrain 
from becoming "tools of the employers". 116 The central 
message from the union leaders to the gathered workers was 
conveyed by Anthony: 
By joining breakaway unions you are only weak-
ening the bargaining strength of your union. 117 
The third development was the first public statement 
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of the colonial state's policy on breakaway unions. On the 
same day of the meeting at Albert Part, the three union 
leaders who addressed it, together with Brij Nand, secretary 
of the Posts and Telegraph and Hospital Employees' Unions, 
met the Governor, Sir Kenneth Maddocks, who was accompanied 
by the Colonial Secretary, P.D. MacDonald, and J. Amputch, 
the newly-appointed Commissioner of Labour. 
The single most important feature of the governor's 
statement after the meeting was the total absence of any 
condemnation of union splits. His whole purpose seemed to 
be to impress upon the union delegation that such splits 
could and would occur if union leaders did not behave "res-
ponsibly".118 Here was the most senior representative of 
the colonial state having an interface with those who had led 
the most significant strike in the country's history, a 
strike which the state has successfully sought to break. His 
whole attitude towards the delegation, therefore, could 
hardly have been different. Secessionism was clearly under-
mining the influence of the 1959 strike leaders and it seems 
that he was not about to put an end to it - not immediately, 
at least. 
Such, then, was the colonial state's attitude towards 
breakaway unions and it was not until August 1962 when, in 
the wake of mounting concern about assistance given by the 
Labour Department to the Public Works Department breakaway 
unions, that official policy changed: 
The formation of breakaway unions is, in prin-
ciple, undesirable because, in general, the 
setting up of breakaway unions can only weaken 
existing organisations and the trade union 
movement in general ••. 119 
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This change in state policy is important but did it 
mean that the colonial state had become rather more sympath-
etic towards trade unions than it had been previously? The 
argument advanced here is that the reason had less to do 
with increasWgstate sympathy than with the fact that the 
colonial state had by that time evolved an industrial relat-
ions policy through which labour could be contained. "Joint 
consultation" had by then established itself as the basis of 
state policy. Significantly, a period of two years had 
elapsed between the breakaway movement of the early sixties 
and the change in the state's attitude to union splits. In 
the intervening two-year period the state was able to consol-
idate its new approach. The architect of that approach was 
the first local Labour Commissioner, John Amputch. In order 
to throw some light on that development, it is necessary to 
return again to the breakaway movement of the early sixties. 
Events up to March 1960, as has been shown, had demon-
strated the colonial state's unwillingness to stem the tide 
of union secessions. Amputch had just taken office and he 
seems to have been inclined more towards following than 
taking the lead in dealing with union splits. That he had 
only recently taken office may well have been one reason for 
this but there was, I would argue, a much more important 
reason. 
During the May 1960 session of the Legislative 
Council, A. Deoki raised the whole matter of breakaway unions. 
Deoki, recall, had acted as legal adviser to the Wholesale 
and Retail Workers' General Union during the 1959 strike and, 
although he could hardly be labelled a radical, his speech to 
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the Council is instructive. He accused the colonial state 
of encouraging the union splits, and to that the Colonial 
secretary made this reply: 
The Government has made its position quite clear. 
It has issued a press release on this matter, 
and it has never stated in any context that I 
know of, that it encourages breakaway unions. 120 
To that Deoki in turn responded by referring to the approa-
ches made by the organisers of the Municipal Native Workers' 
Union to various government departments and he drew this 
conclusion: 
It would seem that this breakaway union was 
formed with the blessing of Government. 121 
He then went on to suggest that the colonial state was still 
pursuing the policy of "divide and rule" and alleged that it 
was "not assisting the worker but assisting big business". 122 
Deoki was of course rebuked for his "wild and mischiev-
ious allegations". Ratu Mara described his speech as "rather 
provocative" and a generally antagonistic posture was adopted 
by Ravuama Vunivalu and Semesa Sikivou. But the whole mathrr 
had been brought out into the open and Deoki's intervention 
is important in several respects. The first is that he 
recognised union splits for what they were - a weakening of 
the power of organised labour and a corresponding increase 
in the power of capital. Secondly, he pointed to state 
collusion, even if only in an indirect way, in the whole 
affair. But it is the third feature which, in the context 
of this discussion, is the most significant. Deoki's analy-
sis was that of an Indian, a Christian, a lawyer and a res-
pected member of the community. This was not a trade 
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union~st talking and even less a communist. Quite the con-
trary, here was a respectable and professional person speak-
ing in deference of the workers and the issue about which he 
was concerned was a development the prime purpose of which 
was not only to divide the trade union movement but more 
importantly to divide it along racial lines. 
It is difficult to imagine how Deoki's condemnation 
of the exclusion of Indians from breakaway unions could not 
have had any impact on the newly-appointed Commissioner of 
Labour who was himself, like Deoki, and Indian and a Chris-
tian. Could Amputch afford to be seen to associate himself 
with a development which, on the one hand, so openly dis-
criminated against workers of his own race but which, on the 
other, served the interests of capital very nicely? This, 
then, was the dilemma which Amputch appears to have been 
caught up in. To have espoused a view that might be inter-
preted as favouring one side would have left him open to 
attack from the other. Rather therefore than risking such 
an attack, the more sensible approach was to seek out a 
middle path and also to refrain frpm decisive action until 
conditions were more propitious. By June those conditions 
were beginning to emerge, for in that month the visiting 
Deputy Labour Adviser from London, Mr E. Parry was openly 
critical of union splits. In a speech to the British 
Council Youth Club and the Viti Club, he noted, very point-
edly, that he had seen more breakaway unions in Fiji than 
in any other palce but, more significantly, he also extolled 
the virtues of closer relations between labour and capital 
as a basis for sound industrial relations in the colony.123 
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It is of course highly probable that Arnputch may have 
already been thinking along those lines. The important 
point, however, is tha-t a senior functionary of the British 
imperialist state was publicly making a case for it and by 
doing so he effectively presented Arnputch with a possible 
solution to the dilemma with which he was confronted. If an 
institutional arrangement could be devised whereby the rep-
resentatives of capital and labour could be brought closer 
together, then perhaps the anti-Indian tendency that had 
recently resurfaced within the trade union movement could be 
contained, or at the very least blunted. Such an arrangement, 
moreover, would not pose any fundamental threat to the task 
of defending the inten~sts of capital, even though comprom-
ises might be necessary. 
This, then, was the most attractive option open to 
the Commissioner of Labour. To realise it, however, two 
conditions would have to be met: first, a demonstrable 
willingness on the part of both capital and labour not only 
to be party to such an arrangement but more importantly to 
make it worki and second, the existence of umbrella organ-
isations on each side from which representatives could be 
drawn. As for the first condition, the colonial state was 
now faced with the task of persuading capital and labour 
about the desirability of such a system and, as we shall see, 
that would take about two years to achieve. with respect to 
the second condition, the Fiji Trade Union Congress was 
already 1n existence but no equivalent organisation for 
capital had yet emerged, not, that is, until June 1960 when 
the Fiji Employers Consultative Association was formed. 
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Significantly, this occurred only six months after the 1959 
strike. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the birth 
of the FECA before considering later developments in the 
colonial state's labour policy. 
5. A MARSHALLING OF FORCES: CAPITAL UNITES 
Dubbed by the Labour Department as "the year of 
strikes", 124 1960 saw fourteen industrial stoppages. In 
total 4,692 workers were involved and 12,017 workdays were 
lost and as the table below shows the latter figure was not 
surpassed until 1971. 
Table 9.1 Strike Activity 1960 - 1971 
No. of Workers Workdays 
Year Strikes Involved Lost 
1960 14 4,692 12,017 
1961 8 1,319 4,711 
1962 not available 
1963 5 263 343 
1964 4 1,531 3,516 
1965 4 194 331 
1966 2 35 101 
1967 12 1,421 7,308 
1968 17 2,438 4,110 
1969 27 1,521 4,526 
1970 8 887 752 
1971 28 4,063 70,920 
Source: J. Reddy, Labour and Trade 
Unions in Fiji, p. 111. 
The intensification of working class pressure 
during 1960, it is reasonable to suppose, owed a great deal 
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to the oil-workers' strike the year before. The latter had 
demonstrated in dramatic fashion the kind of pressure which 
organised labour was capable of exerting, so it is not 
altogether surprising that workers subsequently displayed a 
much greater willingness to wage battle against capital. 
For its part, capital did not idly stand by. A close watch 
was kept on developments and the fact that about half of the 
strikes had occurred by the end of May is significant. 
Labour pressure, especially from the sugar-cane farmers, had 
by then showed little sign of letting up so the need for 
• 
capital to take appropriate defensive measures became ever 
more imperative. Furthermore, the opportune moment for 
decisive action had arrived: splits were reappearing among 
the farmer organisations and the unity of the trade union 
movement was now under serious threat. With organised 
labour now in relative disarray, the time was ripe for a 
marshalling of forces. Divided labour was about to witness 
the birth of a united capital, for on 14 June 1960 the FECA 
was formed. One Labour Officer has described the formation 
of the FECA in this way: 
leading employers ••• rightly realised the need 
to organise themselves against the might of the 
trade unions in Fiji. A year before Fiji had 
experienced the chaos and disorder caused by the 
1959 strike ... trade unions were on the rampage 
and the employers saw the need to organise them-
selves in order to present a collective and 
effective voice to the Government of the day. 125 
Capital had grouped together in defence of its interests,and 
against a labour movement which was plagued with division it 
stood united and confident. A list of the Association's 
foundation members is presented below and it is clear that 
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the association was dominated by foreign-owned companies, 
one of which, significantly, was Fiji Times and Herald 
Limited, publisher of the only national daily and owned by 
Australian capital. 
List 1 Foundation Members of the Fiji Employers 
Consultative Associations 
Fiji Times and Herald Limied 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited 
Emperor Gold Mining Company Limited 
W.R. Carpenter and Company Limited 
Burns Philp (South Seas) Company Limited 
Morris Hedstroms Limited 
Carlton Brewery (Fiji) Limited 
Millers Limited 
Qantas Airways Limited 
Carreras Limited 
Union Soaps Pty. Limited 
The Pacific Biscuit Company 
Suva Motors Limited 
Island Industries Limited 
Pacific Shipowners Limited 
Fiji Airways Limited 
Fiji Pastoral Company Limited 
Fiji Tobacco Company Limited 
G.B. Hari and Company Limited 
Joong Hing Loong Company Limited 
Roadbuilder Limited 
Source: Kuruduadua, The Fiji Employers 
Consultative Association, p. 15. 
The formation of the FECA was a major development in 
bourgeois organisation. The ideology of "joint consultation" 
was another, and in the task of propagating it, the colonial 
state took the initiative. In October 1960, the Commissioner 
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of Labour, in an address to the Suva Rotary Club, proclaimed: 
"Joint consultation between management and staff is essential 
in industry". 126 And then followed this illuminating state-
ment: 
In all fields of life, it is necessary for 
people to understand each other. This applies 
to racial well-being as well as to industry. 127 
Understanding and co-operation, the commissioner was clearly 
intimating, was necessary for both racial and industrial 
harmony, but he also realised that industrial relations in 
the country was suffering from racial disharmony within the 
trade union movement particularly. There were, after all, 
only "some very responsible trade union leaders in Fiji". 128 
Not only, therefore, was the commissioner trying to sell a 
new approach to industrial relations, he also sought to heal 
the racial rifts which had plagued the trade union movement, 
rifts which involved discrimination against workers of his 
race. As for the recently-formed FECA, he .welcomed it as a 
development which would help in the growth of good industrial 
relations in Fiji. 129 
With the ideology of joint consultation now broached 
with the public, capital moved to reinforce it. In December, 
J. Grundy, director of the FECA, informed the Suva Rotary 
Club of capital's obligations: 
Failure of the employers to form and join 
employers associations, particularly in a 
territory such as Fiji where there is a devel-
oping political consciousness, is obstructive 
and selfish. If they do not do so the Govern-
ment is hindered in the framing of its labour 
legislation, industrial relations are impaired, 
and in the long run a state of imbalance will 
be created. This would be detrimental not 
only to the employers, but to the workers and 
the general economy of the country. 130 
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In the years ahead capital and the state would strive to make 
joint consultation a reality. Attempts would be made to draw 
organised labour into an institutional arrangement where it 
could be more effectively controlled. The 1970s, moreover, 
as will be shown in Chapter X, would see an intensification 
of class tensions, thus heightening the need for even tighter 
control. In 1973, therefore, the highly repressive Trade 
Disputes Act was passed and in 1978 the Tripartite Forum was 
formed - two more forms of bourgeois organisation to contain 
class contradictions. But that will be taken up in Chapter 
XI. 
6. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined in some detail the crises of 
1959 and 1960, crises which were the product of the post-war 
struggle. In the post-war balance of class forces, local 
white capital's position was rather less secure than it had 
previously been. It therefore orchestrated a process of 
restructuring which by the end of the 1950s had firmly laid 
the foundations of a neocolonial economy. The hallmark of 
the new economic structure was to be a large tourist indus-
try which local white capital had hoped to dominate. When, 
therefore, the oil workers struck in 1959, the neocolonial 
design was threatened. Capitalist intransigence forced 
organised labour into taking strike action, and the bourgeois 
state provoked the strikers into greater militancy. The 
stage was then set for highly repressive state action. Sim-
ilar action was taken against striking cane farmers in the 
following year. Sugar capital's profits (or the "very 
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lifeblood" of the economy, as the ruling class would say), 
after all, had to be protected. 
If bourgeois plans for neocolonial Fiji were to be 
realised, then organised labour would have to be controlled. 
The strikes of '59 and '60 threatened those plans, so labour 
had to be taught a lesson. Never before had the country 
witnessed conflicts like those of 1959 and 1960, and it has 
not since. Organised labour would of course continue to 
struggle, but the state would ensure that the crises of 59/60 
would not be repeated. In Chapter XI, I show in a general 
way how it set about that task, but first the structure and 
contradictions of the neocolonial economy will be exanlined. 
PART THREE 
NEOCOLONIALISM IN FIJI 1960 - 1980 
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CHAPTER X 
STRUCTURE AND CONTRADICTION IN THE NEOCOLONIAL ECONOMY 
The culmination of the process of restructuring which 
began in the immediate post-war years was the emergence of 
the neocolonial economy in the early 1960s and the single 
most important feature of the new order was the growth of 
the tourist industry. Capital1s successful attempt first in 
the late 40s at persuading the colonial state to divert res-
ources towards infrastructural development, and later in the 
following decade at securing appropriate fiscal incentives, 
opened the way for the dramatic growth in tourism. But the 
fifties also witnessed the increasing assertiveness of organ-
ised labour, so that when the colonial economy was jolted by 
the crises of 159 and 160, the resulting instability proved 
to be a problem for those who sought to entice overseas 
capital to hasten the development of the emergent tourist 
industry. The tourist boom was therefore delayed until the 
middle of the 1960s but by then the structure of the neo-
colonial economy was already well established. The beginning 
of the neocolonial period, therefore, dates back to about 
1960 and not 1970 as many maintain. The regaining of polit-
ical independence in the latter year did of course have 
significant consequences for the neocolonial economy but it 
did not significantly alter its basic structure. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the struc-
ture and underlying contradictions of neocolonial capitalism 
in Fiji. With that done, the way will be clear for an 
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examination in the next chapter of the role of the state in 
the dynamics of class relations in the first twenty years of 
neocolonialism. Four major structural characteristics lie 
behind Fiji's development path over those two decades: 
first, the dramatic change in 1974 when, in the aftermath of 
domestic and international capitalist crises in the preced-
ing year, the country plunged into an economic recession 
which lasted until the end of the decade; second, the 
country's increasing external dependence; third, the contin-
uing high level of foreign control in the domestic economy; 
u 
and f9fth, the growth of the tourist industry. After each 
of these have been examined, attention will turn to changes 
in the employment structure. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the class structure and the high degree to which 
class and racial cleavages coincide. 
1. GROWTH, CRISIS AND RECESSION 
Benefitting largely from the worldwide capitalist 
boom, Fiji enjoyed a period of relative prosperity in the 
1960s. In 1963, for example, Gross Domestic Produce (GDP) 
stood at $93.9 million, having increased by 4.1% since the 
previous year. with the provision of additional fiscal 
incentives under the 1964 Hotels Aid Ordinance, the stage 
was set for the advent of the impending tourist boom. And 
when it set in, the level of economic activity increased in 
leaps and bounds so that by 1973 the country's GDP, standing 
at $191.6 million, was more than double the figure only ten 
years earlier. See Table 10.1 
Table 10.1 Gross Domestic Produce 1962 - 1982 
Year 
At Current Prices 
1963 
1967 
1969 
At Constant 1968 Prices 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
At Constant 1977 Prices 
1978 
1979 
1980 
$ Million 
93.9 
117.3 
140.5 
170.0 
191.6 
196.6 
196.8 
202.1 
616.6 
690.9 
679.3 
Annual Growth 
Rate (%) 
4.1 
7.8 
8.4 
7.9 
12.7 
2.6 
0.1 
2.7 
1.8 
12.0 
- 1. 7 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, Bureau of 
Statistics, Suva, January 1984, p. 6. 
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The high growth rates of the sixties were not, how-
ever, to continue very far into the following decade. By 
1973 the contradictions of capitalism had intensified greatly, 
and at the international level ,the most dramatic expression 
of those contradictions was the oil crisis. Even before 
then, however, the tendency towards crisis in Fiji was 
already clearly evident and a major indicator was that tend-
ency was the increasing level of inflation. 
A sudden price hike in 1964/65 caused widespread 
alarm and the colonial state commissioned R.A. Turner to 
investigate the problem. The main recommendations of the 
Turner Report was that a prices and incomes policy should be 
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formulated and implemented. l Believing, however, that the 
1966 fall in prices was a sign that the upward trend might 
have stopped, the state did not act on Turner's recommen-
ation. 2 But the inflationary spiral soon picked up again. 
In 1967 the consumer price index rose by 1.4%, the following 
year it rose by 3.8%, and in 1970, the increase was 4.1%.3 
Realising that without intervention the trend would not be 
arrested, the state introduced price controls over a limited 
range of goods in April 1971. 
That, however, soon provoked stinging attacks from 
capital. Through its representatives in the Chambers of 
Commerce, the state's action was subject to severe criticism~ 
and, not surprisingly, the price curbs were eased in the 
middle of the following June. But that in turn forced 
prices up even further. By the end of the year the consumer 
price index had risen by 6.5% and in the following year it 
rose by another 9.1%.5 Class tensions mounted and the sit-
uation became progressively worse, and in April 1973 the 
state reacted by passing the Counter-Inflation Act and the 
highly repressive Trade Disputes Act. with that, the stage 
was set for a series of bitter struggles as capital and 
labour sought to defend their respective interests. The 
crisis of '73 was underway and as it intensified, the coun-
try was pushed further and further towards an economic rec-
ession. And the oil crisis in October of that year provided 
the extra jolt which pushed the economy over the edge. 
By 1974, then, Fiji, like the rest of the capitalist 
world, was firmly gripped by a deep economic crisis. In 
that year, the country's GDP increased by a mere $5 million 
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and in the year after by a paltry $0.2 million. Thereafter 
it increased only marginally and it was not until 1979 that 
the annual growth rate reached its former peak of 12%. That, 
however, was only a temporary hiccup, for in the following 
year the level of economic activity actually fell; GDP fell 
by 1.7% since the previous year. 
During the first twenty years of neocolonialism, then, 
the general economic trend was one of growth in the sixties, 
crisis in the early seventies, and followed thereafter by a 
prolonged recession. But being a small, externally-oriented 
economy, it is only to be expected that the country's devel-
opmental trajectory would be determined to a large extent by 
external forces. And it is to the question of Fiji's 
increasing external dependence that we now turn. 
2. INCREASING EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE 
Fiji's external trade balances for the period under 
review are shown in the table below. 
with the exception of 1963, the country incurred a 
trade deficit which increased yearly and, very significantly, 
the deficit increased five-fold in 1965, just when the tour-
ist industry began its rapid growth. From that point on, 
the upward trend continued. In 1973, the year of crisis, 
the deficit grew to $115 million and by the end of the 
decade it had increased by another 50%. 
In addition to the growing trade deficit, the changing 
character of Fiji's external dependence took on a new 
geographical character. Whereas, for example, Britain 
Table 10.2 Balance of Trade 1960 - 1980 
($ Million) 
1960 - 1.77 
1962 - 3.28 
1963 + 3.92 
1964 - 3.02 
1965 - 15.66 
1968 - 19.28 
1970 - 28.19 
1971 - 49.84 
1973 - 100.22 
1976 - 115.52 
1978 - 133.50 
1980 - 153.19 
Source: Overseas Trade Fiji 1981, 
p.p. 35/82, p. 11. 
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accounted for 43.2% of Fiji's exports in 1962 (see Table 10.31 
by 1980 its share had dropped by over one half to 20.2%. 
Despite the fall, however, Britain remained the major buyer 
of Fiji's exports in 1980, largely because of sugar agree-
ments between the two countries. As for the other export 
' .. 
':-L 
destinations, both Australia and canadf became progressively v 
less important over the twenty-year period, the former's 
share having fallen from 11.9% in 1961 to 6.8% in 1980, and 
the latters' from 12.9% to 6.8%. New Zealand's relative 
importance as an export market remained fairly constant, 
fluctuating between 6% and 10%. 
With the decreasing importance of these traditional 
markets, attempts were made to find new ones, and of those 
the most important were Japan and the United States. Japan's 
share of Fiji's exports increased three-fold from 3.4% to 
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10.3% while the United States's share increased from a mere 
0.7% to 10.1%. 
Table 10.3 Direction of Trade: Exports (f.o.b. ) 
Year Total U.K. Australia N. Z. Japan U.S.A. Canada Others 
$ Million % % % % % % % 
1961 26.3 43.2 11.9 9.8 3.4 0.7 12.9 18.1 
1965 42.5 41. 5 9.7 6.3 2.6 12.1 8.7 19.1 
1970 62.3 31.4 8.8 7.1 4.2 15.7 11.6 21.2 
1975 142.3 55.9 9.2 8.3 0.3 1.9 0.4 24.0 
1980 305.6 20.2 6.8 10.2 10.3 10.1 6.8 35.6 
Sources: Trade Report 1971, p. iv, Trade Report 1980, p. iv. 
The changes in the direction of exports is indicative 
of the loosening of Fiji's colonial ties with Britain and 
the emergence of a neocolonial order in which Australian 
capital reinforced its economic dominance in Fiji. Having, 
on the one hand, become less and less important as an export 
market, on the other hand, Australia became Fiji's main 
source of imports. Its share of Fiji's total imports had 
always been high - in 1961, for example, the figure stood at 
26.9% (see Table 10.4 below) - but by 1980 it had firmly 
established itself as the top ranking supplier. Its share 
in that year was slightly over 30%, more than double that of 
any other country. For its part, Britain's importance as a 
supplier decreased greatly, its share having fallen four-
fold from 28% to 7%. New Zealand's share almost doubled 
while that of the United States increased from 2.8% to 6.5%. 
But it is the emergence of Asian countries as important 
suppliers which stands out as a significant, but hardly 
339 
surprising, development. Japan's share of Fiji's imports 
doubled from 7% to 14%, while Malaysia and Singapore's com-
bined share increased from a mere 1.7% to slightly over 11%. 
This shift in direction towards Asia is in large part the 
consequence of that region's ability to supply cheap goods. 
That ability, in turn, is largely the result of Japanese 
capital's technological prowess and its exploitation of 
cheap and abundant labour in the other countries of that 
region. 
Table 10.4 Direction of Trade: Imports (c.i.f.) 
Malaysia 
Year Total U.K. Australia N.Z. Japan U.S.A. and Others 
Singapore 
$ Million % % % % % % % 
1961 34.5 28.2 26.9 7.6 7.7 2.8 1.7 25.1 
1965 58.2 22.7 28.5 7.8 12.4 3.8 2.1 22.7 
1970 90~S 17.3 23.7 12.0 15.1 4.4 4.1 23.4 
1975 220.9 13.4 28.8 12.1 15.7 4.0 8.6 17.3 
1980 485.8 7.3 30.6 14.7 14.2 6.5 11.2 15.3 
Sources: Trade Report 1971, p. iii, Trade Report 1980, p. iii. 
Another dimension of the changing character of Fiji's 
external dependence is indicated by changes in the compos-
ition of its imports, and here three broad trends can be 
identified. The first is the increasing dependence on im-
ported fuel. In the period between 1962 and 1980, the 
country's fuel bill doubled and its proportion of total 
import costs leapt from 12.9% to 23%. See Table 10.5 below. 
The second important change is the increased importation of 
machinery and transport equipment. Although these items 
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have always accounted for a sizeable proportion of total 
imports, their share has actually increased. From 20.2% in 
1962, it rose to 22.6% in 1980. In contrast to these 
increases, and this is the third major change, manufactured 
goods and food items decreased in relative. importance. In 
1962, manufactured goods accounted for 22.4% of total imports 
but by 1980 that figure had fallen to 18.7%. The corres-
ponding decrease for food items was from 20.9% to 14.2%. 
Table 10.5 Composition of Imports ( % ) 
1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Food 20.9% 21.0% 18.7% 17.4% 14.2% 
Beverages and Tobacco 2.6 2-.3 1.9 1.4 0.8 
Crude Materials 1.9 2.3 1.4 0.9 0.7 
Fuels, Lubricants etc. 12.9 9.8 11. 0 17.4 23.0 
Animal and Vegetable Oil 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.1 
Chemicals 7.4 7.9 6.5 7.5 6.7 
Manufactured Goods 22.4 21.1 19.5 17.9 18.7 
Manchinery and Transport 20.2 22.4 20.8 20.2 22.6 Equipment 
Miscellaneous Manufacturers 8.9 10.5 15.0 12.9 8.8 
Others 1.5 1.2 3.7 2.8 3.6 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sources: Trade Report 1971, p. vi, Trade Report 1980, p. xi. 
The changes in the composition of imports reflect 
the structural changes which occurred in the neocolonial 
economy. The growth of the tourist industry occasioned a 
large increase in building and construction and that, toge-
ther with the increase in the level of industrialisation, in 
large part accounted for the increase in fuel consumption. 
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The fall in the importation of food items reflects the 
increase ln local food production and the state's (failed) 
attempts to make Fiji self-sufficient in food. More will be 
said later on about internal economic changes but the central 
point to note at this juncture is how external depen-
dence was aggravated by the structural orientation of the 
neocolonial economy. Worsening trade deficits and the 
increasing dependence on Australia, New Zealand, the united 
States and Japan provide clear evidence of that. But it is 
not only in the area of commodity trade that Fiji's increas-
ing external dependence is evident. It is also obvious in 
the area of foreign borrowing. 
The country's external debt from 1973 to 1978 is 
shown in Table 10.6 below. Between 1973 and 1977, Fiji's 
external debtinc~eA5ed from $128.7 million to $152.5 million, 
and a mere three years later, it doubled) ~ reaching 
a staggering $303.6 million. Unfortunately, external debt 
figures for the period up to 1973 are not available, but 
that most external borrowing during that period was under-
taken by the private sector is suggested by the trend shown 
in Table 10.6 below. Private sector borrowing accounted for 
most of the total up until 1975 and it was not until 1977 
that its proportion was significantly less than that of the 
public sector. 
The level of state borrowing increased vastly towards 
the latter part of the decade, increasing from $143.7 
million in 1978 to nearly $240 million in 1980. Much of the 
state's external loans were devoted to infra structural 
development,6 but a significant proportion also went to 
Table 10.6 External Debt 1973 - 1978 ($ Million) 
Private Sector 
Public Sector 
Total 
1973 
77.7 
51. 0 
128.7 
1974 
82.2 
55.5· 
137.7 
1975 
65.8 
66.1 
131.9 
1976 
81.5 
81. 2 
162.7 
1977 
58.6 
93.9 
152.5 
1978 
57.7 
143.7 
201.4 
Sources: Central Monetary Authority Quarterly Review (Dec 1977), p. 12; 
(Dec 1979), p. 40; and (Sept 1983), p. 120. 
Table 10.7 
Private Debt 
Public Debt 
Total 
External Debt Service 1974 - 1978 ($ Million) 
1974 
5.2 
2.8 
8.0 
1975 
9.0 
7.3 
16.3 
1976 
12.1 
5.0 
17.1 
1977 
13.4 
6.7 
20.1 
1978 
15.2 
14.2 
29.4 
1979 
8.1 
10.9 
19.0 
1979 
59.5 
183.8 
243.3 
Sources: Central Monetary Authority Quarterly Review (Dec 1979), p. 45; 
and (Sept 1983), p. 121. 
1980 
10.5 
25.6 
36.1 
1980 
64.3 
239.3 
303.6 
w 
,j:>. 
~ 
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productive projects, the most significant of which was the 
development of the Seaqaqa sugar plantation in Vanua Levu. 
The question of state borrowing will be taken up 
again later when the origins of the loans are examined. The 
central issue at this point is that private sector loans 
dominated the country's external borrowing for the greater 
part of the neocolonial period and the financial burden 
which that imposed on the national economy is shown in Table 
10.7 above. As late as 1978, the greater proportion of the 
country's external debt service payments were made by the 
private sector, and it was not until 1979, when more and 
more state loans began to mature, that public sector debt 
servicing accounted for most of the total. 
Significantly, most of the external borrowing under-
taken by the private sector was concentrated in precisely 
those sectors where foreign capital was most heavily concen-
trated. Private borrowers in the tourist sector accounted 
for about one half of the total between 1976 and 1978 while 
those in commerce increased their share from 14.9% to 17.8% 
over the same period. The largest increase, however, was 
achieved by those in transport and communication - an 
increase from 5.4% to 13.7%. See Table 10.8 below. 
The stress imposed on the economy by external borrow-
ing is suggested by the figures in Table 10.9 below. As a 
proportion of exports, Fiji's external debt rose from 59.4% 
in 1974 to 64.4% in 1978, and as a proportion of the 
country's international reserves, it increased from 175% to 
183%. Quite clearly, then, Fiji's international liquidity 
got progressively worse during the neocolonial period and 
Table 10.8 sectoral Composition of Private Sector 
External Debt 1976 - 1978 
$ Million 
1976 1977 1978 1976 
Tourism 50.4 31.0 26.6 62.1 
Commerce 12.1 13 .4 10.0 14.9 
Transport and 4.4 3.9 7.7 5.4 Communication 
Manufacturing 4.3 3.8 3.8 5.3 
Real Estate and Land 6.4 2.6 2.2 7.9 Development 
Agriculture, Forestry, 0.0 2.2 3.6 0.0 Fishing 
Finance and Insurance 1.6 0.2 1.2 2.0 
Mining and Quarrying 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.6 
Other 1.5 0.2 0.7 1.8 
Total 81.2 57.3 56.1 100.0 
Sources: Central Monetary Authority Quarterly Review, 
(Dec 1977), p. 16,. and (Dec 1979), p. 41. 
Table 10.9 Selected Indicators of External Debt 
Burden 1975 - 1978 
As % of 1974 1975 1976 1977 
GDP 34.4 26.2 29.2 24.0 
Exports 59.4 51.8 68.4 51.1 
International 175.1 Reserves 102.2 147.4 
119.0 
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% 
1977 1978 
54.1 47.4 
23.4 17.8 
6.8 13.7 
6.6 6.8 
4.5 3.9 
3.8 6.4 
0.4 2.1 
0.0 0.6 
0.4 1.3 
100.0 100.0 
1978 
29.3 
64.4 
183.3 
Sources: Central Monetary Authority of Fiji Quarterly 
Review (Dec 1977), p. 27, and (Dec 1979), p. 46. 
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that trend, at least up until the mid-70s, was due more to 
private than state borrowing. 
Another feature of Fiji's external indebtedness is 
significant. If the currency in which loans were denominated 
is taken as an indicator of source, then it is clear that 
Fiji has become increasingly indebted to United states cap-
ital. In 1973, for example, American lenders accounted for 
only 28.5% of the private sector's external debt. By 1978, 
however, that figure had leapt to 63.2%. Not surprisingly, 
the trend with respect to British sources was quite the 
opposite. Lending from those sources to private borrowers 
fell from 56.9% of the total in 1973 to 13.9% five years 
later. See Table 10.10. 
Table 10.10 Currency Composition of Private Sector 
External Deht 1973 - 1978 ( % ) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
US $ 28.5 44.0 62.6 75.4 68.7 
UK £ 56.9 47.5 21.0 11.8 14.8 
A $ 10.1 5.4 11. 9 9. 7 10.6 
NZ $ 4.4 2.6 4.4 2.4 4.3 
Others 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.7 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Central Monetary Authority Quarterly Review 
(Dec 1979), p. 42. 
1978 
63.2 
13.9 
13.7 
4.8 
4.4 
100.0 
The trend in state borrowing is similar. As a pro-
portion of total public sector borrowing, loans denominated 
in US dollars increased from 36.5% to 53% between 1973 and 
1980, while loans in sterling decreased from 30.3% to 24.5% 
over the same period. See Table 10.11 below. 
Table 10.11 Currency Composition of Public Sector 
External Debt 1973 - 1980 ( % ) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
US $ 36.5 35.9 35.0 48.3 52.8 53.4 50.8 
UK £ 30.3 30.4 38.5 27.6 26.8 25.1 31.4 
A $ 33.2 32.4 25.6 20.7 17.1 10.0 14.5 
NZ $ 0.0 1.3 0.9 2.6 2.3 1.4 0.4 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 10.1 2.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Central Monetary Authority Quarterly Review (Dec 1979), 
p. 43, and (Sept 1983), p. 126. 
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1980 
53.0 
24.5 
12.9 
0.2 
9.4 
100.0 
Official sources point out that the loans denominated 
in US dollars include those from multilateral agencies such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but 
these organisations are dominated by the united States. The 
increasing ties between Fiji and the United States are there-
fore unmistakeable and the significance of those ties lies 
partly in the fact that they reinforce the increasingly 
common view that American interest in Fiji has grown consid-
erably. Arguably, that is due in part to Fiji's strong pro-
West bias and, relatedly, to the special place which Fiji 
occupies in the geopolitics of the South Pacific. 
In sum, then, several important trends about external 
dependency in neocolonial Fiji can be identified. Trade 
deficits have continued to rise, external indebtedness has 
worsened, Britain has given way to Australia as the major 
347 
economic power in Fiji, Asian influence has increased signif-
icantly, and there is evidence of growing American interest. 
In order to underline the extent of this dependence, the 
analysis now turns to the question of private foreign 
investment. 
3. FOREIGN CONTROL 
The impact of private foreign investment in Fiji is 
suggested by the fact that in the decade up to 1980, almost 
$120 million left the country in the form of investment 
income. See the table below. 
Table 10.12 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Private Capital Inflow and Private Investment 
Income Outflow 1971 - 1980 ($ Million) 
Investment 
Income Outflow Capital Inflow 
1l.5 10.8 
11.1 22.0 
7.1 20.9 
8.2 31. 9 
10.5 12.6 
11. 7 5.0 
8.0 8.0 
9.8 10.0 
16.4 9.5 
25.2 14.6 
119.8 145.3 
Sources: Review of Fiji's Seventh Development Plan 1976-8, 
Central Planning Office, Suva, October 1979, p. 79; 
Current Economic statistics January 1981, p. 49; 
Central Monetary Authority Quarterly Review, 
September 1982, p. 116. 
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As Table 10.12 also shows, after reaching a peak in 1973, 
private capital inflow quickly dropped off. Presently, the 
implications of that fall in terms of the level of foreign 
control will be considered. First, however, further evid-
ence of historical trends in foreign involvement will be 
given. 
Between 1956 and 1981, the number of foreign companies 
registered in Fiji increased from a mere 64 to 286. Again 
reflecting the neocolonial order described above, British 
companies accounted for a decreasing proportion of the total, 
falling from 39% to 14%, while Australian companies increased 
their share of the total from 34% to 43%. See Table 10.13 
below. The number of New Zealand companies also increased, 
and so too that of American ones, but they are included in 
the 'Other Countries' category. 
Table 10.13 Foreign Companies Registered in Fiji 
Incorporated in: 
U.K. Australia Other Countries Total 
Year No. % No. % No. % No. 
1956 25 39.0 22 34.4 17 26.6 64 
1961 27 35.1 28 36.4 22 28.6 77 
1966 30 30.3 37 37.4 32 32.3 99 
1971 38 23.0 67 40.6 60 36.4 165 
1976 40 16.6 104 43.2 97 40.2 241 
1981 40 14.0 123 43.0 123 43.0 286 
Sources: Statistical Summary, Government Statistician, 1962, 
Table 17; and M.J. Taylor, Foreign Capital in the 
Fiji Economy, 1983, Table 2. 
349 
The figures given in Table 10.13 refer, however, only 
to companies whose foreign ownership could be determined 
directly by their registration. They do not include compan-
ies in which foreign equity was held indirectly, and one 
recent study which identifies such companies is that conduc-
ted by Carstairs and Prasad of the Centre for Applied Studies 
in Development at the University of the South Pacific. For 
more than any other reason, the study is important because it 
is the only work which claims that the level of foreign 
control in Fiji has decreased. For that reason alone, a 
close scrutiny of the study is necessary. 
Taking into account affiliates, associates and 
branches of foreign companies, the study identified 736 
companies in Fiji in 1979 as having foreign equity. Of 
those, 660 were more than 50% foreign-owned, 45 had between 
2.0% and 50% foreign ownership, and the remaing 31 had less 
than 20% foreign equity. As Table 10.14 below shows, Austra-
lian companies were the most numerous (247), followed by 
New Zealand (136), American (61) and British companies (48). 
As a measure of their influence in the economy, 
foreign companies generated 54.1% of total company turnover, 
and 54.3% of company GDP at factor cost, in 1980. 7 They also 
accounted for 65.3% of company tax assessments, 18.3% of the 
total workforce, and 19.6% of wages, salaries and supple-
ments. s Their impact on the various economic sectors, 
however, was uneven. Taking just those companies which were 
more than 50% foreign-owned (these represented about 90% of 
the total), it is evident from Table 10.15 below that they 
were well represented in all the major economic sectors 
Table 10.14 Country of Origin of Foreign Companies, 
1979 - Degree of Foreign Ownership 
Less Than 
50% 20% - 50% 20% Total 
Australia 247 10 2 259 
New Zealand 136 18 8 162 
U.S.A. 61 61 
U.K. 48 2 2 52 
Japan 10 1 1 12 
Joint Foreign 48 8 3 59 Participation 
Other Countries 98 6 15 119 
Not Detailed 12 12 
Total 660 45 31 736 
Source: R.T. Carstairs and R.D. Prasad, Impact of 
Foreign Direct Private Investment on the Fiji 
Economy, p. 11. 
350 
except for agriculture. More importantly, their dominance 
in several sectors was very substantial: their share of 
total company turnover in electricity, gas and water supply 
was 100%; in the mining sector it was 99.6%; almost 75% in 
tourism; 63% in the wholesale and retail trade; and 90% in 
the financial sector. Their shares in the manufacturing and 
transport and communications sectors, although somewhat 
smaller - 30% and 42% respectively - were nontheless signif-
icant. It is quite clear, therefore,that foreign private 
capital exerted a great deal of control over most of the key 
economic sectors. 
The central thrust of Car stairs and Prasad's argu-
ment is that despite the high degree of foreign control, 
"during the 1970s ... that control has slipped noticeably in 
Table 10.15 Sectoral Domination of Foreign Companies, 1980 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manuracturing 
Electricity, Gas and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and Retail 
Hotels, etc. 
Transport, Communications and Storage 
Financial Institutions 
Real Estate and Business Services 
Community, Social and Personal Services 
Not Classified 
Total 
Location 
No. ,% 
7 
38 
61 
5 
44 
138 
106 
179 
8 
74 
660 
1.0 
5.8 
9.2 
1.0 
6.6 
20.9 
16.0 
27.1 
1.2 
11. 2 
100.0% 
TUrnover 
% Share of 
Total Company 
Turnover in 
$ Million this Sector 
1.1 15.0 
11. 0 99.6 
81. 0 30.3 
3.7 100.0 
3.0 16.6 
(249.2 (63.4 
( 22.6 (74.5 
27.9 42.5 
(49.3 (90.4 
( 4.2 (22.0 
1.8 27.4 
13.2 86.5 
468.0 
Source: Carstairs and Prasad, Impact of Foreign Direct Private Investment •.. , 
pp. 17, 18. 
w 
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contradiction to some earlier findings". 9 In his preface to 
the book, Benjamin Higgins welcomed the work as "an object-
ive, well documented, and balanced case study" whose find-
ings challenge some of the "sweeping generalisations" which 
he associates with "the currently popular 'dependency 
theory', Radical Political Economy and neo-Marxism in 
general". 10 Higgins's assessment clearly exposes his own 
position, so it is not surprising that he failed to detect 
the obvious and fundamental flaws in his colleagues'analysis. 
The case which Carstairs and Prasad make-for the 
decline in the level of foreign control rests essentially on 
three arguments. The first is that foreign companies' share 
of total company turnover fell from 80% in 1970 to 54.1% in 
1980. 11 Unfortunately, however, the authors do not provide 
figures for the intervening years of the decade to subs tan-
tiate the general historical decline which they claim. But 
even that aside, the fact remains the figure of 54.1% is in 
fact a high one. Their second argument is that 
there are signs that 'local' companies have 
gained control in construction, manufacturing 
and transport - three areas heavily dominated 
by 'foreign' companies at the commencement of 
the decade. 12 
In support of this they provide figures which show that 
"local" companies' share of company turnover in the three 
sectors which they identify were 71.6%, 68% and 54% respec-
tively.13 Two objections, however, can be raised here. In 
the first place, included in their "local companies ll category 
are "foreign companies with less than 2D% foreign equity" and 
their inclusion is justified on the grounds that they are 
"normally regarded as falling outside the ambit of foreign 
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direct investment". 14 Precisely by whom such companies are 
so regarded, and on which specific grounds they can, legit-
imately, be so regarded, they do not say. In any case, level 
of direct investment is not, by itself, an adequate indicator 
of degree of control. It is obvious, therefore, that the 
authors have twisted their definition to suit their ends, and 
their ability to do that stems from their manifest failure to 
make, and maintain, a distinction between legal and real econ-
omic ownership. And that distinctions is crucial. As Taylor 
put it, "equity holding is a very inadequate measure of for-
eign participation in an economy", IS which means that" foreign 
control can be exercised even in circumstances of zero equity 
holdings".16 If, therefore, the less-than-20% foreign owned 
companies which Carstairs and Prasad include in their "local 
companies" category are excluded, then their claim about the 
increasing level of local control does not bear up to scrut-
iny. After making the necessary adjustments, local companies' 
share of total company turnover in manufacturing falls dram-
atically from the figure of 68% which the authors claim to a 
mere 14.4%, and for the transport and communication sector, 
the drop is from 54% to 22.2%. Quite clearly, then, by 
adopting a very loose and questionable definition of 'local 
companies', Carstairs and Prasad have presented a highly 
exaggerated account of the level of local control. 
But there is a further objection which can be raised. 
Even if the case which the authors make is accepted, there is 
no indication of the degree of concentration. And it is a 
fact that degree of control is largely a function of capital 
concentration. other things being equal, the higher the 
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concentration the greater the share of the market. To 
illustrate, and using the authors' data, in the manufacturing 
sector, merely 69 foreign-owned companies accounted for 30% 
of total company turnover. Local companies, according to 
the authors' classification, on the other hand, accounted 
for 68%. Just how many such companies there were, however, 
they do not say. According to official sources, in 1980, 
there were 2,605 companies registered as being headquartered 
in Fiji.17 In that year, also, the manufacturing sector 
accounted for 12% of GDP. Assuming that the first was the 
actual number of local companies, and that the second figure 
is a reasonable indicator of the proportion of local compan-
ies engaged in manufacturing, then the actual number of such 
companies would be about 300. The situation, then, is that 
69 foreign companies control roughly one third of the market 
while more than four times as many local companies control 
the remaining two-thirds. Proportionately, therefore, 
foreign control of the market was much greater than local 
control, and it is reasonable to suppose that a major con-
tributing factor was the higher degree of capital concen-
tration among foreign companies. Clearly, then, with cap-
ital concentration com~s greater control, and in the case of 
Fiji such concentration is higher among foreign-owned rather 
than local companies. But that point, Carstairs and Prasad 
miss altogether. 
The third argument which they advance in support of 
the claim that the level of foreign control in Fiji has 
declined is that the level of private capital inflow had 
fallen. Carstairs and his colleague, however, do not offer 
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any explanation for this, but clearly the world-wide economic 
recession was a major factor and so too the lack of suffic-
iently attractive investment opportunities in Fiji. But in 
any case, the decreasing level of capital inflow is not in 
itself evidence of declining foreign control. What is more, 
the authors themselves point out that the impact of the fall 
in capital inflow "has been considerably dampened by the 
continued high reliance on undistributed profits as a source 
of funds". 18 . Significantly I however, they do not work 
through the implications of that finding for their central 
argument. And the point is this: with the marked decline in 
economic growth in the latter half of the 1970s, those com-
panies which were able to reinvest a lot of profits were much 
better placed to withstand the effects of the recession. And 
to the extent that foreign companies were able to do precis-
ely that, they were able to reinforce their position of dom-
inance in the economy. The point that Carstairs and Prasad 
have missed altogether, then,is that profit reinvestment is 
concentration of capital, an important means by which to 
entrench one's position. All this can be demonstrated by 
the activities of Australian capital in Fiji. 
Carstairs and Prasad describe Australian companies as 
"the most important and the most mature" of all the companies 
in Fiji. 19 That 'maturity' is demonstrated by their invest-
ment behaviour, for as can be seen in the table below, in 
times of recession, greater reliance is placed in reinvesting 
internally-generated funds. with the exceptions of 1975 and 
1977, Australian capital showed a marked unwillingness to 
repatriate profits, with no more than 33% being sent abroad 
Table 10.16 Australian Investment and Profit Reinvestment 
in Fiji, 1969/70 - 1970/80 ($ Million) 
Net Inves tmen t 
Total Direct Undistributed Income Payable Income Paid 
Year Investment Profits (A/B) % Overseas Overseas 
( A ) ( B ) ( C ) ( D ) 
1969/70 2 1 50% n.a. n.a. 
1970/71 3 1 33% n.a. n.a. 
1971/72 5 2 40% n.a. n.a. 
1972/73 - 16 2 indo n.a. n.a. 
1973/74 5 3 60% 4 1 
1974/75 2 2 100% 3 1 
1975/76 5 2 40% 4 2 
1976/77 9 7 78% 10 3 
1977 /78 8 2 25% 5 3 
1978/79 12 7 58% 9 2 
1979/80 11 5 45% 6 1 
Source: Carstairs and Prasad, Impact of Foreign Direct Private Investment , p. 48. 
Notes: indo : indetermina te 
n.a. : not available 
(C/D) % 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
25% 
33% 
50% 
32% 
60% 
22% 
17% 
w 
U1 
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in anyone year. See Table 10.16 above. Note also, and 
this is indicative of its success, that the level of profit-
ability remained consistently high throughout the recession 
of the seventies. Rather, therefore, than having decreased, 
the level of foreign control in the Fiji economy has, at 
least, remained at its previously high level. 
One final criticism can be made of the Carstairs and 
Prasad study, and it is that their definition of foreign 
control is open to serious question. By limiting it largely 
to legal ownership, they fail adequately to take into 
account other mechanisms of control - indirect forms of 
ownership, managerial control, transfer pricing, technolog-
ical dependence, patents, licences, and so on. Taylor takes 
up some of these issues in his critique of the study 20 and 
he argues very forcefully that the authors have seriously 
underestimated the extent of foreign control in Fiji. The 
evidence presented here lends support to his argument. It 
is clear, therefore, that what exists in Fiji is an economy 
dominated and distorted by foreign capital. 21 
Having considered the external orientation of the 
neocolonial economy, attention now turns to its internal 
characteristics. 
4. THE GROWTH OF THE TOURIST INDUSTRY 
The single most important feature of the neocolonial 
economy is of course the dramatic growth of the tourist 
industry. 22 Although the agricultural sector continued to 
be the backbone of the economy, its contribution to GDP 
declined relatively during the neocolonial period. 
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Table 10.17 Sectoral Composition of GDP, 1963 - 1980 ( % ) 
1963 1968 1973 1978 1980 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 41 26 21 23 23 
Manufacturing 12 15 10 12 12 
Distribution (includes Tourism) 10 13 23 18 17 
Building and Construction 5 5 6 7 9 
Transport and Communication 7 5 8 9 10 
Finance and Insurance 8 12 14 13 12 
Government and Other Services 14 21 15 17 16 
Mining and Quarrying 2 2 1 1 1 
Electricity, Gas, Water 1 1 2 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Sources: Annual Statistical Abstract 1969, p. 137, and 1970-1970, p.7; 
Current Economic Statistics Feb. 1975, p. 4, Feb. 1980, p. 8, 
and January 1984, p. 8. 
As shown in the above table, agriculture's share of 
GDP fell from 41% to 23% between 1963 and 1980. In contrast, 
the distribution sector, which includes tourism, increased 
its share from 10% to 17% over the same period, reaching a 
peak of 23% in 1973. The effect of the tourist industry on 
the wider economy is suggested by the growth in related 
sectors. The financial sector, for example, increased its 
share of GDP from 8% to 12%. Similarly, transport and 
communication increased from 7% to 10%; and building and 
construction from 5% to 9%. Further evidence of the growth 
in the building industry is provided in the table below 
which shows that from a mere $4.3 million in 1962, the value 
of building permits almost trebled to $12.5 million in 1969, 
and by 1978 it stood at $48.5 million. 
Table 10.18 Private Building Activity: Value of 
Building Permits Issued 1962 - 1978 
($ Million) 
1962 4.3 
1965 9.1 
1969 12.5 
1973 29.9 
1975 26.2 
1976 21.4 
1978 48.5 
Sources: Current Economic Statistics January 1975, 
p. 90; February 1980, p. 79; January 
1984, p. 78. 
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The importance of tourism is demonstrated most clearly, 
however, by the way in which it quickly came to rival sugar 
as the country's main earner of foreign exchange. See Table 
10.19 below. Compared with an average of 8% in the first 
half of the 1960s, tourism's share of total foreign earnings 
leapt to an average of over 20% by the end of the decade. 
Sugar's share correspondingly fell from about 60% to an aver-
age of 45%. During the 1970s, the percentage difference 
narrowed even more and, in fact, four times in that decade, 
tourist receipts exceeded that of sugar - in 1971, 1973, 1976 
and 1978. The general trend, therefore, was that the 1960s 
saw a dramatic rise in tourist earnings. After reaching a 
peak in 1973, tourism's share of total foreign earnings 
dropped suddenly as the cost of international travel escal-
ated following the increase in oil prices. Nevertheless, 
throughout the remainder of the decade, tourism continued to 
provide about 30% of all foreign exchange earnings. And with 
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Table 10.19 Gross Foreign Exchange Earnings from Sugar 
and Tourism, 1963 - 1980. 
Total: All Exports 
Plus Tourism Sugar as % Tourism as % % Difference 
Year ($ Million) of Total of Total Sugar - Tourism 
1963 47.9 60.1 7.5 + 52.6 
1964 57.2 62.2 8.7 + 53.5 
1965 49.9 50.1 14.8 + 35.3 
1966 47.5 45.7 17.9 + 27.8 
1967 53.9 44.1 20.8 + 23.3 
1968 64.4 38.6 23.8 + 24.8 
1969 73.8 38.0 27.9 + 20.1 
1970 86.5 36.7 28.1 + 8.6 
1971 94.9 34.5 34.8 - 0.3 
1972 102.9 33.3 32.0 + 1.3 
1973 122.8 27.9 40.0 - 12.1 
1974 184.4 36.3 32.9 + 3.4 
1975 211.2 44.8 32.7 + 12.1 
1976 198.5 34.1 38.3 - 4.2 
1977 244.3 38.3 32.7 + 6.6 
1978 252.5 33.0 34.1 - 0.9 
1979 317 .0 36.9 32.2 + 4.7 
1980 427.6 40.7 28.5 + 12.2 
Sources: Fiji Tourism and Migration Statistics 1979/80, p. 56; and 
Stephen G. Britton, Tourism in a Peripheral Capitalist 
Economy, p. 390. 
sugar's share pluIT@eting from highs of around 60% in the 
early '60s to an average of about 35% in the late '70s, the 
percentage difference between the two sectors narrowed pro-
gressively. From a 52% difference in 1963, the gap closed 
to 20% in 1969, and in the 1970s it hovered between 4% and 
6%, except for 1975 and 1980 when it stood at 12%. 
The importance of tourism as Fiji's second highest 
earner of foreign exchange needs, however, to be qualified. 
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with the exception of mining, it had in 1977, for example, 
a higher leakage factor than any of the other major economic 
sectors. 24 The major reason for that was its heavy depen-
dence on imported inputs, a factor which, as Britton put it, 
is largely due to the inflexible taste prefer-
ences of tourists (concerning the qualitative 
aspects of accommodation, food, transport, and 
shopping purchases), the high degree of foreign 
ownership in the industry, Fiji's poorly devel-
oped domestic productive structure that is 
incapable of meeting the standards of many 
required inputs, and the tourist shopping 
sector which has led to an extensive demand 
for imported consumer luxuries. 25 
The broad thrust of Britton's findings, then, is that 
although tourism has come to rank as the second most impor-
tant earner of foreign revenue, it has also imposed upon the 
neocolonial economy a heavy burden which comes from its 
considerable reliance on imports and also its high degree of 
foreign control. Some idea of that control is provided by 
the figures in the tables which follow. 
Table 10.20 below shows that although it constituted 
a mere 4.6% of all the enterprises in the tourist industry 
in 1977, foreign capital accounted for close to two-thirds of 
all tourism receipts. The extent of foreign domination is 
therefore very clear. As for local capital, those who fared 
the best were the Europeans. Representing a mere 5% of the 
total number of firms, they accounted for nearly 15% of 
total receipts. Little wonder, then, that tourism has come 
to be seen as "white-dominated", and that racial image is 
further underlined by the disproportionately low shares of 
total receipts which local non-whites had. Indian firms 
accounted for 39% of all firms but only 15% of total receipts, 
Table 10.20 Distribution of Tourism Receipts by Ownership, 1977 
No. of Enterprises % of Enterprises % of Total Receipts 
Local: European 42 5.1 14.5 
Indian 324 39.3 15.3 
Fijian 395 47.9 1.0 
Other 25 3.l 3.6 
786 95.4 34.4 
Foreign 38 4.6 65.6 
Total 824 100.0 100.0 
Source: Britton, Tourism in a Peripheral Capitalist Economy, pp. 443, 445. 
Total Receipts 
($ Million) 
10.5 
26.6 
0.8 
2.6 
40.5 
31.5 
72.0 
LV 
0'1 
W 
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and for Fijian enterprises, the corresponding figures were 
even worse - 47.9% and 1% respectively. Against that kind 
of picture, it is difficult to understand how the post-
colonial state's constant pleading for greater Fijian 
"participation" in tourism will produce much of a change. 
But that issue will be taken up at length in the next 
chapter. 
Table 10.21 Subsectoral Composition of 
Tourist Receipts, 1977 
$ Million % 
Accommodation 31. 7 44 
Tourist Shopping 25.1 35 
Travel and Tours 13.8 19 
Handicrafts 1.4 2 
Total 72.0 100 
Source: Britton, Tourism in a Peripheral 
Capitalist Economy, p. 445. 
Accommodation and tourist shopping, as Table 10.21 
above shows, generated most of the receipts from tourism. 
Between them they accounted for 79% of the total, while 
tourist travel and tours accounted for 19% and handicrafts 
2%. More importantly, however, it was in precisely the two 
largest .subsectors that foreign firms were most dominant. As 
an examination of Table 10.22 below reveals, they command 65% 
of the accommodation sector and 72% of tourist shopping 
receipts. But the table also provides further clues about 
the racial character of economic participation in the tourist 
industry. 
Table 10.22 Distribution of Tourism Receipts by Ownership and Subsector, 1977 ( % ) 
Subsector 
Accommodation Tourist Shopping Travel and Tours 
Ent. Rec. Ent. Rec. Ent. Rec. 
Local: European 30 16 3 2 36 35 
Indian 27 11 92 26 13 2.5 
Fijian 5 15 0.5 
Other 7 7 1 5 1 
69 34 96 28 69 39 
Foreign 31 66 4 72 31 61 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Britton, Tourism in a peripheral Capitalist Economy, p. 445. 
Notes: Ent.: Enterprises 
Rec.: Gross Receipts 
Handicrafts 
Ent. Rec. 
1 11 
28 41 
68 44 
3 4 
100 100 
100 100 
LV 
0'1 
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In accommodation, the subsector which generated the 
most money, whites (foreign firms and local European ones) 
were clearly dominant, accounting for 61% of gross receipts. 
In the next largest subsector~ tourist shopping, again they 
were dominant, accounting for 74% of all receipts. By way 
of contrast, Indian firms, which made up 92% of all firms in 
the tourist shopping sector, accounted for only 26% of gross 
receipts in that sector. A similar pattern existed in 
tourist travel and tours, but it is in the handicrafts sector 
that racial disadvantages are most pronounced. By far the 
largest racial group there were the Fijians who made up 68% 
of the total, followed by the Indians who made up 28%. 
Between them, they accounted for 85% of all handicraft sales 
but as a proportion of total tourism receipts, those sales 
represented a mere 2%. So again, the evidence strongly 
supports the picture of a white-controlled tourist industry 
dominated by foreign capital. 
In sum, then, the dramatic growth of a white-domin-
ated, foreign-controlled tourist industry stands as the hall-
mark of neocolonial Fiji, and as we turn now to consider 
changes in the pattern of employment, the nature of its 
impact on the wider economy will become more evident. 
5. THE PATTERN OF EMPLOYMENT 
In 1980, the population of Fiji stood at about 639,000 
and its racial composition remained largely what it was at 
the end of the 1950s. The only significant change was that 
the Indian proportion decreased by 1% while Fijians increased 
their share by the same percentage. Indians, however, 
Table 10.23 Population of Fiji 1966 - 1980 (' OOOs) 
Year Fijian Indian European Part-European Chinese 
1956 148 43% 169 49% 6 2% 8 2% 4 1% 
1966 202 42% 241 51% 7 2% 10 2% 5 1% 
1971 231 43% 270 51% 6 1% 9 2% 5 1% 
1976 260 44% 293 50% 5 1% 10 2% 5 1% 
1980 284 44% 321 50% 4 1% 11 2% 5 1% 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, January 1973, p. 4, and January 1984, p. 
Others 
10 3% 
12 3% 
12 2% 
15 2% 
14 2% 
3 
Total 
345 
477 
533 
588 
639 
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